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Abstract: In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (Pessoa 2013), I describe the many ways that emotion and cognition interact and are
integrated in the brain. The book summarizes ﬁve areas of research that support this integrative view and makes four arguments to
organize each area. (1) Based on rodent and human data, I propose that the amygdala’s functions go beyond emotion as traditionally
conceived. Furthermore, the processing of emotion-laden information is capacity limited, thus not independent of attention and
awareness. (2) Cognitive-emotional interactions in the human prefrontal cortex (PFC) assume diverse forms and are not limited to
mutual suppression. Particularly, the lateral PFC is a focal point for cognitive-emotional interactions. (3) Interactions between
motivation and cognition can be seen across a range of perceptual and cognitive tasks. Motivation shapes behavior in speciﬁc ways –
for example, by reducing response conﬂict or via selective effects on working memory. Traditional accounts, by contrast, typically
describe motivation as a global activation independent of particular control demands. (4) Perception and cognition are directly
inﬂuenced by information with affective or motivational content in powerful ways. A dual competition model outlines a framework
for such interactions at the perceptual and executive levels. A speciﬁc neural architecture is proposed that embeds emotional and
motivational signals into perception and cognition through multiple channels. (5) A network perspective should supplant the strategy
of understanding the brain in terms of individual regions. More broadly, in a network view of brain architecture, “emotion” and
“cognition” may be used as labels of certain behaviors, but will not map cleanly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain.
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1. Introduction
In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (Pessoa 2013), I
describe how emotion and cognition interact and are inte-
grated in the brain. I believe that brain research has been
ill-served by the dichotomization of large concepts like cog-
nition and emotion. Further, strict a priori deﬁnitions of
these concepts fuel dichotomization. We need a vocabulary
that views concepts as complementary pairs that mutually
deﬁne each other and, critically, do not exclude each
other. As in the book, I will not deﬁne here terms such as
emotion, motivation, and cognition; they will be used de-
scriptively to refer to paradigms, task conditions, or “pro-
cesses” that are closer to the traditional intended
meanings of these terms. The book is aimed at students
and investigators interested in the brain basis of emotion,
especially those interested in understanding how percep-
tion and cognition reﬂect and embed affective/motivational
signiﬁcance. The book integrates ﬁndings from nonhuman
animal research and human imaging research, the latter
being the area my research focuses on.
The structure of this précis is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
reviews issues covered in chapters 2–4 of the book, which
propose how to conceptualize amygdala function in
broader terms than typically adopted in the ﬁeld, and
argue against the notion of the “automaticity of emotion.”
Sections 3–6 focus on chapters 5–7 of the book, which
describe how cognitive-emotional/motivational interactions
and integration take place in the brain. Section 7 addresses
the general issue of structure-function mapping in the
brain. There, I argue for a “network” view of brain function
but also describe several problems with this view that are
underappreciated in the literature. Potential tools to char-
acterize complex structure-function mappings are de-
scribed. Finally, in Section 8, I draw some conclusions of
the network perspective to the understanding of emotion
and the brain.
2. Amygdala and the automaticity of emotion
2.1. Amygdala
Chapter 2 discusses the ever-important amygdala and its
role in brain function. Based on rodent and human data,
I describe how the amygdala’s functions go beyond
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emotion as traditionally conceived, reﬂecting a trend
toward viewing this structure not simply in terms of “fear.”
A key function of the amygdala is to shape selective infor-
mation processing. Selection of information for further
analysis is, of course, a central problem that needs to be
solved for effective behavior (Grossberg & Levine 1987).
The amygdala is a core structure in a system involved in
“What is it?” processing and thus contributes to highlight-
ing what is of signiﬁcance to the organism (Pribram &
McGuinness 1975). However, the functions of the amygda-
la also involve “What’s to be done?” A key reason for this is
that the amygdala participates in the representation of
value (including positive value) and in decision making.
For example, amygdala lesions impair behavior on the
Iowa Gambling Task in humans and alter delay-based deci-
sion making in rats (e.g., they become more impulsive).
The amygdala thus takes part in an impressive array of
processes that far exceed some of its proposed functions,
such as vigilance, arousal, salience detection, novelty detec-
tion, and relevance detection. “Information gathering”
(Whalen 1998) better captures several of its functions but
comes short, too. In the end, it is better simply to refrain
from overly summarizing its functional repertoire so as to
better appreciate the wide scope of the amygdala’s contri-
butions to brain mechanisms and behavior.
2.2. Subcortical “low road” pathway and emotional
processing
A purported division of labor between cortical and subcort-
ical regions has been present from the time of the earliest
circuit models of emotion (e.g., Papez 1937). Many versions
of this type of dual processing model exist, including some
variants that have captured the popular imagination, such
as the “triune brain” (MacLean 1970; 1990).
In the case of vision, it has been suggested that a subcort-
ical pathway from the retina to superior colliculus to pulvi-
nar to amygdala that entirely bypasses cortex enables the
processing of emotion-laden visual stimuli to be fast, auto-
matic, and nonconscious. In chapter 3, I argue against this
notion on several general grounds: (1) Affective visual in-
formation is not handled qualitatively faster than other
visual information; (2) processing of affective visual
stimuli involves both low- and high-spatial frequency infor-
mation; and (3) the amygdala is not required for rapid, non-
conscious detection of affective information. For these and
many other reasons, Ralph Adolphs and I proposed the
“multiple waves” model as an alternative to the low-road
pathway scheme (Pessoa & Adolphs 2010). The model
shifts the debate away from whether there is a unique sub-
cortical pathway to whether a processing architecture exists
that is capable of rapidly transmitting information via mul-
tiple pathways. The resulting multiple waves model empha-
sizes the role of the pulvinar in coordinating and regulating
the ﬂow of multimodal information, which is accomplished
via a series of thalamo-cortical loops. In this role, the pulvi-
nar moves from being a passive relay station of the “stan-
dard hypothesis” to being an active element of
information processing.
2.3. What kind of unawareness matters?
The research literature is replete with paradigms such as
backward masking and the attentional blink that challenge
the visual system so that awareness can be studied. At
times, much is made about neuroimaging responses ob-
served in the amygdala for very brief stimuli (e.g., 15–30
ms). In such cases, subjects may report not seeing them
(“subjective unawareness”). In the book, I argue that this
type of “subliminal” unawareness is not the most relevant
one to understand the impact of affective content on
behavior and on clinical conditions such as anxiety. A
more important sense is associated with the idea of unin-
tentional processing, which may prove to be more impor-
tant to the understanding of human behavior. Whether
the unintentional unconscious is sophisticated and ﬂexible,
as argued by social psychologists (see Bargh & Morsella
2008), is a matter of debate. But there can be no doubt
that it is qualitatively different from the type of subliminal
unconscious sometimes emphasized in the emotion litera-
ture (for evidence that the “subliminal unconscious” may
be quite “dumb,” see Loftus & Klinger 1992 – if at all
present; Pessoa 2005).
2.4. Why is the amygdala important?
In the broader neuroscience literature, the amygdala is
viewed as a central node in emotional processing in part
because of the “low-level” properties ascribed to the sub-
cortical pathway. Defects in the amygdala system are said
to underlie phobias, mood disorders, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome, and variability in its functioning to
reﬂect individual differences at the genotypic and personal-
ity level.
Although in chapter 3 I challenge many of the properties
typically ascribed to the subcortical pathway, the amygdala
is indeed important for behavior and mental health.
First, together with the hypothalamus and medial PFC,
the amygdala has extensive projections to downstream
regions in the brainstem that are capable of mobilizing
the body; indeed, its central nucleus is at times described
as a “controller of the brainstem.” The autonomic and neu-
roendocrine connections of these brain regions are part of
sympathetic and parasympathetic networks that coordinate
bodily responses in the face of challenges to the organism.
Second, the amygdala, hypothalamus, medial PFC, and
related regions, being among the most extensively connect-
ed parts of the brain, are optimally positioned to inﬂuence
information processing. As hubs through which evaluative
signals are communicated, they are thought to have wide-
spread effects on mental function and to play a signiﬁcant
role in affective and cognitive impairments observed in
mood disorders. Metaphorically speaking, as one of these
hubs, the amygdala is strategically positioned to “ignite”
both body and brain.
2.5. Processing of emotion-laden information and
automaticity
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977, pp. 155–156) deﬁned an “au-
tomatic process … as a sequence of nodes that nearly
always becomes active in response to a particular input con-
ﬁguration.” Because automatic and controlled processes
appear to be qualitatively opposed, it is natural to dichoto-
mize mental phenomena into these two classes. But such a
dichotomy has simply not held up in the face of data.
Reports of automaticity have invariably been countered
by reports of capacity limitation; behavioral effects
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assumed to operate automatically are inﬂuenced in ways
that belie that assumption.
The argument that I make in chapter 3 is that a better
framework is one where performance is always considered
capacity limited and described as a performance-resource
function (Norman & Bobrow 1975). Some behaviors will
exhibit shallower performance-resource relationships,
where performance only rises slowly based on the mental
effort exerted – these behaviors are hence “controlled.”
Other behaviors exhibit steeper relationships, and ceiling
performance is reached even when conditions are degraded
(e.g., under short exposure) – these behaviors are hence
“efﬁcient.” Although the performance-resource function
may seem to be an abstract construct when little is known
about the task at hand, it forces researchers to consider a
spectrum of scenarios when studying how a behavior
depends on multiple factors that inﬂuence performance.
Why is a continuous framework better than a dichoto-
mous one? For one thing, it ﬁts the empirical data better:
Researchers have repeatedly found capacity limitations
for “automatic” phenomena (e.g., Pashler 1998). For
another, the dichotomous framework is plagued by
serious conceptual issues (Moors & De Houwer 2006).
Another reason a continuous framework is better is that
we still have an incipient understanding of competition –
and, hence, of whether interference will result when mul-
tiple items are involved. The notion of competition, as
accepted by most researchers, goes roughly as follows.
Because processing capacity is limited, competition is pro-
posed to “select” the most relevant information at any given
time (Desimone & Duncan 1995; Grossberg 1980); when
resources are not fully consumed, spare capacity is used
to process task-irrelevant items (Lavie 1995). The
problem is that we do not always know whether interfer-
ence will occur in any given situation. Generally, multiple
factors determine how information competes in visual
cortex and beyond, including task difﬁculty, set size,
spatial arrangement, cuing, and the like. Finally, a continu-
ous framework demystiﬁes the processing of certain
complex features. For example, processes such as reading
and the perception of elaborate emotional images are at
times depicted as “automatic” in a sense that is almost
magical (for a cogent in-depth discussion, see Pourtois
et al. 2012). Indeed, the underlying mechanisms of abilities
such as proﬁcient reading and the perception of emotional
scenes are remarkably fast. That we do not understand why
they are so fast, however, simply means that we are still
quite some way from a better mechanistic description of
these processes.
2.6. Dual process models
The discussion of automatic versus controlled processes is
also pertinent to dual process models. Common to these
models is the strong assumption of the existence of two
qualitatively different mental systems, for example, “intui-
tion” and “reasoning” (see Keren and Schul 2009). A
popular trend is to call the two components “system 1”
and “system 2,” where the ﬁrst is automatic/heuristic/reﬂex-
ive and the second is controlled/analytic/reﬂective (Evans
2008). But as others have expressed in the past, the idea
of a dual system model is both slippery and conceptually
unclear (see Keren & Schul 2009). For one, nearly all
dual process models have as a central component the
automatic versus controlled dichotomy, which as discussed
above is not a viable distinction. In fact, as with the question
of automatic versus controlled processing of emotion-laden
stimuli, the question of whether there are two systems in
dual process models is not an entirely empirical one. This
is because no single critical experiment can provide a
ﬁnal, deﬁnitive answer. In the end, however irresistible di-
chotomies are to the human mind (Kelso & Engstrøm
2006; Newell 1973), dichotomizing implies oversimplifying
(Keren & Schul 2009; Kruglanski et al. 2006). A continuous
framework is better, albeit more complex (Kruglanski et al.
2006).
3. Diverse forms of cognitive-emotional
interactions are not limited to mutual suppression
Nauta (1971, p. 182) suggested that the PFC could be con-
sidered “the major – though not the only – neocortical rep-
resentative of the limbic system.” Yet, most proposals in the
literature portray the PFC’s core function as cognitive, or
compartmentalize it into cognitive and affective regions
(see Bush et al. 2000). In particular, the lateral PFC is
still viewed as a quintessential cognitive region, especially
the portion that is loosely referred to as the “dorsal-
lateral PFC.” This section reviews human studies that
have investigated cognitive and emotional processing in
the human PFC (see also Dolcos et al. 2011) to explore
how emotion and cognition, domains traditionally thought
of as mutually antagonistic, interact there. The section
does not discuss the part of the PFC called the orbitofrontal
cortex, whose contributions to emotion are well accepted
(Zald & Rauch 2007). In the ensuing discussion, it is
useful to consider the regions outlined in Figure 1.
3.1. The “Classical” view: Emotion-cognition push-pull
In an important paper, Drevets and Raichle (1998) noted
that regional blood ﬂow during attentionally demanding
cognitive tasks decreased in regions such as the amygdala,
orbitofrontal cortex, and ventral-medial PFC, whereas
blood ﬂow increased in these regions during speciﬁc
emotion-related tasks. Conversely, blood ﬂow during ex-
perimentally induced and pathological emotional states
(Mayberg et al. 1999) decreased in regions such as the
dorsal-medial and dorsal-lateral PFC, whereas blood ﬂow
increased in these regions during cognitive tasks. These re-
ciprocal patterns of activation suggested to Drevets &
Raichle (1998) that emotion and cognition engage in com-
petitive interactions.
This insight led to a wealth of studies pursuing the notion
of a dorsal-cognition versus ventral-emotion axis of organi-
zation in the human brain. For example, Dolcos and col-
leagues investigated emotional distraction during working
memory tasks (see also Anticevic & colleagues 2010). Sub-
jects were shown sample stimuli that had to be remem-
bered during a subsequent delay period during which
they saw distracting stimuli, including neutral and emotion-
al pictures. The ﬁndings of one of their studies (Dolcos &
McCarthy 2006) are illustrated in Figure 2. During the
delay period, responses in dorsal-lateral PFC (Fig. 2B)
were highest for the “scrambled” (digitally scrambled ver-
sions of pictures), intermediate for neutral, and lowest for
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emotional distractors – a pattern of responses also observed
in parietal cortex. Behavioral performance mirrored this
and was worst for emotional distractors. Viewing emotional
distractors during the delay period appeared to interfere
with neural activity normally observed in these sites – activ-
ity that supports working memory performance (e.g.,
Pessoa et al. 2002). Responses in the ventral-lateral PFC
(Fig. 2C) followed the opposite pattern, namely, the stron-
gest responses were observed during the viewing of emo-
tional distractors, suggesting that ventral-lateral PFC
contributed to inhibiting the distracting effects of stimuli
presented during the delay period. Overall, several
studies are consistent with the dorsal-cognition versus
ventral-emotion segregation (both along the lateral
surface of the brain and its medial sector), including
those probing emotional distraction, emotional conﬂict,
and emotion regulation (Ch. 5).
The organization of the medial PFC, a complex brain
region involved in diverse functions (Vogt 2008), has
strongly fueled the dorsal versus ventral view of emotion
and cognition organization in the brain, particularly follow-
ing another inﬂuential paper (Bush et al. 2000; see also
Devinsky et al. 1995). In the next section, I argue against
the dorsal versus ventral framework in the medial PFC in
particular, and in the subsequent section against the
dorsal versus ventral view in the PFC more generally.
3.2. Beyond the dorsal versus ventral-medial dichotomy
in the prefrontal cortex
Results from several individual studies challenge the
dichotomy. For example, Mobbs and colleagues (2010) ex-
amined how brain responses vary as a function of perceived
threat proximity. In an unusual experimental manipulation,
each participant inside the MRI scanner placed a foot into a
custom-built box containing multiple compartments, while
watching a video of a live tarantula placed into one of the
compartments at varying distances from the foot (actually
prerecorded). Increases in responses as a function of prox-
imity were observed in several brain regions; notably in the
dorsal-medial PFC.
The “attentional network” involves fronto-parietal
regions, including the dorsal-medial PFC (Corbetta &
Shulman 2002; Kastner & Ungerleider 2000). To assess
brain regions that are sensitive to high levels of threat, I re-
viewed activation sites reported in aversive conditioning
studies (Pessoa 2009). Surprisingly, activation was repeat-
edly reported not only in the amygdala but also in frontal
Figure 1. Frontal cortex anatomy. “Prefrontal cortex” refers to cortex “in front of motor areas,” typically anterior to Brodmann area
6. (A) Lateral surface of cortex, showing dorsal and ventral sectors. (B) Medial surface of cortex, outlined in black, showing
approximate locations of dorsal (d) and ventral (v) sectors. In the paper, dorsal parts of medial prefrontal cortex also include parts
posterior to the “d” arrow (such as presupplemantary and supplementary motor areas). S, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex.
Figure 2. Emotional distraction during a working memory task. Subjects were shown scrambled, negative, or neutral distractor images
during the delay period of the task. (A) Schematic representation of differential responses in brain. Regions where responses were
stronger to scrambled than to emotional images are shown in light gray; regions where they were stronger to emotional than to
scrambled images, in dark gray. (B) Time course data for dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex. (C) Time course data for ventral-lateral
prefrontal cortex. Horizontal bars in panels B and C correspond to onset and duration of sample stimuli, distractors, and probes,
respectively. Time series plots kindly provided by Florin Dolcos, adapted with permission from Dolcos and McCarthy (2006).
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sites overlapping with those in the attentional network, in-
cluding the dorsal-medial PFC – consistent with ﬁndings
from formal meta-analyses (Etkin & Wager 2007;
Mechias et al. 2010). To understand the organization of
the medial PFC and its role in emotion, Etkin and col-
leagues (2011) reviewed both the human and nonhuman
animal literatures. They surmise that sites in both dorsal-
and ventral-medial PFC make prominent contributions to
emotional processing. Finally, an extensive formal meta-
analysis of human neuroimaging studies (Shackman et al.
2011) further demonstrates the considerable overlap of
sites in the medial PFC engaged during negative affect
and cognitive control (Fig. 3).
In summary, although it is still inﬂuential, the segrega-
tion model of medial PFC organization is no longer
viable, as different research groups now argue (e.g., Etkin
et al. 2011; Pessoa 2009; Shackman et al. 2011). Large por-
tions of the PFC are engaged during emotional processing,
including both dorsal and ventral portions of the medial
PFC. Indeed, when large numbers of studies are consid-
ered jointly, the weight of their ﬁndings strongly favors
an organization of the medial PFC that is not segregated
into affective and cognitive compartments but instead is
shared by cognitive and affective domains in a way that
allows the medial PFC to support the adaptive control of
complex behaviors (Pessoa 2008; Shackman et al. 2011).
3.3. Beyond push-pull: When emotion and cognition work
together
Now, I will turn to the broader issue of the frequently held
view of emotion-cognition organized as push-pull, or antag-
onistic, systems. Consider once more the study by Dolcos
and McCarthy (2006) that showed that emotional distrac-
tors produced decreased responses in parts of the dorsal-
lateral PFC that are important for cognitive tasks. This
type of response, which favors the antagonistic organiza-
tion, is far from universal, however. For example, also
during conditions of emotional distraction, Erk et al.
(2007) observed increased responses to emotional stimuli
in the dorsal-lateral PFC. They also observed increased re-
sponses when they increased the load of a separate non-
emotional working memory task. In other words, both
the emotional and cognitive manipulations produced
enhanced responses in the dorsal-lateral PFC. Conversely,
emotional manipulations do not always generate decreased
responses in frontal-parietal areas that are recruited by ef-
fortful, cognitive tasks. For example, in one of our studies,
when subjects viewed a “threat cue” that signaled a poten-
tial upcoming shock, deactivation was observed in emotion-
related regions (Choi et al. 2012).
In all, cognitive-emotional interactions take diverse
forms that go beyond a straightforward antagonistic rela-
tionship (Ch. 5). Instead, I suggest that lateral PFC, in par-
ticular, is a convergence site for cognitive and emotional
signals where they are integrated.
3.3.1. The basic “direction” of brain responses and their
interpretation. As discussed above, a key question during
cognitive-emotional interactions is whether emotional in-
formation decreases or enhances a region’s responses
during cognitive tasks – to decide if the relationship is
push-pull. Unfortunately, the direction (increases vs. de-
creases) of brain responses does not uniquely determine
their functional signiﬁcance. Consider again the working
memory study by Dolcos and McCarthy (2006), which
showed decreased responses in dorsal-lateral PFC during
emotional distraction. More important, this condition was
linked with impaired task performance, matching the
pattern of an antagonistic cognitive-emotional interaction.
But how should we interpret these ﬁndings? Because it is
unknown whether increased responses reﬂect greater ca-
pacity to utilize the region, neural inefﬁciency, or increased
effort, the interpretation of the results is equivocal. The dif-
ﬁculty here is not about problems of interpreting functional
MRI responses given their indirect relationship with neuro-
nal activity. The same issues would arise with cell recordings,
because disentangling, say, neural efﬁciency, increased effort,
and so on, is again far from simple.
A potential strategy is to interpret response changes in
terms of behavior and brain responses during neutral
tasks. During working memory, we know that dorsal
frontal and parietal regions are important from both
monkey and human work. In these regions, response mag-
nitude even tracks performance on a trial-by-trial basis
(Pessoa et al. 2002). Thus, when emotional distractors
lead to decreased responses in dorsal-lateral PFC and im-
paired task performance (Anticevic et al. 2010; Dolcos &
Figure 3. Cognition and emotion in medial frontal cortex. Foci of activation across studies of negative affect and cognitive control.
Extensive overlap between emotion and cognition was observed in dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex. Figure kindly provided by Alex
Shackman and adapted with permission from Shackman et al. (2011).
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McCarthy 2006), it is possible to more strongly interpret
the ﬁndings in terms of underlying antagonistic interac-
tions. Although in this case the original interpretation
holds, the example underscores the need to ground the re-
sponses during emotional manipulations by building on
closer ties between a brain region’s responses and associat-
ed behavior during nonemotional tasks.
3.3.2. Anxiety, executive function, and prefrontal cortex
responses. A closely related issue arises in the context of
studies of brain responses in anxious individuals: Are cogni-
tive control areas in the PFC, including the dorsal-lateral
PFC, under- or overactivated in these individuals? This
question is relevant given the belief that anxiety is particu-
larly associated with reduced processing efﬁciency. Thus, to
maintain comparable levels of task performance, anxious
individuals must exert greater cognitive effort (Eysenck
et al. 2007), which is linked to increased responses in
brain regions involved with cognitive control.
But some studies have reported that anxiety is associated
with underactivation in cognitive control circuits (Bishop
2007; 2009; Bishop et al. 2004; see also Basten et al. 2011;
for additional discussion, see Eysenck & Derakshan 2011).
Examining under- or overutilization of a brain area,
however, does not lead to an unequivocal interpretation of
cognitive processing in anxious subjects, as argued by Fales
and colleagues (2008). This is because either reduced or en-
hanced neural recruitment may reﬂect differences in a host
of factors, including efﬁciency, motivation, effort, or the ca-
pacity to activate regions when needed. The difﬁculties sur-
rounding the issue of under- versus overactivation are
mirrored by those encountered in the human developmental
literature, where changes in the responses of a brain region
with age are hard to interpret (Somerville & Casey 2010).
The upshot of section 3 is as follows: The effects of
emotion on cognition, and vice versa, are best viewed not
as a simple push-pull mechanism, but as interactions that
result in processes and signals that are neither purely cog-
nitive nor emotional. Instead, their “cognitive” or “emo-
tional” nature is blurred in a way that highlights the
integration of these domains in the brain (Pessoa 2008).
4. Motivation: Interactions between motivation and
cognition
According to traditional psychological models, motivation
relies on a global, rather blunt energization factor to inﬂu-
ence the vigor and frequency of behavioral output, though
without speciﬁc effects (e.g., Duffy 1962; Hull 1943).
Current progress in understanding the mechanisms of
reward and motivation challenges this view, which has
renewed interest in motivational effects on perception
and cognition. Chapter 6 contains discussion of the selective
ways motivation affects task performance, some of which I
brieﬂy review here.
Jan Engelmann and I investigated the impact of changes in
incentive value on behavior during a difﬁcult spatial localiza-
tion task (Engelmann & Pessoa 2007). Participants per-
formed the task under conditions in which they could earn
extra monetary rewards, avoid losing money, or, during a
baseline condition, neither gain nor lose. In theory, motiva-
tion could lead to indiscriminate responding increasing the
number of both correct detections and false alarms.
Instead, detection performance improved as a function of ab-
solute incentive value (gains and losses produced similar
results) independent of unspeciﬁc inﬂuences, such as
general activation (e.g., purely faster response times) or re-
sponse bias (e.g., more conservative responses). We
observed increases in visual sensitivity (d-prime) in both en-
dogenous and exogenous attention tasks (see also Engelman
et al. 2009).
In an event-related potential (ERP) study, Hickey and
colleagues (2010) sought to dissociate “strategic” (such as
paying more attention) and “incidental” (such as undesired)
effects of reward. To that end, they probed how reward in
one trial affected visual processing in the next. Following a
high-reward trial, the P1 ERP response component, which
occurs approximately 100 ms after stimulus onset, was
found to be stronger contralateral to targets of the same
(task-irrelevant) color rewarded on the previous trial, re-
vealing facilitated responses based on previous-trial
reward. So-called N2pc responses were found to be stron-
ger as well, indicating that target processing was enhanced.
Notably, P1 and N2pc effects were observed on trials fol-
lowing high reward when a salient distractor was shown
in the reward-paired color, showing that reward has an
impact that can be independent of its role in establishing
goal-driven attention (e.g., when a subject deliberately in-
creases attention in anticipation of reward). In a related
monkey cell-recording study, Peck and colleagues (2009)
showed that cues signaling reward biased attention in a
value-speciﬁc fashion, even though they were “maladap-
tive” (they interfered with the required behavior). They
proposed that posterior parietal cortex in the monkey con-
tains a visuospatial map – a salience map – that takes into
account reward expectations when guiding attention.
Does motivation inﬂuence the selection of information?
To answer this question, Srikanth Padmala and I investigated
the effects of reward during a response-conﬂict task (Fig. 4)
Figure 4. Response-conﬂict paradigm. In the reward condition
shown here, a cue stimulus (“$20”) signaled that subjects would
be rewarded for fast and correct performance; in the control
condition (not shown here), a cue stimulus (“$00”) signaled that
there would be no reward. During the target phase, a stimulus
picture of a house or building was presented together with a
task-irrelevant word (an incongruent condition is illustrated
here). After the target stimulus, subjects were informed about
the reward and about the total number of points accrued.
Reproduced with permission from Padmala and Pessoa (2011).
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(Padmala & Pessoa 2011). Based on previous studies, we an-
ticipated that motivation would enhance engagement of
fronto-parietal attentional regions and, consequently, that
these regions would be better positioned to exert goal-direct-
ed control inﬂuencing visual processing (Fig. 5). Behavior-
ally, we observed response interference: Performance was
slower on incongruent trials than on neutral ones. But
reward reduced response interference. Given that reward
also decreased response facilitation (i.e., the beneﬁcial
effect of a congruent task-irrelevant item), the results sup-
ported the inference that motivation enhanced attentional
ﬁltering, thereby reducing the inﬂuence of the task-irrele-
vant word item. Our brain imaging results revealed that,
during the cue phase when subjects were told whether a
reward was possible, responses in fronto-parietal regions
were stronger with reward – consistent with increased
attention. Notably, larger cue-related responses were associ-
ated with larger decreases in interference-related responses
in the dorsal-medial PFC during the subsequent task
phase. This suggested that upregulation of control during
the cue phase led to decreased interference during the
task phase.
We also observed responses to the cue in several subcort-
ical sites that are engaged during reward-related processing,
including the caudate and putamen in the dorsal striatum,
nucleus accumbens in the ventral striatum, and midbrain.
We reasoned that, if motivationally salient cues engage
fronto-parietal regions more robustly during the cue
phase, these regions should exhibit increased “coupling”
with some of the above regions, which are sensitive to the
motivational signiﬁcance of the cues (Fig. 6A). Indeed, in
the reward condition, we observed increased trial-by-trial
functional connectivity between the intraparietal sulcus in
parietal cortex and the putamen, caudate, and nucleus
accumbens (Fig. 6B; see also Harsay et al. 2011). More in-
teresting, the strength of the differential coupling (reward
minus nonreward) between cortical and subcortical areas
was linearly related to individual differences in reward sen-
sitivity, showing that the functional interaction between
these regions was stronger for subjects who scored higher
in this dimension. See also Krebs et al. (2010; 2011).
Interactions between motivation and working memory
have been the target of several neuroimaging studies
(e.g., Beck et al. 2010; Gilbert & Fiez 2004; Jimura et al.
2010; Pochon et al. 2002; Taylor et al. 2004). In the study
by Jimura and colleagues (2010), reward did not simply in-
crease activation; it also shifted the timing of working
memory responses (an effect that correlated with individual
differences in reward sensitivity). They suggested that, in
the reward condition, subjects may have adopted a more
proactive control strategy to aid performance instead of a
just-in-time reactive strategy – and thus increase their
chance of reward (Braver 2012; Braver et al. 2007). Inter-
actions between motivation and working memory have
been studied in monkey cell-physiology studies, too. Not
only do cells in the lateral PFC hold information of an
object’s shape and location, but they are also modulated
by reward expectancy (Watanabe 1990; 1996; see also
Leon & Shadlen 1999). In fact, studies demonstrate that
cognition and motivation signals are integrated. For
example, during the delay period of a delayed–eye
saccade task, some lateral prefrontal cells increased their
ﬁring if the monkey was initially cued to make a saccade
to the preferred versus the opposite direction; these cells
also exhibited increased ﬁring during rewarded versus un-
rewarded trials (Kobayashi et al. 2002). Importantly,
during rewarded trials of saccades to the preferred direc-
tion, there was an increase of the amount of transmitted in-
formation with respect to target position, as quantiﬁed by
information theory; reward information increased the dis-
criminability of target positions, leading to enhanced per-
formance (see also Kobayashi et al. 2007).
4.1. Energizing force versus selective effects
Traditional accounts describing motivation as a global activa-
tion independent of particular control demands have been
echoed by a functional MRI study in which Kouneiher and
colleagues (2009) argue that motivation and cognitive
control can be regarded as two separate and additive –
instead of interactive – factors. Although there is little ques-
tion that motivation can have generalized, activating contri-
butions to behavior (see Robbins & Everitt 2007; Salamone
et al. 2009), current ﬁndings (Ch. 6) underscore the ability
ofmotivation to shapebehavior selectively, whether by reduc-
ing response conﬂict or task-switch costs, via selective effects
onworkingmemory, or by improving long-termmemory (for
the latter, see thework ofAdcock and colleagues; e.g., Adcock
et al. 2006). Another body of research demonstrating selec-
tive effects of motivation has investigated attentional effort,
as described by Sarter and colleagues (e.g., Sarter et al. 2006).
5. Dual competition model
Here, I describe a framework in which both emotional and
motivational signals are integrated with perception and
cognition so as to effectively incorporate value into the
Figure 5. Hypothesized network interactions. (A) Predicted
mediation by target/distractor processing in visual cortex of the
relationship between attentional control implemented in fronto-
parietal cortex during the cue phase and conﬂict-related activity
in medial prefrontal cortex during the subsequent target phase
(see white arrow). (B) Predicted effect of motivational context
on functional interactions between fronto-parietal cortex and
subcortical regions involved in reward processing. Reproduced
with permission from Padmala and Pessoa (2011).
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unfolding of behavior (Pessoa 2009; Pessoa & Engelmann
2010). To reﬂect the central idea that both emotion and
motivation inﬂuence competition at both the perceptual
and the executive levels, the framework is termed the
dual competition model (thus “dual” spans both “emotion
and motivation” and “perceptual and executive”). Follow-
ing general remarks in the next paragraph, I will describe
how the framework applies to emotion (sect. 5.1, focusing
on emotion-laden negative stimuli) and then motivation
(sect. 5.2, focusing on task manipulations involving reward).
Competition for neural resources exists in the sensory
cortex (Grossberg 1980). To understand the ﬂow of infor-
mation processing more generally, we need to go beyond
perceptual competition and explicitly incorporate the role
of executive control. Behavioral research indicates that ex-
ecutive control is not unitary and that different functions
have their own limited processing capacities, or resources.
Neuropsychological research also supports the dissociation
of cognitive operations, consistent with the “fractionation”
of the central executive (Norman & Shallice 1986; Stuss
& Knight 2002). Yet ample evidence also suggests at least
some unity of executive functions – certain mechanisms
are shared across functions (Duncan et al. 1996; Miyake
et al. 2000). Capacity sharing has implications for informa-
tion processing because it implies executive competition:
Subcomponents of executive control are mutually interact-
ing, such that multiple functions cannot be independently
executed simultaneously. This competition can be cast in
terms of resources. Accordingly, even though some execu-
tive processes rely on partly independent mechanisms, they
share a common pool of resources. Therefore, when a given
function is needed, resources devoted to one operation will
not be available for other operations, and behavioral inter-
ference will ensue.
5.1. Emotion
5.1.1. Perceptual competition. How does affective signiﬁ-
cance inﬂuence visual processing? Researchers have de-
scribed a projection system emanating from the amygdala
that reaches nearly all levels of the ventral visual system. Al-
though this system is often highlighted as the sole modula-
tory mechanism for visual processing, I propose that at least
ﬁve other mechanisms need to be investigated as well.
These mechanisms, which include both cortical and sub-
cortical structures, involve network interactions that
sculpt how visual signals evolve in response to the behavio-
ral and affective signiﬁcance of sensory stimuli.
One mechanism through which emotion may affect per-
ception involves other valuation regions, most notably orbi-
tofrontal cortex (Barrett & Bar 2009) and possibly the
insula. The orbitofrontal cortex is important for the evalu-
ation of sensory stimuli (Zald & Rauch 2007) and is recip-
rocally interconnected with visual cortex, especially the
more anterior portions of the ventral stream (Barbas
1995; Cavada et al. 2000; Rempel-Clower & Barbas 2000;
Saleem et al. 2008). This region is thus capable of inﬂuenc-
ing responses in visual cortex based on affective value. A
second mechanism involves the basal forebrain, whose ter-
minals inﬂuence visual processing through the release of
Figure 6. Functional connectivity during reward trials. (A) Regions exhibiting stronger functional connectivity with the right
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) during the cue phase for reward trials. (B) Scatter plot showing the trial-by-trial relationship between right
IPS and right nucleus accumbens (NAcc) signals during reward (black dots and line) and no-reward (gray dots and line) trials. Data
are illustrated for a sample subject. (A-B) Reproduced with permission from Padmala and Pessoa 2011. (C) The polar plot shows
increases in functional connectivity of the right caudate with nearly all regions belonging to the “other” community. Line lengths
represent the relative strength of the functional connectivity between regions. Key: _L, left; _R, right; Caud, caudate; FEF, frontal
eye ﬁeld; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; aIns, anterior insula; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; PCG, precentral gyrus; MFG, middle frontal
gyrus; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area. (C) Reproduced with permission from Kinnison et al. (2012).
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acetylcholine. For example, cholinergic mechanisms affect
the competition between attended and unattended stimuli
(Furey et al. 2000; 2008). Several regions that participate in
the evaluation of incoming inputs project to the basal fore-
brain, which is then able to modify information processing
in visual cortex. Third, regions in lateral frontal cortex and
parietal cortex are suggested to modulate visual processing
according to an item’s affective signiﬁcance. In particular,
both the frontal eye ﬁeld and parietal cortex contain priority
maps (Fecteau & Munoz 2006; Serences & Yantis 2006).
To embed affective signiﬁcance into priority maps,
fronto-parietal regions work closely with regions such as
the hypothalamus, amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and ante-
rior insula, to prioritize processing based on the emotional
value of a sensory stimulus (note that anatomical connectiv-
ity will not be direct in some cases; see Ch. 9). A fourth
mechanism involves the pulvinar complex of the thalamus,
whose importance for affective processing is a result not of
its putative role as part of a subcortical pathway, but instead
of its connectivity with other cortical regions (Pessoa &
Adolphs 2010). I have proposed that the pulvinar ampliﬁes
responses to stimuli of potential value to the organism
during challenging sensory conditions (Padmala et al.
2010). A ﬁfth potential mechanism was recently reported
by Zikopoulos and Barbas (2012), who described a
pathway from the amygdala to the reticular nucleus of
the thalamus and suggested that the connection is impor-
tant for the capture of attention by emotion-laden
stimuli. I anticipate that additional mechanisms beyond
those described here will need to be considered, too.
5.2. Executive competition
Because emotion can either enhance or impair cognitive
performance, to see how emotional content impacts execu-
tive control, we must consider at least two factors: the
strength or arousal of the stimulus (or manipulation) and
task relevance (see also Mather & Sutherland 2011).
When arousal is “low” and affective signiﬁcance is task irrel-
evant, some interference with the main task may be ob-
served and the behavioral effect will be typically small.
When, however, arousal is “high” and the stimulus/manip-
ulation is task irrelevant, resources are more fully diverted
toward the processing of the emotional item and, because
the mobilization of resources is more pronounced, the
effects on behavior are greater (Lang et al. 2000; Panksepp
1998). For example, in our investigation of cognitive-emo-
tional interactions, Choi, Padmala, and I (2012) observed
that response conﬂict increased on trials with the possibility
of shock, suggesting that the impact of emotion on behavior
comes in part from the more vigorous recruitment of atten-
tional/effortful control required to prioritize the processing
of high-arousal items. Naturally, attentional/effortful control
involves executive control resources and, because situations
associated with high levels of arousal are expected to recruit
some of these resources (see also Bishop 2007; Eysenck
et al. 2007; Mathews & Mackinstosh 1998), interference
with executive functions will ensue (Fig. 7A). The impact
of emotion on performance thus occurs because of limited
processing capacity and competition for common-pool
resources.
What about the situation when the emotional stimulus is
task relevant? Here, two outcomes are possible. If the af-
fective intensity is “low,” task performance might improve
because control will be mobilized in the service of handling
the task at hand, and the executive functions needed for task
completion will more effectively compete for resources. In
all, task performance will be enhanced. If, however, the af-
fective intensity is sufﬁciently high, task performance might
be compromised. Thus, in a study of response inhibition, my
colleagues and I asked participants to perform a simple dis-
crimination task but to withhold responding when they saw
Figure 7. Executive control, competition, and processing resources. (A-C) Processes are proposed to share resources called “common-
pool resources” (smaller ellipses in gray), such that the engagement of one will detract from the processing of the other. Common-pool
resources are necessary for general functions of attentional/effortful control. (A) High-arousal emotional stimuli recruit common-pool
resources that allow their processing to be prioritized, thus detracting from other mechanisms sharing those resources. (B) These
stimuli also trigger executive functions, such as updating, shifting, and inhibition, to handle the challenges to the organism, as
indicated by the arrows emanating from attentional/effortful control. (C) Competition for resources during cognitive and emotional
manipulations can, at times, produce push-pull–like interactions. Reproduced with permission from Pessoa (2009).
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a stop signal (Pessoa et al. 2012). We found that, when we
used both fearful and happy faces as low-arousal stop
signals, response inhibition was enhanced relative to
neutral faces, but when we employed high-arousal emotion-
al stimuli (previously paired with mild shock) as stop signals,
response inhibition was impaired relative to neutral stimuli.
Thus, inhibition performance was degraded even though
emotional content was task relevant. We conjectured that
processing the emotional stimulus consumed resources
needed for inhibition.
5.3. Processing resources
Although the concept of resources invoked in accounts of
the limits of information processing has been criticized in
the past (e.g., Logan 1988; Navon 1984; Neisser 1976) and
has not been mechanistically speciﬁed, further insight into
it can be gained by examining brain regions sensitive to
changes in task load, including the attentional network.
Accordingly, researchers have probed attentional bottle-
necks observed during tasks such as the attentional blink
and the phenomenon known as the “psychological refrac-
tory period.” Based on these paradigms, Marois and
colleagues have proposed the existence of a “uniﬁed” at-
tentional bottleneck that involves several regions of the
fronto-parietal attentional network (Tombu et al. 2011).
If robust emotional manipulations indeed consume pro-
cessing resources, then they should engage sites implicat-
ed as “bottleneck areas.” As described in section3, a
compilation of activation peaks in aversive conditioning
functional MRI studies revealed sites throughout the
lateral and medial PFC, in addition to the anterior insula
(Pessoa 2009). Thus, attentional bottleneck regions are con-
sistently recruited during emotion processing. If this re-
cruitment prevents them from being adequately engaged
when neutral task-related processing is required, we
should expect to see behavioral impairments (see also
Bishop et al. 2004).
5.4. Triggering additional functions
A distinct impact of emotion is the result of its inﬂuence on
speciﬁc resources. Dealing with an emotional stimulus re-
quires the types of behavioral adjustments that characterize
executive functions. For example, to refresh the contents of
working memory, to switch the current task set, and to
cancel previously planned actions might require updating,
shifting, and inhibition, respectively. Such adjustments
recruit speciﬁc resources required for emotional processing
(Fig. 7B) and, if these resources are temporarily unavail-
able for the task at hand, behavioral performance will be
compromised – the more so, the stronger the emotional
manipulation (see below). An example may help to illus-
trate. Suppose a subject is performing a cognitive task
and a change in background color signals that she or he
will receive a shock sometime in the next 30 seconds.
The subject might update the contents of working
memory to include the “shock possible” information, shift
between the execution of the cognitive task and “monitor-
ing for shock” every few seconds, and, if another cue indi-
cated that the shock would be delivered in the next second,
inhibit a response to the cognitive task to prepare for the
shock. In other words, dealing with the emotional situation
necessitates the same types of executive functions that are
considered to be the hallmark of cognition.
5.5. Cognitive-emotional interactions versus push-pull
The dual competition framework suggests that brain
regions important for executive control are actively
engaged by emotion. In contrast, push-pull studies have
demonstrated reduced signals in some of these regions
when emotional stimuli are shown. Hence, the two frame-
works appear to make opposite predictions. The ﬁndings of
Anticevic and colleagues (2010) provide a potential clue as
to when we might expect antagonistic interactions.
Whereas, relative to neutral, negative distractors decreased
responses in the dorsal-lateral PFC during the delay period
of the working memory task, task-related distractors
(stimuli similar to items to be remembered) actually in-
creased responses, in much the way increases in working
memory demand would. What explains this difference?
Dealing with the negative stimuli during the delay period
produced a momentary “neglect” of the memory mainte-
nance (Anticevic et al. 2010). In contrast, because neutral
task-related distractors were so similar to the to-be-remem-
bered items, participants may in effect have also held them
in memory so as to avoid matching the ﬁnal probe stimulus
to a distractor. Consequently, the distractors may actually
have increased working memory load. I therefore suggest
that cognitive-emotional push-pull interactions are related
to a type of competition that directs processing away from
the concurrently executed main task, thereby producing de-
creased activation (in relative terms) in some of the key
frontal and parietal regions underlying the task at hand
(Fig. 7C). Which is to say, deactivations are the result of com-
petitive interactions between resources required for executive
functions. As such, they should be understood not in terms of
a mutually suppressive relationship between emotion and
cognition, but in terms of executive competition.
5.6. Neural interactions
Cognitive-emotional interactions rely on the communica-
tion between “task networks” (e.g., the attentional
network during attention tasks) and “valuation networks,”
which involve both subcortical regions, such as hypothala-
mus and amygdala, and cortical ones, such as orbitofrontal
cortex, anterior insula, and medial PFC. These interactions
are suggested to take place via multiple forms of communi-
cation (Fig. 8).
First, direct pathways connect task and valuation net-
works. One example is the pathway between orbitofrontal
and lateral PFC (Barbas & Pandya 1989). Other examples
are the pathways between the extensively interconnected
lateral surface of the PFC (including dorsal-lateral PFC)
and all cingulate regions (Morecraft & Tanji 2009). A
second type of communication relies on “hub” regions at
the intersection of task and valuation networks – hubs are
highly connected and central regions that play a key role
in information communication between different parts of
a network.
What are some of the hub regions? Dorsal-medial PFC
plays a prominent role as “common node” of executive
and emotional networks because of its participation in inte-
grating inputs from diverse sources, notably cognitive and
affective ones (e.g., Devinsky et al. 1995; Fig. 8). This
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region is involved in multiple executive functions, such as
conﬂict detection, error likelihood processing, and error
monitoring (Alexander & Brown 2011). As reviewed in
section3, the dorsal-medial PFC is also reliably engaged
during conditions involving negative affect (see Fig. 3), as
are all sectors of the anterior-medial PFC.
A second hub region, the anterior insula, is important for
interoception (Craig 2002; 2009). Moreover, threat, uncer-
tainty, and risk are all factors that engage the anterior
insula (Singer et al. 2009), which is also reliably recruited
by cognitive processes (Craig 2009; Van Snellenberg &
Wager 2010). Indeed, in a recent analysis of the functional
diversity of brain regions (see sect. 7.4 and Fig. 14), the an-
terior insula emerged as one of the most diverse in the brain
(Anderson et al. 2013; see also Uddin et al. 2013). In all, the
dorsal-medial PFC and anterior insula provide substrates for
ample cognitive-emotional integration that, in broad terms,
include both bodily “input” and “output” signals (roughly,
via anterior insula and dorsal-medial PFC, respectively). Of
course, these regions do not work in isolation. During cogni-
tive-emotional interactions, they interact with the lateral
PFC and parietal cortex, for example (Fig. 8).
A third type of communication depends on the diffuse
action of neuromodulatory systems, including the action
of dopamine and norepinephrine. Widespread modulatory
connections originating from these systems reach large
portions of the cortical surface and multiple subcortical
areas, from which they are able to rapidly inﬂuence brain
responses during emotional situations (Arnsten 2009;
Panksepp 1998).
6. Motivation
The framework of the dual competition model described
thus far for the case of negative emotion also describes
how motivation inﬂuences perceptual and executive com-
petition. This applies to situations in which individuals
work for a potential reward, as well as paradigms in
which an item acquires motivational signiﬁcance by being
paired with reward.
6.1. Perceptual competition
How does motivational signiﬁcance inﬂuence sensory pro-
cessing? Several of the circuits described in the context of
emotion operate in the case of motivation, too. Notably,
the interactions between valuation networks and fronto-
parietal regions important for attentional control are
engaged by both emotion and motivation. An illustration
of the latter was described in the response-conﬂict study re-
viewed previously (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). One of the differ-
ences between emotion and motivation is that at times the
interactions will involve different valuation regions, say, the
amygdala in the case of emotion and the accumbens in the
case of motivation. Yet, the general form of the interaction
is similar. Which is to say, items of affective/motivational
signiﬁcance will redirect the ﬂow of signals such that
their processing is favored. I further propose that mecha-
nisms involving the basal forebrain and the pulvinar
operate for both emotion and motivation. More generally,
despite the considerable differences between basal fore-
brain, pulvinar, and fronto-parietal mechanisms, each
shapes, say, visual perception by altering competition
in visual cortex. Thus, the idea is that their respective
pathways may be engaged both during emotional and mo-
tivational conditions. Once they are engaged, the down-
stream effects on visual processing (and elsewhere) may
be the same for both types of manipulation. A corollary
of this notion is that priority maps (Awh et al. 2012;
Baluch & Itti 2011; Fecteau & Munoz 2006; Serences &
Yantis 2006; Wolfe 1994) – containing representations of
Figure 8. Modes of interaction between cognitive and emotion/motivation networks. (1) Interactions rely on hub regions, such as those
in the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex, which are part of both attentional and motivational networks (hub region in the slice and gray node
in the cortical valuation network). (2) In addition, speciﬁc regions may link the two networks, either directly or via the thalamus. (3)
Finally, motivational signals are further embedded within cognitive mechanisms through the action of diffuse neuromodulatory
systems. Key: ant., anterior; NAcc, nucleus accumbens; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; PFC, prefrontal
cortex; SN, substantia nigra; VTA, ventral tegmental area. Reproduced with permission from Pessoa and Engelmann (2010).
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spatial locations that are behaviorally important – incorpo-
rate signals as a result of an item’s affective and motivation-
al signiﬁcance.
6.2. Executive competition
Motivation inﬂuences executive competition, too, and
section 4 described examples during response-conﬂict,
task switching, and working memory. Two effects of moti-
vation on executive function are proposed here. First, mo-
tivation sharpens executive functions by enhancing them or
by making them more efﬁcient (Fig. 9). An illustration of
this effect was the working memory study by Kobayashi
and colleagues (2002) in which reward increased the
amount of transmitted information regarding the item
being maintained in memory. Second, motivation reallo-
cates resources available to executive functions, increasing
the likelihood of reward attainment by improving perfor-
mance (Fig. 9). For example, in the study by Jimura and
colleagues (2010) brain responses appeared to reﬂect a
shift toward a proactive control strategy that was beneﬁcial
to performance. Motivation can thus be viewed, at times, as
reallocating resources to prioritize implementation of the
rewarded task component at the expense of unrewarded
components (Fig. 7C) (which at times can lead to deleteri-
ous performance effects; Padmala & Pessoa 2010).
6.3. Neural interactions
The same general architecture for cognitive-emotional in-
teractions is proposed to underlie cognitive-motivational in-
teractions (Fig. 8). In particular, the interactions between
valuation networks and fronto-parietal regions important
for attention and executive control are suggested to be
common to both emotion and motivation. Subcortical
reward/valuation regions include the caudate (particularly
more ventral portions), nucleus accumbens, midbrain,
and the amygdala; and cortical regions include orbitofrontal
cortex, anterior insula, medial PFC, and posterior cingulate
cortex.
Hub regions also play a central function during interac-
tions between cognition and motivation. For example,
Mesulam and colleagues suggested that posterior cingulate
cortex is important for the integration of motivational and
spatial attention information (Mohanty et al. 2008; Small
et al. 2005; see also Platt & Huettel 2008). Another key
hub region is medial the PFC (including the dorsal PFC),
already discussed in the context of emotion. Indeed, multi-
ple sources of evidence demonstrate that the medial PFC is
a critical component of the motivational system (see
Summerﬁeld & Koechlin 2009; Vogt 2008; Walton et al.
2007). Shackman and colleagues (2011) proposed that the
dorsal-medial PFC implements domain-general processes
of adaptive control, based on the region’s extensive contri-
butions to cognitive control, negative affect, and nocicep-
tion. I suggest that the proposal should be extended to
incorporate motivation as well, which is to say, that
dorsal-medial prefrontal context implements motivated
adaptive control –where “motivated” is understood to
include emotional processing. The anterior insula has
been repeatedly implicated during the processing of
negative events (Paulus & Stein 2006; Simmons et al.
2006). But a growing number of studies implicate it
during appetitive conditions (Liu et al. 2011a; Mizuhiki
et al. 2012; Naqvi & Bechara 2009; Padmala & Pessoa
2011; Samanez-Larkin et al. 2007). Here, I propose
that the anterior insula is a chief hub region for
cognition-motivation interactions.
As in the case of emotion, a third mode of communica-
tion involves the widespread action of neuromodulatory
signals, including those of dopamine and acetylcholine. It
is possible that dopaminergic and cholinergic neuromodu-
lation provide a key mechanism by which motivation sharp-
ens executive control (and hence behavioral performance),
for example, by improving the signal-to-noise ratio of rele-
vant neurons (e.g., Goldman-Rakic et al. 1989). Motivation
thus enhances processing efﬁciency in target cortical and
subcortical regions.
6.4. “Resources”: Linking human and animal literatures
The dual competition model employs the admittedly vague
concept of “resources.” One way in which a more mecha-
nistic account can be formulated is to build on the extensive
literature of motivation in nonhuman animals. Redgrave
and colleagues (Redgrave & Gurney 2006; Redgrave
et al. 1999) have proposed that dopamine-related circuits
in the striatum facilitate the reallocation of limited process-
ing capacity toward unexpected events of behavioral signif-
icance, including rewarding ones. Thus, instead of simply
providing a “reward signal,” striatal activation drives the re-
distribution of available resources to salient events whose
processing is then prioritized (see also Horvitz 2000; Zink
et al. 2004). Furthermore, Sarter et al. (2006) propose
that increased prefrontal cholinergic activity contributes
to the recruitment of goal-driven mechanisms (see also
Sarter et al. 2005), which depend on fronto-parietal
regions, act to enhance sensory processing and to attenuate
interference effects.
6.5. Mechanisms of motivational effects: Conceptual
issues
Disentangling the contributions of cognition and motiva-
tion to neural signals is far from easy, especially when ex-
periments involve goal-directed task manipulations. For
example, in human studies, subjects may be instructed
that a potential reward will result following a cue stimulus
if their performance is both fast and accurate. In such
Figure 9. Executive control and reward. Motivation is proposed
to have two key effects on executive function: ﬁrst, it ﬁne-tunes
executive functions that are important for the task at hand
(represented by the change of shape of the updating function;
see solid arrow); and, second, it redistributes the allocation of
common-pool resources (gray ellipse; see dashed arrow), and
thus modulates how executive processes compete with each
other. Reproduced with permission from Pessoa (2009).
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cases, increased brain signals may reﬂect enhanced atten-
tion because subjects are more likely to engage attention
when a reward is at stake. But whether the increased
signals actually reﬂect greater attention is another matter,
an issue Maunsell described forcefully in the context of
monkey physiology studies of attention:
When the effects of spatial attention are examined, subjects are
motivated to direct attention to one location or another only by
expectations about which location is more likely to be associated
with a reward.… Such reward manipulations reliably lead to
shifts in attention … However, these experiments typically
provide no basis for assigning changes preferentially to atten-
tion or to expectations about reward. In most cases, attention-
related modulation could equally well be described in terms
of expectation about rewards because the two are inextricably
confounded. (Maunsell 2004, pp. 262–63)
Maunsell’s point raises the broader issue of the relationship
between motivation and cognition. One possibility is that
motivation has effects that take place independently of cog-
nition (Fig. 10A). A second is that motivation modulates
behavior by engaging the same functions that are used by
cognition, in which case, the impact of motivation on
behavior could be described as “mediated by cognition”
(Fig. 10B). This mediation could be partial only, such
that both direct (motivation-to-behavior) and indirect (mo-
tivation-via-cognition-to-behavior) effects take place. A
third possibility is that cognition and motivation are more
intertwined, such that they jointly guide behavior
(Fig. 10C), in which case, although certain processes
could be described as “cognitive” and others as “motiva-
tional,” the interactions between them are sufﬁciently
strong that their separation is more semantic than real.
See Chelazzi et al. (2013) for a related discussion.
The situation Maunsell describes thus could be portrayed
in terms of the mediation model (B): Mechanistically,
effects of attention are obtained via “attentional circuits.”
Whereas this relationship would presumably indicate that
such motivational effects are less interesting, l argue that
how motivation recruits “cognitive” circuits is as important
as which circuits it recruits. Indeed, I suggest that the
major issue is conceptual, and that by using separate
boxes for “attention” and “motivation,” the models of
Figure 10 describe motivation in an impoverished way. As
in the case of emotion and cognition (Pessoa 2008), I
propose that it is counterproductive to carve the brain
into “attention” (or “cognition”) and “motivation.” Chapters
6 and 7 outline how motivational signals are embedded into
cognition (and perception) through multiple mechanisms.
In this manner, the “inextricably confounded” relationship
described by Maunsell (2004) ceases to be a problem and
can be seen as a property of brain organization (see also
sect. 7.2).
7. Network perspective on brain function
The type of embedding of emotional and motivational
signals into perception and cognition (e.g., Grossberg
1982 necessitates a network perspective of brain organiza-
tion. Thus, the network itself is the unit, not the brain
region. Processes P that support behavior are not imple-
mented by an individual area, but rather by the interaction
of multiple areas, which are dynamically recruited into mul-
tiregion assemblies.
7.1. Overlapping networks
Commonly, networks are described in terms of unique,
nonoverlapping sets of brain regions (Fig. 11A). But this
assumes that brain areas compute a speciﬁc function, one
that is perhaps elementary and needs other regions to be
“actualized,” but nonetheless is well deﬁned. I propose
that networks contain overlapping regions, such that speciﬁc
areas will belong to several intersecting networks (Mesulam
1990). In this manner, the processes carried out by an area
will depend on its network afﬁliation at a given time. What
determines a region’s afﬁliation? For this, the importance of
the context within which a brain region is operating must be
considered (McIntosh 2000). For example, in Figure 11B,
region An will be part of network N1 during a certain
context Ck, but will be part of network N2 during another
context Cl. The existence of context-dependent, overlap-
ping networks also means that from the perspective of
structure-function mappings summarized in Figure 11B, a
given region will participate in multiple processes. In
addition, the importance of context emphasizes the need
to consider dynamic aspects of structure-function relation-
ships. A network needs to be understood in terms of the in-
teractions between multiple brain regions as they unfold
temporally. In the extreme, two networks may involve the
exact same regions interacting with each other in distinct
ways across time.
Though simple, the “multiple afﬁliation” point is sufﬁ-
ciently important to merit an example. Consider the case
of the amygdala. Even a simpliﬁed view of its anatomical
connectivity shows that, minimally, it belongs to three net-
works. The ﬁrst is a “visual network,” as the amygdala re-
ceives ﬁbers from anterior parts of temporal cortex. The
amygdala, by its turn, inﬂuences visual processing via a
set of projections that reach most of ventral occipito-tem-
poral cortex. The second is the well-known “autonomic
Figure 10. Three models of the relationships between attention and motivation. (A) In the parallel model, attention and motivation have
independent effects on behavior. (B) In the mediation model, the inﬂuence of motivation on behavior is mediated via attentional systems.
(C) In the integration model, attentional and motivational systems interact so strongly they cannot be decomposed. Adapted with
permission from Pessoa and Engelmann (2010).
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network,” as evidenced by connectivity with subcortical
structures such as the hypothalamus and periaqueductal
gray, among others. Via this network, the amygdala partic-
ipates in the coordination of many complex autonomic
mechanisms. The third is a “value network,” as evidenced
by its connectivity with the orbitofrontal cortex and
medial PFC. In total, the amygdala afﬁliates with different
sets of regions (“networks”) in a highly ﬂexible and context-
dependent manner. Many other examples of this dynamic
afﬁliation idea exist, including the fronto-parietal cortex,
whose regions afﬁliate with others based on task demands
(Cole et al. 2013).
Two issues deserve further consideration here. First,
when describing networks, the term process is preferable
to function. One reason is that a process emerges from
the interactions between regions – it is thus an emergent
property (see Bressler & Menon 2010). Furthermore, a
process is viewed as a useful external description of the op-
eration of the network, and not necessarily as a ﬁxed inter-
nal computation implemented by the network (Thompson
2007; Thompson & Varela 2001; Varela et al. 1992; cf.
Lindquist & Barrett 2012).
A second – and critical – issue is whether utilizing net-
works solves the many-to-many mapping problem we face
when considering regions as the unit of interest. In other
words, does a description of structure-function relation-
ships in terms of networks allow for a one-to-one
mapping? For example, in the context of the salience
network, Menon, Uddin, and colleagues note that “to
determine whether this network indeed speciﬁcally per-
forms this function will require testing and validation of a
sequence of putative network mechanisms” (Bressler &
Menon 2010, p. 285; see also Moussa et al. 2011). The pros-
pect of simpler structure-function relationships (hence less
context dependent) is discussed by Buckner and colleagues
when describing regions of high connectivity: “An alterna-
tive possibility is that the hubs reﬂect a stable property of
cortical architecture that arises because of monosynaptic
and polysynaptic connectivity. Within this alternative possi-
bility, the same hubs would be expected to be present all of
the time, independent of task state” (Buckner et al. 2009
pp. 1867–68; emphasis mine).
Unfortunately, the attempt to map structure to function
in a one-to-one manner in terms of networks will be fraught
with some of the difﬁculties encountered when considering
individual brain regions (Ch. 8). To be true, the problem is
ameliorated, but the mapping is still highly complex. For
example, two distinct networks may generate similar behav-
ioral proﬁles (Fig. 9D; many-to-one); a given network
will also participate in several behaviors (one-to-many).
Broadly speaking, a network’s operation will depend on
several more global variables, namely an extended context
that includes the state of several “neurotransmitter
systems,” arousal, slow wave potentials, and so forth. In
other words, a network that is solely deﬁned as a “collection
of regions” is insufﬁcient to eliminate the one-to-many
problem. What if we extend the concept of a network
with these additional variables? For example, Cacioppo
and Tassinary (1990) suggest that psychological events
can be mapped to physiological ones in a more regular
manner by considering a spatiotemporal pattern of physio-
logical events. The notion of a network is thus extended to
incorporate other physiological events, for example, the
state of a given neurotransmitter (as in the elegant work
by Marder and colleagues; see Marder & Goaillard 2006).
How extensive does this state need to be? Clearly, the use-
fulness of this strategy in reducing the difﬁculties entailed
by many-to-many mappings will depend on how broad
the context must be (Thompson 2007).
7.2. An example: Cognitive-motivation interactions
Graph-theoretical analysis of functional neuroimaging data
has focused almost exclusively on characterizing the large-
scale properties of resting-state data (Bullmore & Sporns
2009; Wang et al. 2010). In a recent study, we sought
instead to understand the network properties of a
focused set of brain regions during task conditions engaging
them (Kinnison et al. 2012). In particular, we analyzed the
data of the response-conﬂict task discussed previously
(Fig. 4 and Fig. 5; Padmala & Pessoa 2011). At the
network level, global efﬁciency (a measure of integration)
increased and decomposability (a measure of how easily a
network can be divided in terms of smaller subnetworks
or “communities”) decreased (Fig. 12). In other words,
the network became less segregated with reward, revealing
that one way in which a reward cue affects brain responses
is by increasing functional connections across brain regions.
Figure 11. Structure-function mapping and networks. (A) The
“landscape of behavior” depicts the multidimensional space of
behaviors. A1, A2, An, B1, and Bn=brain regions; N1 and
N2=networks; Pi and Pj=processes. (B) Intersecting networks.
The networks Ck and Cl (and the additional ones) intersect at
node An. (C) Dynamic aspects. Because region An will have
network afﬁliations that vary as a function of time, the processes
carried out by the emerging networks will evolve across time
and lead to dynamic “landscapes of behavior.” The four time
points represented are such t1 is close to t2 but far from t3 and
t4, which are close to each other. (D) Structure-function
mappings in the case of networks. Two networks may instantiate
similar processes, a case of many-to-one mapping. The reverse
relationship is also suggested to apply to networks, namely, one-
to-many mappings. Reproduced with permission from Pessoa
(2013).
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From the vantage point of a single region, the changes in
functional connectivity can be quite broad and can be char-
acterized via a functional connectivity ﬁngerprint (see Pas-
singham et al. 2002). For example, the caudate (Fig. 6C)
and the nucleus accumbens showed increases in functional
connectivity to nearly all cortical regions that were driven
by reward, reinforcing the notion of “embedding” de-
scribed earlier. Finally, this example underscores the
need to move beyond simple pairwise relationships
between regions to a multivariate representation of the
changes in functional connectivity that underlie network
reorganization.
7.3. Issues when considering networks
If we are to use networks to understand structure-function
mappings, then we must consider several issues. I brieﬂy
describe them here (see also Pessoa 2014).
7.3.1. “Importance”: Structural and functional embedding.
A network framework moves the unit of analysis away from
brain regions and distributes it across them. This does not
mean that regions provide equal contribution to speciﬁc be-
haviors, of course. That being the case, devising ways to
characterize a region’s importance is of great interest.
This section builds on a recent discussion by Vlachos and
colleagues (2012), who considered this question in the
context of neurons.
What determines the importance of a region to a given
computation? One strategy is to consider its degree of
structural embeddedness and functional embeddedness.
The former refers to the way elements are physically
embedded in their surrounding; the latter is the inﬂuence
elements have on the activity of other elements, which
depends on structural embeddedness, in addition to other
synaptic and cellular properties, ongoing activity, neuromo-
dulators, and so forth. Regions (that is, nodes) with high
connectivity (that is, high degree) have the potential to be
inﬂuential, particularly if they function like connector
hubs (Guimera & Nunes Amaral 2005). Counterintuitively,
however, in some circumstances the most highly connected
nodes of a network are not the most inﬂuential (Kitsak et al.
2010; see also Liu et al. 2011b). Instead, the most promi-
nent nodes are those located within the core of the
network. In other words, they belong to a topologically
central subnetwork. Hence, one way to measure embedd-
edness is to determine nodes that exhibit the property of
centrality (Newman 2010). In general, however, no single
measure will perfectly capture inﬂuence or importance
because different measures will convey different aspects
of network organization. Indeed, multiple measures of cen-
trality have been proposed (Rubinov & Sporns 2010) and
generate different results (Zuo et al. 2012). Therefore, a
combination of different metrics will provide a better
measure of embeddedness and, better still, how a node
affects network properties (Liu et al. 2011b; Modha &
Singh 2010; Vlachos et al. 2012); see also Power et al.
(2013).
A further issue relates to communicability in complex
networks (Estrada & Hatano 2008). Many important mea-
sures that characterize networks are based on the shortest
paths connecting two nodes, including the determination
of communities. Counterintuitively, as described by
Estrada and Hatano (2008), “information” can in fact
spread along paths that are not the shortest (see also Bor-
gatti 2005; Newman 2005). This has implications for the
understanding of brain networks because direct anatomical
connectivity is frequently emphasized as the chief mode of
communication between brain regions. The notion that
communicability does not necessarily rely on shortest
paths reminds us of the need to obtain network-level prop-
erties in describing the ﬂow of signals in neural networks. It
also highlights the need to characterize functional connec-
tivity between regions, which does not uniquely depend on
direct anatomical connections (see Adachi et al. 2012).
7.3.2. The importance of weak connections. Here, I cri-
tique another component of the “standard” network view,
which can be summarized as follows: Network states
depend on strong structural connections; conversely,
weak connections have a relatively minor impact on brain
states.
Schneidman and colleagues (2006) recorded simultane-
ously from 40 cells in the salamander retina. Although
some pairs of cells had very strong correlations, most corre-
lations were weak. Importantly, the ﬁndings demonstrated
that weak pairwise correlations are capable of generating
strongly correlated network states. The lesson learned
here is that weak connections cannot be disregarded when
the goal is to understand network states. Now consider
that most studies of large-scale networks based on structural
and functional data disregard weak connections. In fact, in
resting-state functional connectivity studies, researchers
typically assign connections with weak correlations
(say<.3) a value of zero (no connection) (e.g., Meunier
et al. 2009). Although more studies are evidently needed
Figure 12. Network structure and reward. (A) Community
detection was applied to the set of brain regions that responded
more strongly to reward than to no-reward context at the cue
phase. Two communities were detected. (B) Comparison of the
pattern of connectivity between reward and no-reward contexts
revealed increases during the former, mostly between the two
communities, reﬂecting increased integration with reward.
Adapted with permission from Anderson et al. (2013).
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to examine the implications of weaker connections to brain
architecture, their importance is unlikely to be restricted to
cells in the salamander retina. For example, Bassett and col-
leagues (2011) studied the dynamic reconﬁguration of
human brain networks during learning and uncovered
several clusters of brain regions that remained integrated
with one another by a complex pattern of weak functional
interconnections.
7.4. Understanding a region’s function via
multidimensional proﬁles
If brain regions are engaged in many processes based on
the networks they are afﬁliated with in particular contexts,
they should be engaged by a range of tasks. Although this
introduces outstanding problems, the availability of data re-
positories containing the results of thousands of neuroim-
aging studies provides novel opportunities for the
investigation of human brain function (Yarkoni et al. 2010).
Like others (e.g., Robinson et al. 2012), my colleagues
and I recently employed a data-driven approach to investi-
gate the functional repertoire of brain regions based on a
large set of human functional MRI studies (Anderson
et al. 2013). We characterized the function of brain
regions in a multidimensional manner via their functional
ﬁngerprint (Passingham et al. 2002), namely, the relative
degree of engagement of the region across a range of
task domains (Fig. 13, top); the approach was extended to
networks, too (Fig. 13, bottom). Based on the ﬁngerprints,
we calculated a diversity index to summarize the degree of
functional diversity; a brain region with high diversity
would be one engaged by tasks in many domains,
whereas a low-diversity region would be engaged by a
few domains. We found that diversity varied considerably
across the brain (Fig. 14).
Our ﬁndings suggest that brain regions are very diverse
functionally, in line with the points raised by Poldrack
(2006; 2011). Beyond the descriptive aspects of the ap-
proach, it outlines a framework in which a region’s function
is viewed as inherently multidimensional: Avector deﬁnes
the ﬁngerprint of a region in the context of a speciﬁc
domain structure. Although the domain that we explored
used a task classiﬁcation scheme from an existing database,
it was not the only one possible. How should one deﬁne the
domain structure? One hope is that cognitive ontologies
can be deﬁned that meaningfully carve the “mental” into
stable categories (Bilder et al. 2009; Price & Friston
2005). I contend, however, that no single ontology will be
sufﬁcient. Instead, it is better to conceive of several task
domains that are useful and complementary in characteriz-
ing brain function and/or behavior. Thus, a region’s func-
tional ﬁngerprint needs to be understood in terms of a
Figure 13. Functional ﬁngerprints of regions and networks. (Top) Polar plots illustrate the ﬁngerprints of three brain regions. Each
vertex corresponds to one of the domains investigated. Both the left anterior insula and the left intraparietal sulcus exhibited diverse
functional proﬁles. The superior temporal gyrus in the vicinity of auditory cortex was less diverse, although the ﬁngerprint revealed
its involvement in emotional processing, in addition to audition. (Bottom) Polar plots illustrate the ﬁngerprints of two brain networks,
which were deﬁned by Toro and colleagues (2008) based on a meta-analysis of task activation data. The frontal-parietal “attention”
network was a task-positive network generated by “seeding” the left intraparietal sulcus. The cingulate-parietal “resting-state” network
was a task-negative network generated by “seeding” ventral-anterior medial prefrontal cortex. Although both networks are quite
diverse, the analysis revealed that they are fairly complementary to one another. Adapted with permission from Anderson et al. (2013).
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family of (possibly related) domains. Finally, the framework
can be extended to networks, provides a way to compare
them as described next, and to advance our understanding
of the properties of constituent nodes (see Anderson et al.
2013).
7.5. Comparing brain networks
In several instances, investigators have proposed
closely related networks (for example, “dorsal attention”
and “executive control”), raising the possibility that
they could be closely related, or possibly the same
except for a change in label. Thus, developing tools that
help characterize and understand brain networks is of
great relevance and could help reveal principles of
organization.
With this in mind, we asked the following question
(Anderson et al. 2013): What is the relationship of the
functions of regions belonging to a given network? One
approach is to evaluate how homogeneous ﬁngerprints
are in a network. In other words, are ﬁngerprints from
the regions of network X more similar to each other
than to those of regions from network Y? In our investi-
gation, we chose to not investigate a unique set of net-
works, but instead considered possibly related (or even
closely related) networks deﬁned by different research
groups and approaches, including meta-analysis, resting-
state, and task-based approaches. To contrast brain net-
works to each other in terms of the functional ﬁnger-
prints of the component regions, we employed a
multivariate test based on “statistical energy” (Aslan &
Zech 2005). Interestingly, several network pairs were
found to be only modestly distinct (e.g., dorsal and
ventral attention networks). Moreover, some of the net-
works that have been distinguished from one another in
the past were not strongly distinct (e.g., the fronto-parie-
tal “adjust control” network and the cingulo-opercular
“maintain task set” network described by Dosenbach
and colleagues 2008).
We also evaluated the assortativity of the regions within
networks, where assortativity refers to the tendency of “like
to connect with like” (e.g., Christakis & Fowler 2007).
Functional ﬁngerprints within an assortative network
would be relatively similar to each other and relatively dis-
similar to ﬁngerprints from other networks. Interestingly,
we observed several levels of assortativity, suggesting that
existing networks are composed of nodes whose functional
repertoire varies in their homogeneity. In fact, one version
of the task-negative network tended to be disassortative,
namely, its regions tended to be more dissimilar to each
other than to those of other networks, consistent with the
notion that task-negative networks are relatively heteroge-
neous (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010).
8. Conclusions
As I reﬂect on the network perspective described in chapter
8, ﬁve signiﬁcant implications come to mind. First, given the
extensive interactions between brain territories, emphasis
shifts from attempting to understand the brain a region at
a time to characterizing how coalitions of regions support
the mind-brain. And because brain regions are not the
unit of interest, they should not be viewed as “cognitive”
or “emotional.” This stands in sharp contrast to the tradition-
al view, which sees regions whose function involves homeo-
static processes or bodily representations as emotional, and
those less aligned with such operations as cognitive.
Second, considered from the network perspective, the ar-
chitectural features of the brain providemassive opportunity
for cognitive-emotional integration, encompassing all brain
territories. For example, extensive communication
between the amygdala and visual cortex exists. Thus, visual
processing takes place within a context that is deﬁned by
Figure 14. Functional diversity map. Areas of higher functional diversity are shown in warm colors, and areas of lower diversity are
shown in cool colors (color bar represents diversity Shannon entropy values). Locations without colors did not have sufﬁcient ﬁndings
for the estimation of diversity. Adapted with permission from Anderson et al. (2013).
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signals occurring in the amygdala and related brain regions
(e.g., orbitofrontal cortex), including those linked to affective
signiﬁcance. In this sense, vision is never pure, but only affec-
tive vision. A similar point can bemade for other sensory mo-
dalities. Cognitive-emotional interactions also abound in the
PFC, which is commonly described with reference to ab-
stract processes. More generally, given inter-region interac-
tivity, and the fact that networks intermingle signals of
diverse origin, although a characterization of brain function
in terms of networks is still needed, the networks themselves
are best thought of as neither “cognitive” nor “emotional.”
Third, regions traditionally viewed as central for affective
processing appear to be extremely well connected (Ch. 9),
which suggests that they have at times important “near-
global” roles and that this may be a central feature of
their class. But they are not the only regions with high con-
nectivity: We encounter highly connected regions through-
out the brain, including occipital, temporal, parietal, and
frontal lobes, in addition to insula, cingulate, thalamus,
and other regions at the base of the brain.
Fourth, the network perspective reminds us that emphasiz-
ing only interactions betweenbrain regions that are connected
by direct, robust structural connections is misleading. The
strength of functional connectivity is equally important and
at times (frequently?) will deviate from the strength of the
structural connection. Architectural features guarantee the
rapid integration of information even when strong structural
connections are not present – and support functional interac-
tions that will vary based on context. A case in point is illustrat-
ed by the “one-step” property of amygdala–PFC connectivity
(i.e., amygdala signals reachnearly all prefrontal regionswithin
a single connectivity step in the PFC), which allows the amyg-
dala to engage in functional interactions with lateral PFC
regions not heavily connected to it (seeAverbeck&Seo 2008).
And, ﬁfth, the insights gained from adopting a network
perspective suggest that the mind-brain is not decompos-
able in terms of emotion (or motivation) and cognition.
In other words, the neural basis of emotion and cognition
should be seen as governed less by properties that are in-
trinsic to speciﬁc sites and more by interactions among
multiple brain regions. In this sense, emotion and cognition
are functionally integrated systems, namely, they continu-
ously impact each other’s operations.
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Abstract: We emphasize the importance of a neuroevolutionary
perspective in moving beyond the cognition-emotion dichotomy.
Cognitive behavior depends on cortical structures ﬁrmly rooted in the
emotional brain from which they have evolved. As such, there cannot be
cognition without emotion. Endocrine regulation of amygdala
connectivity, a neural “switch” between impulsivity and deliberation,
further underscores the phylogenetic impossibility of a cognition-
emotion dichotomy.
In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013) confronts the
reader with the richness of what human neurosciences have
achieved in the past decades and what these achievements
imply for our understanding of human behavior and its neural
underpinnings. A central aim of his book is to show that the
often-applied conceptual dichotomy between “emotional” and
“cognitive” brain regions is an incorrect view of how the brain is
organized. Pessoa brings forth an abundance of studies showing
that the neural substrates of cognition, on the one hand, and
emotion, on the other hand, are largely shared, and by no
means mutually exclusive. According to Pessoa, the brain should
be understood from a network perspective: The function of the
brain depends on its intrinsic connections rather than on speciﬁed
brain modules. As such, Pessoa’s view concurs with previous cri-
tiques of a modular brain (Panksepp & Panksepp 2000; Prinz
2006b) and with the currently popular idea that, more so than
brain regions alone, it is the neural connections between these
regions that are of main interest (Seung 2012; Sporns 2010). Al-
though we appreciate the breath of research addressed by
Pessoa to convince his audience (and he surely convinced us),
we were surprised to ﬁnd that the book lacks a neuroevolutionary
approach in describing brain function. We think this is a missed
opportunity because a neuroevolutionary perspective illustrates
why the distinction between emotion and cognition lacks theoretic
ground and, thus, explanatory value.
In the human lineage, the most striking neural development is
the vast increase in size of the neocortex. Evolved from the frontal
part of the forebrain, the neocortex overlays the brainstem and
limbic system, which consists of a set of brain regions (e.g., the
amygdala and hypothalamus) shared by all mammalian species
(MacLean 1990). The development of the anterior and dorsal
part of the prefrontal cortex enabled people to mentally represent
abstract information and to inhibit prepotent action tendencies,
which gave rise to cognitive capacities such as foresight, planning,
and selection of different behavioral responses. Together with in-
creased linguistic capacities, this cortical development opened the
door to modern culture (Munakata et al. 2011; Wilson 1998).
However, the vast majority of the human cerebral cortex
remains involved in unconscious processing of information from
the environment and the viscera, which, through constant com-
munication with phylogenetically older regions of the brain, can
change our behavior without conscious deliberation (Damasio
2010). The neocortical expansion thus facilitated highly complex
capacities often termed “cognitive,” but these capacities are still
ﬁrmly rooted in the largely unconscious emotional brain. As
such, cognition can be seen as the tip of the emotional iceberg.
By deﬁnition, evolution builds on what is already there and is in-
capable of fundamental design changes in complex organisms.
Thus, from a neuroevolutionary perspective there is not only no
cognition without emotion, but this insight also provides the the-
oretical grounding for a network organization, instead of modular
organization, of the brain.
A neural substrate that intriguingly exempliﬁes this mechanism
of cumulative adaptation is the amygdala. The amygdala has often
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been regarded as a single subcortical structure, but animal work
and recent advances in neuroimaging techniques show this view
to be incorrect. In fact, the amygdala consists of many nuclei
that resemble either subcortical (central and medial amygdala
nuclei, CMA) or cortical (lateral and basolateral amygdala
nuclei, BLA) cytoarchitecture. Considering the amygdala’s loca-
tion and structure, we believe it is the perfect candidate to inte-
grate what Pessoa describes as “cognition” and “emotion.”
Although Pessoa elaborates on the amygdala’s heterogeneity, he
seems to struggle to incorporate this feature in his network per-
spective of the brain. We believe that a neuroevolutionary view
on amygdala functions will remedy this issue.
In terms of motivated behavior, two major amygdala network
models can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is a parallel model in which
the cortical (BLA) and subcortical (CMA) amygdala respectively
drive instrumental and impulsive goal-directed behavior through
their projections to striatal and prefrontal structures (Balleine &
Killcross 2006; Phillips et al. 2003). Second is a serial model in
which information ﬂows from BLA to hypothalamus and brain
stem via CMA regions, which drives reﬂexive vigilance and
ﬁght-or-ﬂight behavior (Whalen & Phelps 2009). Recent evidence
also indicates that the BLA not only feeds the CMA’s initiation of
vigilance but also exerts opposite inﬂuence that can reduce innate
fear (Macedo et al. 2006; 2007; Tye et al. 2011). Functional and
structural MRI studies conﬁrm these distributed networks of
amygdala subregions in humans (e.g., Bickart et al. 2012).
Recent studies also conﬁrmed the models’ behavioral conse-
quences, demonstrating that humans with focal damage to the
BLA show increased fear vigilance (Terburg et al. 2012b) and
more impulsive socioeconomic choices (van Honk et al. 2013).
Hence, a view emerges where the “cortical” amygdala (BLA)
drives instrumental behavior and the “subcortical” amygdala
(CMA) drives impulsive behavior. Thus, when combining the neu-
roevolution of the amygdala with recent evidence on its function
and connectivity, the amygdala can be considered a key compo-
nent of Pessoa’s network perspective as a neural switch between
impulsivity and deliberation. In this view, behavior cannot be con-
sidered distinctly “cognitive” or “emotional,” but will always be a
cognitive-emotional synergy given the evolutionary organization
of the brain.
This view of the amygdala as a neural “switch” extends even
further when considering the endocrine regulation of amygdala
function and connectivity (Bos et al. 2012). For example, the
steroid hormone testosterone and the neuropeptide oxytocin
have opposite effects on amygdala output. When people are
under direct social threat, testosterone decreases amygdala-corti-
cal connectivity patterns and upregulates amygdala-subcortical
routes (van Honk et al. 2011b; Terburg & van Honk 2013),
whereas oxytocin reduces amygdala output to the brainstem
(Stoop 2012) and increases amygdala-cortical coupling (Riem
et al. 2011). Moreover, both hormones have been involved in
sexual and reproductive behavior in animal species living as long
as 450 million years ago (Bryan et al. 2008; Goodson & Bass
2001), and these functions have been conserved in humans. In
line with the evolutionary development of the amygdala and the
neuroendocrine system, the behavioral impact of these hormones
has extended to more diverse human behavioral repertoires. Fol-
lowing evidence that testosterone promotes social, but not preda-
tory, aggression (Archer 2006), recent testosterone studies have
focused on human dominance behavior. Being the leader of the
pack provides evolutionary advantages by increasing chances of
survival, and testosterone indeed not only promotes emotional-
reﬂexive (Terburg et al. 2012a) but also cognitive-strategic (Eise-
negger et al. 2010; van Honk et al. 2012) dominance behavior. In
addition, testosterone in humans has recently been shown to
affect even more complex social behaviors; for example, it
reduces interpersonal trust (Bos et al. 2010), reduces cognitive
empathy (van Honk et al. 2011a), and promotes utilitarian deci-
sion making (Montoya et al. 2013). As predicted based on its op-
posite effects on amygdala function, oxytocin has opposite effects
to those of testosterone; it increases interpersonal trust (Kosfeld
et al. 2005) and increases cognitive empathy (Domes et al.
2007). Thus, the neuroendocrine messengers that have evolved
to serve basic emotional processes throughout the animal
kingdom have come to serve complex, allegedly “cognitive,” func-
tions in humans. They do so by acting on ancient brain “hubs” and
“switches,” thereby leaving no brain areas unaffected.
In agreement with Pessoa, this literature highlights the difﬁcul-
ties, if not impossibility, of defending a view in which parts of the
brain are discussed in terms of their unique functions. We suggest
that a neuroevolutionary approach in discussing brain function
provides for a theoretic reason for rejecting the “emotion-cogni-
tion” dichotomy and also provides a theoretical grounding for a
network organization, instead of a modular organization, of the
brain. In addition, Pessoa (2013) notes that “more than making
the case against dissociating [emotion and cognition], one of my
goals in this book is to move beyond the debate and to illustrate
the many ways in which emotion and cognition interact and in
fact are integrated” (p. 3). We fully agree with Pessoa that the
emotion-cognition dichotomy is one in need of revision, but we
wonder if Pessoa’s focus on cognition-emotion interactions
might inadvertently keep the false dichotomy alive. We believe
that a neuroevolutionary perspective, which sees cognition as
the tip of the emotional iceberg, provides a solution to deﬁnitely
move beyond this debate and allows us to focus on explaining
how the brain brings forth behavior, irrespective of the terminol-
ogy that is used to describe this behavior.
On emotion-cognition integration: The effect of
happy and sad moods on language
comprehension
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Abstract: I comment on Pessoa’s (2013) idea that the interaction between
emotion and cognition cannot be reduced to mutual interference. As an
example that bolsters Pessoa’s position, I discuss the effects of happy
and sad moods on discourse and sentence comprehension. I distinguish
between the effects of moods elicited without participants’ knowledge
(incidental) and moods elicited with participants’ contribution
(constructed).
In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013) effectively
argues against the traditional view on which interactions between
emotion and cognition in the brain are interpreted exclusively in
antagonistic terms. According to this traditional view, emotional
and cognitive brain systems are distinct; they compete for process-
ing resources and lead to mutual suppression. Pessoa argues that
this view is restrictive and does not capture the many possible
ways in which emotion and cognition actually interact in producing
behavior. His view, based on accumulating evidence that emotion
and cognition share brain systems (especially those identiﬁed as in-
formational hubs, e.g., amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, anterior
insula), is that emotion and cognition can interact in ways that
result in more efﬁcient behavior.
I agree with the gist of this argument. My aim here is to relate
this account to complementary research on affective states and
cognitive processes that are not considered in the book and that
can strengthen Pessoa’s position. One interesting case, for
example, lies in the effect of mood on language comprehension,
especially at the discourse and sentence level.
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Pessoa’s account is based mainly on research about processing
emotional stimuli, focusing primarily on visual perception and ex-
ecutive functions and touching upon trait anxiety and depression.
The cases Pessoa considers are therefore those in which emotion
has a strong, rapid bottom-up effect (emotional stimuli) or has a
persistent and prolonged top-down effect (trait anxiety and
depression). Research on the effects of experimentally induced
happy and sad moods on cognitive processes has shown that
moods can inﬂuence performance when they are preexisting
and unrelated to the task at hand and, most importantly, when
people are unaware of experiencing them (for a review, see
Martin & Clore 2001). These features put mood in the position
to exert an inﬂuence on cognitive processes for longer periods
than the emotions elicited by experimental stimuli (such as a
shock or a disgusting picture). Mood’s effect also differs from
that of emotional stimuli in that it is top-down. At the same
time, it differs also from the top-down effect of trait anxiety and
clinical depression: Because mood waxes and wanes easily in ev-
eryday life, it has less extreme and persistent effects on cognition.
We discuss here research on the effects of mild happiness and
mild sadness, as examples of moods that listeners and readers
may be experiencing during language comprehension.
Experimentally induced moods can have a strong effect on a
wide range of high-level cognitive functions (e.g., judgment,
memory, executive functions; for reviews, see Clore & Huntsinger
2007; Martin & Clore 2001). The fact that mood can inﬂuence in-
tegration processes during discourse comprehension is a recent
ﬁnding; language has been usually studied as one of the cognitive
functions most impermeable to affect, at least at the sentence and
discourse level.
Recent research has found that incidental mood can have a
strong and rapid inﬂuence on the way discourse is understood. In-
cidental mood is elicited with a procedure of which participants
are not aware and that results in mild affective changes escaping
participants’ awareness (e.g., Koch et al. 2013; Matovic et al.
2014). Behavioral evidence has shown that readers induced into
a happy or sad incidental mood judge a positive or a negative
story ending as more surprising when its valence mismatches
that of the mood (Egidi & Gerrig 2009). This is seen not only in
explicit behavioral evaluations after reading, but also in neural re-
sponses during listening to the story endings (Egidi & Nusbaum
2012). Mood interacts with linguistic content as early as 400 ms
after the presentation of a critical word. The study by Egidi and
Nusbaum (2012) examined the effect of happy, sad, and neutral
moods on the comprehension of a positive and negative ending
that concluded a very short story. Mood modulated the auditory
N400 effect, with a pattern of increased N400 for story endings
mismatching the valence of the mood (for consistent results; see
also Chung et al. 1996). The N400 pattern for the happy and
sad group further differed from that of the neutral mood group.
Importantly, the effect of mood in evaluations and N400 effect oc-
curred when positive and negative endings were equally consis-
tent and plausible (Egidi & Gerrig 2009; Egidi & Nusbaum
2012). A study by van Berkum and colleagues (2013) further
found a reduced N400 for sad mood (vs. happy mood) after
verbs that create an implicit causality bias (e.g., Carice annoyed
Tom because he/she repeatedly had to correct her mistakes). At
the sentence level, Federmeier et al. (2001) also examined the
effects of positive and neutral moods on semantic organization
by using sentence pairs. In this study, positive mood, as compared
to neutral mood, was associated with a decrease in N400 ampli-
tude between unexpected items of different categories (e.g.,
They wanted the hotel to look more like a tropical resort. So
along the driveway they planted rows of pines/tulips).
Taken together, these results highlight a very direct effect of
mood on cognition, with no intentional component. In these
cases, the effect of mood cannot therefore be attributed to moti-
vational or attentional differences. Consistent with Pessoa’s posi-
tion, the inﬂuence of incidental mood suggests that the
concepts of selection and competition for resources cannot
easily explain the interaction between emotion and cognition,
and that low arousal is not necessarily linked to decrement in per-
formance. Instead, the impact of mood may be that of adjustment,
as in the case of responding to positive and negative endings as
more or less consistent depending on mood (Egidi & Gerrig
2009; Egidi & Nusbaum 2012). However, general interference
cannot be completely ruled out: Results such as the mood-depen-
dent reduced sensitivity to implicit causality (van Berkum et al.
2013) suggest that interference is a possible effect of mood on
language.
At the sentence level, recent behavioral research has shown that
incidental moods inﬂuence participants’ ability to discriminate
between ambiguous and unambiguous sentences (Matovic et al.
2014). Other studies have also found evidence of mood modula-
tions of linguistic processes that typically elicit N400 and P600.
These studies have capitalized on a known tendency of happy
and sad moods to promote different processing strategies.
Several behavioral studies of social judgment and memory have
in fact found that happy mood promotes a more global, top-
down and heuristics-based type of processing, whereas sad
mood promotes more local, bottom-up, and analytic type of pro-
cessing (e.g., Bless 2000; Clore & Huntsinger 2007; Fiedler
2001). Importantly, however, this effect is more often obtained
when participants are induced to experience a certain mood by
taking active part in changing the way they feel and maintaining
it over time. Typically, participants are presented with a happy
or sad stimulus (or are asked to think of something happy and
sad) and are instructed to allow the stimulus to put them in a
certain mood and to maintain that mood throughout the experi-
ment (e.g., Chwilla et al. 2011; Vissers et al. 2010; 2013). In this
way, mood is voluntarily constructed and therefore likely to
inﬂuence cognition through a different avenue than incidental
mood. Mediating factors such as (1) awareness of being in a
certain mood, (2) the strategies participants adopt to maintain a
certain mood, (3) the potentially different ease with which different
moods can be maintained, and (4) the constant attention partici-
pants pay to how they feel may result more easily in the adoption
of different processing strategies than does incidental mood.
In the literature on sentence processing, this indirect effect of
mood has been studied on the consistency effect elicited by
reading high and low cloze-probability sentences (e.g., the
pillows are stuffed with feathers/books; Chwilla et al. 2011). It
was found that the N400 effect was differently distributed de-
pending on participants’ mood. Vissers and colleagues (2010;
2013) also found that the effect of constructed mood can modu-
late syntactic processing, as seen by a different amplitude and
scalp distribution of the P600 in reading subject–verb disagree-
ments and apparent syntactic anomalies (as a result of unusual
semantic context: e.g., the fox the poachers hunts/hunt). Interest-
ingly, no effects of mood on syntactic anomalies was found when a
less explicit mood manipulation was used (van Berkum et al.
2013), thus suggesting that some aspects of linguistic processing
may be permeable to mood only when participants are made con-
sciously aware of their mood via mediating factors (such as those
mentioned above). In general, motivational and attentional expla-
nations of the kind discussed by Pessoa are deﬁnitely applicable to
the research on the effect of constructed mood on language.
With respect to the neural architecture underlying the effect of
mood on discourse and sentence comprehension, there is only one
study on this issue: an fMRI experiment examining the effects of
incidental happy and sad mood on consistent and inconsistent
story endings (Egidi & Caramazza 2014). The study’s results are
consistent with the notion that mood and language interact to
create emergent activation patterns rather than attenuating or in-
creasing activity in ﬁxed networks. Speciﬁcally, a contrast between
story endings that were consistent or inconsistent with prior
context showed that happy and sad mood moderated inconsistency
detection, but did so in different networks. For example, happy
mood increased sensitivity to inconsistency in regions often
linked to language comprehension, whereas sad mood increased
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sensitivity to inconsistency in other networks, less frequently linked
to language processing. With respect to Pessoa’s position, these
results show that incidental mood can fundamentally alter the base-
line functioning of linguistic processes, by restructuring the brain
networks that perform that function. In this sense, these results
are consistent with Pessoa’s view of emotion-cognition relation as
integration.
To conclude, research on the effects of mood on discourse and
sentence comprehension shows that mood does not only interact
with language processing in terms of interference or enhancement
of function, but that it also fundamentally alters how linguistic
processes are performed. This is especially seen in modulations
of fast ERP responses to inconsistencies and linguistic anomalies
and in mood-dependent reorganizations of the brain networks
that perform linguistic functions. These results constitute a con-
structive addition to Pessoa’s account, as they both increase its
scope and highlight an additional way of emotion-cognition inter-
action that is not mentioned in the book.
Surprise as an ideal case for the interplay of
cognition and emotion
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Abstract: The target article is a timely exposition on the impact of how
emotion and cognition interact, a speciﬁcally important issue in surprise
research. Psychologists debate whether disconﬁrmed expectations or
sense-making processes determine surprise levels experienced for an
event. We posit that, in surprise, cognition and emotion are intertwined,
making it an interesting test case for the proposals in this article.
In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013) highlights the
interplay of emotion and cognition in the brain. When one consid-
ers the panoply of human emotions, the emotion and cognition in
surprise seems an ideal test case for this interplay.
Surprise has been intensively researched since Darwin’s time,
perhaps because it involves this interesting mixture of emotion
and cognition. Although originally conceived of as a “basic
emotion” (e.g., Darwin 1872; Ekman & Friesen 1971; Izard
1977; Plutchik 1991; Tomkins 1962), more recently surprise has
been reappraised more as a cognitive state because, unlike most
emotions, it can either be positively or negatively valenced
(Ortony & Turner 1990). Surprise clearly involves an emotional
reaction (often accompanied by a startle response), but it also
seems to service a strategic, cognitive goal, as it directs attention
to explain why the surprising event occurred and learn for the
future (e.g., Foster & Keane 2013; Macedo 2010; Maguire et al.
2011; Ranganath & Rainer 2003).
Attentional models of learning suggest that when events are
surprising, they collect and focus neural resources that enhance
the processing of the event and drive learning (as in, for
example, the Pearce-Hall model; Pearce & Hall 1980; see also
Hayden et al 2011; Roesch et al. 2012). In neural models of sur-
prise in learning and novelty, it is predominantly suggested that
surprise arises from comparative processes between what was ex-
pected to occur and what actually occurs (e.g., Hayden et al. 2011;
Roesch et al. 2012; Wessel et al. 2012). Many cognitive theories of
surprise take a similar view – that surprising events are low prob-
ability events in the context of the event sequence, that are
schema discrepant, or conﬂicting with previous expectations (e.g.,
Meyer et al. 1997; Reisenzein & Studtmann 2007; Schützwohl &
Reisenzein 1999; Teigen & Keren 2002; 2003). However, recent
theories of surprise have placed a greater emphasis on the
“sense-making” aspects of surprise (e.g., Foster & Keane 2013;
Kahneman & Miller 1986; Maguire & Keane 2006; Maguire
et al. 2011; Pezzo 2003). These sense-making theories argue that
surprise is fundamentally about understanding an abnormal
event, about ﬁnding an explanation for the event’s occurrence.
For example, the recently developed metacognitive explanation-
based theory of surprise (Foster & Keane, under review), proposes
that the difﬁculty of explaining an event informs the emotional
feeling of surprise.
As Pessoa discusses at a more general level, the dichotomising
of systems into a dual-process model with separable mental
systems consisting of automatic versus controlled processes is
questionable, whereas a continuous framework seems optimal.
In the phenomenon of surprise, this continuous framework is con-
sistent with sense-making accounts that emphasise understanding,
involving the mechanism of explanation, with the feeling of sur-
prise arising from the ease/difﬁculty of this understanding
process. Traditionally, explanation is seen as playing a role in
building causal models or predictive schemas to deal with future
events (Heider 1958; Lombrozo & Carey 2006). Apart from
having a predictive role when a new situation is initially encoun-
tered, however, explanation may also serve to help people
decide how information should be weighted or how attention
should be allocated, even as an event is occurring (Keil 2006;
see also Foster & Keane 2013). So, for this cognitive emotion,
there is a true interaction between cognition and emotion,
which seem to be intrinsically linked in the experience of surprise.
This focus on the more cognitive, explanation-based treatment
of surprise has yet to be fully explored at a neurological level.
However, Pessoa’s suggestion that the amygdala is involved in
much more than “fear,” that it has novelty, salience detection,
and information gathering functions, identiﬁes it as a candidate
structure playing a role in surprise. In surprise research, it has
been found that functioning of the amygdala central nucleus is im-
portant in learning (e.g., Belova et al. 2007; Lin & Nicolelis 2008),
but it seems that the functioning of the amygdala may only be crit-
ical at the time that the surprise is initially experienced, whereas
functioning of other areas, such as the cholinergic neurons in the
sublenticular substantia innominate/nucleus basalis magnocellula-
ris, are critical when that enhanced associability gained from sur-
prise is seen in more rapid learning (Holland & Gallagher 2006).
Indeed, further hints about the importance of an interplay
between cognition and emotion in surprise can be gleaned from
studies of two neural mechanisms involved in processes that
have been linked to surprise. These are the P300, a positive-
going wave in the human ERP appearing 250–500 milliseconds
after a stimulus, which is thought to respond to contextual
novelty, and the N400, a negative-going wave in the human
ERP which peaks around 400 milliseconds post-stimulus, and
which is associated with the processing of meaningful stimuli
(Coulson & Kutas 2001), particularly to words and pseudowords.
The N400 is additionally thought to respond to stimulus novelty
(for a review, see Ranganath & Rainer 2003) and is especially
large in response to semantic violations. It should be noted that
the P300 is sometimes split into two components, P3a and P3b;
of these, the P3b appears to be more linked to surprise (e.g.,
Kopp & Lange 2013). As an example of this interplay in surprise,
P300 amplitude, although responsive to contextual novelty, is also
thought to be associated with “signiﬁcance” (Donchin 1981), “in-
formation value” (Sutton et al. 1965), and “meaning” (Johnson
1986), all of which are encompassed by the proposal that it is a
manifestation of “context-updating” or “understanding” during in-
teraction with the environment (Ferrari et al. 2010). Motivation-
ally signiﬁcant stimuli, including emotionally valent stimuli, are
associated with larger P300s than motivationally insigniﬁcant or
emotionally neutral stimuli (Keil et al. 2002), and studies involving
feedback stimuli about monetary gains or losses have shown that
the P300 is sensitive to the absolute magnitude of the feedback
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outcome, for both gains and losses (e.g., Yeung & Sanfey 2004).
These effects of subjective probability and motivational signiﬁ-
cance on P300 amplitude are modulated by the amount of atten-
tion paid to the stimulus, particularly if the subject is engaged in a
secondary task that poses increasing perceptual demands (cf. Kok
2001). So, ﬁndings for the P300 seem to reﬂect that it is inﬂuenced
by both cognitive and emotional components.
A reduction in N400 amplitude appears to reﬂect ease of pro-
cessing, or ease of integration after-the-fact; more colloquially,
“easier understanding” (e.g., Coulson & Kutas 2001; Eddy et al.
2006; Kutas & Federmeier 2000). It has been suggested that
the N400 is larger when integration is relatively more difﬁcult
(Eddy et al. 2006). Consistent with our approach, which encom-
passes both the emotional and cognitive aspects of surprise as
arising from a process of attempting to explain the event, it has
been suggested that in joke processing, positivities (which have
been argued to reﬂect the more emotional surprise component)
and sustained negativity of the N400 (which has been proposed
to index a more cognitive reinterpretation of information) can
all occur within the same time window (Coulson & Kutas 2001).
So, again, the N400 seems to be inﬂuenced by emotional factors
as well as cognitive factors, during the same time frame, reﬂecting
the interplay of these aspects in surprise.
The target article thus opens up exciting possibilities for future
work on surprise. Neuroscientiﬁc research assessing the impact of
surprise still tends to treat it as merely the disconﬁrmation of ex-
pectations, whereas recent theories suggest that this traditional
treatment is too simplistic and that surprise should instead be con-
ceptualised more as a feeling that arises from cognitive difﬁculty in
explaining why an event occurred (see Foster & Keane 2013;
under review). More speciﬁcally for this article, we feel that
surprise could be an interesting test case for many of Pessoa’s pro-
posals, such as his discussion of the differential possibilities of the
relationship between cognition and motivation, and, more gener-
ally, for his position that cognition and emotion are fundamentally
linked, as we feel the interaction between the intrinsic motivation-
al, cognitive, and emotional components may guide our behaviour
both during and in response to surprising events.
Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception
hypothesis, and the socially extended mind
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Abstract: Pessoa’s The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative
approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in
cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as
essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and
emotion, which enactivism uniﬁes in its foundational concept of sense-
making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental
processes is not reducible to speciﬁc brain regions and neuroanatomical
connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.
Enactivism has been gaining in popularity in a variety of disci-
plines over the last couple of decades (Di Paolo & Thompson
2014). Its discourse is centered on a cluster of concepts – autono-
my, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience (Di
Paolo et al. 2010). Brieﬂy, mind is deﬁned as meaningful activity
in the world; it is an autonomous process of sense-making embod-
ied in self-sustaining neural, bodily, and sensorimotor dynamics
under precarious far-from-equilibrium conditions. Speculations
about internal mental representations are rejected in favor of in-
vestigations of the complex dynamics that structure a subject’s
lived (phenomenological) and living (biological, i.e., both neural
and bodily) existence (Thompson 2007).
Nevertheless, a speciﬁcally enactive neuroscience is still out-
standing. To be sure, some of its key concepts can be traced to
the neuroscientiﬁc research done by Maturana and Varela in the
1960s and 70s. And after the ﬁrst comprehensive statement of
the enactive approach (Varela et al. 1991), Varela continued to
promote a systems approach to neuroscience (e.g., Varela et al.
2001). Moreover, Varela’s proposal of integrating this approach
with a disciplined study of ﬁrst-person experience turned into
one of its core methods: neurophenomenology (Gallagher
2009). Such methodological recommendations are valuable, but
they are not an enactive theory of the brain.
This striking omission has not gone unnoticed. For example,
proponents of the predictive processing framework, which
aspires to a uniﬁed theory of the brain (Friston 2010), are
taking advantage of this lacuna by attempting to subsume enacti-
vism under its way of thinking (e.g., Clark 2012; Seth 2014). Al-
though this takeover move is resisted by some enactivists
(Froese & Ikegami 2013; Roesch et al. 2012), as yet there is no
clear alternative proposal.
I suggest that Pessoa’s (2013) integrative approach provides
much needed steps in the right direction. He avoids two undesir-
able extremes that typically characterize other approaches. He
rejects the tendency, prevalent in neuroimaging research, to
reduce aspects of mind to speciﬁc brain regions (pp. 194–95).
And neither does he reduce the workings of the brain to one
general abstract principle (e.g., a free-energy principle). Instead,
Pessoa emphasizes that there is a diversity of neural structures
and processes at play; that structure and function are mutually dis-
sociable; and that mental processes are realizable in multiple ways
by distributed networks and unavoidably context dependent. This
middle way between the extremes of anatomical speciﬁcity and
computational generality matches with enactivism’s insistence
on a systems theoretic approach that nevertheless remains
grounded in the concreteness of the living organism. And
Pessoa is in favor of developing stronger links between neurosci-
entiﬁc data and subjective experience (p. 116). I am also intrigued
by several more speciﬁc convergences between his approach and
the enactive approach.
Pessoa interprets the ﬁndings of cognitive neuroscience as dem-
onstrating that perception, cognition, emotion, and motivation do
not refer to essentially distinct categories. Instead, they are over-
lapping aspects of a complex network of mental processes in which
one aspect can temporarily become more expressed than the
others depending on the circumstances, but in which none can
be completely isolated from the others. The enactive approach
has come to the same conclusion on the basis of theoretical con-
siderations stemming from the philosophy of the organism and
phenomenology of the body, which is why the notion of sense-
making has become one of its core concepts (Thompson 2007).
Brieﬂy, sense-making refers to the process by which an organism
enacts a meaningful point of view on the world, which always con-
tains a mixture of sensation, pre-reﬂective interpretation, and val-
uation. Accordingly, every organism is situated in what von
Uexküll (1934/1957) once called an Umwelt: a concrete context
of signiﬁcance deﬁned by affordances for interaction, which are
shaped by the environment but also by each organism’s embodi-
ment, knowledge, and motivations (goals, needs, desires). This
supports Pessoa’s contention that “vision is never pure, but only
affective, vision. A similar point can be made for other sensory mo-
dalities” (p. 257).
As Colombetti (2014) has argued extensively, an important im-
plication of the enactive theory of sense-making is that affectivity
is an essential aspect of mind, and that this primordial affectivity
provides the foundation for the origins of more speciﬁc emotions,
moods, and values. In the words of Varela and Depraz (2005,
p. 61): “emotions cannot be seen as a mere ‘coloration’ of the
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cognitive agent, understood as a formal or un-affected self, but are
immanent and inextricable from every mental act.” Enactivism
therefore provides a suitable interpretative framework – for
example, for explaining the ﬁnding that emotional networks are
among the most widely connected in the brain (Pessoa 2013,
p. 229). In addition, the substantial connections from brain
regions implicated in cognitive and emotional processing to
even the earliest sensory regions, such as projections from the
amygdala and the pulvinar to visual cortex, are to be expected if
we primarily live in a meaningful world, and not in some abstract
model consisting of meaningless physical facts, as assumed by clas-
sical cognitive science. Enactive theory may therefore help us to
better understand the role of “nonstandard” pathways to visual
perception (Pessoa 2013, pp. 244–46).
This convergence also provides an opportunity for neuroscience
to help resolve a puzzle that has emerged for enactive theory. In
short, if sense-making is the default mode of being in the world,
such that an organism’s point of view is saturated with affordances
that are meaningful in terms of its potential actions, then how
do we explain the emergence of the detached observer’s stance
and dispassionate reﬂection, that is, precisely the hallmarks
of higher-level cognition (Cappuccio & Froese 2014)? The
problem is no longer just to understand how perception, cogni-
tion, and emotion are integrated, but likewise under what condi-
tions they can become temporarily separated. This task becomes
especially pressing when it comes to explaining the unusual re-
quirements of sense-making in the context of symbolic culture.
For example, when we see a representation of a pipe, as in
Magritte’s famous painting, what we perceive is a presentation
of an imagined pipe that is in fact objectively absent (Seth
2014). But from the point of view of most animals (as long as
they have not been enculturated), such a representation is experi-
enced differently: either the presented is taken as objectively
present (i.e., a pipe is seen, as a result of a failure of veridical
perception), or the presented is not even recognized as such. Phe-
nomenologically, to experience a representation as a representa-
tion, one has to detach from one’s immediate preoccupations
with the world so as to bring the underlying material substrate
of the potential representation to attention, while neutralizing
any preexisting affordances of that medium, in order to then
imbue it with renewed meaning in accordance with cultural
norms. The revolutionary human abilities based on symbolic cog-
nition, particularly language and writing, are only achievable with
this tight yet ﬂexible integration of perceptual, cognitive, and
emotional processes. Pessoa (2013) did not systematically review
species-speciﬁc differences of neural integration, but we can hy-
pothesize that in humans these processes are more ﬂexibly inte-
grated. Findings worthy of a closer look include the malleable
relationship between prefrontal cortex and the amygdala (p.
115) and the relative isolation of prefrontal cortex from sensory
stimuli (pp. 233–34; 255–56).
Pessoa’s work also nicely complements the enactive approach to
social cognition, which includes the phenomenological claim that
we normally directly perceive aspects of others’ minds in their
bodily expressions; for example, happiness in another’s smile.
This “direct perception hypothesis” (Froese & Leavens 2014)
stands in contrast to standard theory of mind accounts, which
start from the assumption that others’ subjective states are percep-
tually inaccessible and must therefore be inferred (or simulated)
based on perception of purely objective surface behavior.
Unless we are referring to the abnormal social experience of
certain people with schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder,
standard approaches are not phenomenologically convincing
(Froese et al. 2013). But it is easy to see how they theoretically
made sense when combined with the premise that perception,
cognition, and emotion are distinct modules: perception could
only ever deliver neutral physical facts, such that cognition then
has to ﬁgure out what is going on, after which it can evoke an emo-
tional response. However, if perception, cognition, and emotion
are tightly integrated, as Pessoa asserts, then there is no longer
any reason to assume that perception cannot directly present us
with others’ states of minds in their meaningful bodily expressions.
Conversely, the direct perception hypothesis helps us to better
understand the role of cognitive-emotional feedback to early
sensory regions: it is required to constitute such a meaningful per-
ceptual world.
Pessoa’s proposal also productively relates to another contro-
versial theory of the enactive approach – namely that bodily and
environmental (including social) activity can form a genuine part
of mental processes (De Jaegher et al. 2010; Thompson 2007).
On this view, the brain is conceived of as a “mediating organ”
(Fuchs 2011) of embodied activity in the world rather than as
its sole basis (Gallagher et al. 2013). Returning to an issue
raised earlier, one criticism of recent attempts to formulate a pre-
dictive processing account of enactive perception is that the
former is committed to the classical cognitivist assumption of
brain-centered internalism (Di Paolo 2014; Froese 2014), which
in the social domain equates with individualism. Admittedly, it is
difﬁcult to investigate a distributed view of the mind with the
current tools of neuroscience, and even neurophenomenology
has not always managed to avoid internalism (Beaton 2013).
However, a more embodied and socially situated neurophenome-
nology seems possible (Desmidt et al. 2014; Froese et al. 2014).
Pessoa does not take an explicit stand with regard to the limits
of mind, but I suspect that he might be sympathetic to this highly
contextualized enactive view (see, e.g., p. 202). Crucially, he
allows that functional connectivity can play a role in neural pro-
cesses even in the absence of direct anatomical connectivity (pp.
148–49). It is only a small additional step to extend this concession
to include some kinds of extra-neural processes as another type of
functional connectivity. For example, there does not seem to be
any principled reason for excluding bodily and environmental dy-
namics from neuroscientiﬁc explanations, because externally me-
diated activity can functionally connect effectors and sensors into
a coherent sensorimotor system (Fig. 1).
Relatedly, it has been debated whether the direct perception
hypothesis should be cashed out solely in terms of individuals,
or whether social interaction can play a constitutive role as well.
For example, when we share an intimate moment with a loved
one, may we actually be sharing one experience co-constituted
by networks distributed across two brains? Several authors have
argued that the underlying dynamics of emotional episodes can
span two or more individuals (Colombetti 2014, pp. 66–70), and
Pessoa’s approach is consistent with this possibility. According
to the enactive approach, not every kind of interaction is sufﬁ-
cient. Individuals must co-regulate their activities such that the
Figure 1 (Froese). Two indirect relationships between function
and anatomical structure. According to Pessoa (2013, pp. 207–12),
a functional relationship between two regions of the brain (R1 and
R3) does not necessarily have to be supported by direct structural
connectivity (solid arrows), because their functional connectivity
can be mediated via structural connectivity through another
region (R2). But other forms of mediation are conceivable,
including dynamical routes via extra-neural context C1 (dashed
arrows). Most straightforwardly, we can think of region R3 as
the motor system, region R1 as the sensor system, and context
C1 as the body situated in an environment. R1 and R3 are then
also functionally connected by sensorimotor interactions.
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conditions of success of their actions cannot be reduced to one in-
dividual (Froese et al. 2014), and the effects are further enhanced
by emotional engagement (Schilbach et al. 2013). This is reminis-
cent of Pessoa’s thinking about degrees of isolability and decom-
posability in neural networks (pp. 196–97); for example, that
strong integration requires coupled systems that are strongly in-
teracting. Moreover, measures of functional connectivity are con-
siderably strengthened in affective versus neutral contexts (pp.
209–11). Thus, unless there is a principled reason for rejecting
the application of Pessoa’s approach to inter-brain integration,
we can genuinely participate in each other’s sense-making.
Integration of cognition and emotion in
physical and mental actions in musical and
other behaviors
doi:10.1017/S0140525X14000909, e76
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Abstract: Integration of cognition and emotion, discussed by Pessoa in
The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013), is further illustrated by music. In
music, I argue, this integration begins during mental control of the
actions by which musical sounds are produced. Many emotional
reactions to the music we hear are also strongly related to the actions by
which musical sounds are produced. Studies involving music can further
illuminate the integration of emotion and control of action throughout
behavior.
The experience that music creates as we play it or listen to it
(Dewey 1934/1980) has strong emotional components. How our
brains connect music to emotion is less well understood (Juslin
& Vastfjall 2008; Lindquist et al. 2012). But the pleasure that
making music gives children can help to explain why they will
work to develop music-making skills – skills whose learning can
also affect broader skill development (Gardiner et al. 1996;
2000; 2003; 2008a; 2008c; Zuk et al. 2014).
Facial expressions (Ekman 1992) that communicate genuine
emotion depend on direct involvement of emotion in the
control of the expressive action (Damasio 2010). Music-making
acts should be viewed in a similar way.
As I discussed previously (Gardiner 2012), Damasio’s theory
concerning emotion (1994/2005; 1999; 2010) seems especially rel-
evant to the relationship of music and emotion. Damasio inte-
grates evidence from James and Lange (1922) and Cannon
(1929) with extensive, more-recent research to propose that
emotion is deeply related to ongoing moment-to-moment activa-
tion and restoration adjustments of physiology responding to
changing demands on body and brain. If one adds secondary
and background emotions and mixtures that defy verbal classiﬁca-
tion to primary emotions such as fear and joy, normal experience
shows no break, only changes, in emotion. Feelingsmake us aware
of major features of our physiological emotional adjustments in
ways that interact with our longer-term behavioral choices and
even decision making and reasoning (Damasio 1999).
I will begin with several examples where activities of making
music create emotional experience, then discuss emotional expe-
riences while listening to music. Some of these examples will be
more familiar than others.
Music making typically involves rhythm and always involves
tempo, and these both affect emotional experience. The behavio-
ral uses of rhythm in locomotion are especially relevant here. Rep-
etitions within rhythmic forms can help an individual to
coordinate muscular activities with more general physiological ac-
tivation and recovery. Such integrated physiological coordination
can aid individual capability to continue rhythmic behavior over
time. Relationship between music and locomotion was important
to ancient Greeks (Sachs 1953). Putnam Aldrich taught that to the
ancient Greeks, rhythm was verb: a way of moving through time
(Aldrich 1958). The feelings we experience when walking rhyth-
mically at andante rhythmic tempo, or playing music with such
rhythmic tempo, include an awareness of the associated, unhur-
ried and calm physiology of our body (Gardiner 2012). Slowing
or increasing the tempo in rhythmical locomotion or in music
can cause related changes in the emotional experience and a
related sense of absence or presence of haste.
A more subtle change in experience related to rhythm can also
be experienced in both locomotion and music making. In my daily
walks, my progress seems less and less hurried as I change think-
ing of my individual stepping acts to mentally grouping them into
sets of two, then three, then four. I notice my breathing slowing
and presume that my heart rate changes as well, as my sense of
haste decreases. Something analogous happens when I group
the individual acts in music making into higher-order groupings,
for example when called upon by rhythmic notation involving
so-called cut time in the last movements of sonatas by Haydn,
Mozart, or Beethoven. The decreased sense of haste experienced
is useful in helping to more easily produce music that moves
forward rapidly.
These examples only introduce the many ways in which rhythm
has been developed to interact with emotion in music making.
A second type of contribution to emotional experience as music
is produced comes from reaction to the speciﬁc sounds individu-
ally and in combination that are chosen to be used for musical pur-
poses. I will focus here on sounds used most frequently within
Western music. These either convey a transient percussive
quality (e.g., as produced by clapping or by striking a drum) or, fol-
lowing a start transient, produce a continuing rhythmic vibration
so rapid that individual vibrations do not reach awareness. But
we perceive changes in main frequency of vibration as involving
changes in perception of pitch. Other induced modes of vibration
related to perceived overtones also affect the auditory experience.
The percussive or pitch-bearing sounds have been produced
vocally or by instruments in many different ways (Geiringer
1978; Sachs 1940/2006; 1943/2008) that can affect emotions dif-
ferently. Here I will focus on choices of pitches for sounds from
which music is built. The ratios of frequency between sounds
when presented in sequence (during melody) affect a sense of di-
rection of movement within the music, and also a sense of musical
distance within perceived musical motion. These ratios of fre-
quency also affect the quality and degree of harmony or disso-
nance as two or more sounds with the same or different pitches
are presented at the same time. Modes and scales identify those
pitch relationships that are allowed. The difference in emotional
experience produced by combinations of musical pitches taken
from a major scale and from a minor scale can be striking –
major typically conveying most easily positive; minor, negative
emotion. Hence, the ﬁrst movement of Mozart’s Piano Sonata
KV 310 in A minor, written at the time of his mother’s death,
can convey anger and grief when played with the particular
pitches of the A minor scale. But if the pitch values of only a
few notes are changed slightly, as if the piece were written in A
major, it would be essentially impossible to convey the same emo-
tions available in A minor.
That music making depends on speciﬁc choices of sounds, and
speciﬁc plans for organizing the production of these sounds over
time is of course well understood. But emotions developed as
music is performed do not come only from such basic features.
As or still more importantly, they come from other details of the
creational acts by which musical sounds are produced. Two per-
formances of the same piece can express emotion very differently
depending upon such other details.
In work begun in the 1970s and continued, Manfred Clynes has
opened an extremely important window on the relationship of
such details of music making to emotion (Clynes 1977; Clynes
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& Nettheim 1982; Clynes & Walker 1982). Here, I can only intro-
duce this work and discuss musical implications of his earliest
observations.
Clynes developed a scientiﬁc instrument to study and compare
the vertical and horizontal pressures as an individual produced a
pushing gesture with the ﬁnger. He compared gestures produced
with no speciﬁc emotion in mind with those made when subjects
were asked to express a speciﬁc emotion through the action. He
compared expressions of anger, hate, grief, joy, love, sex, and rev-
erence. And he reported that as individuals indicated they were
indeed experiencing and thus expressing the emotions through
the pressing acts, the nature of records they produced took on
characteristic shapes. The shapes were sufﬁciently different
across emotions but similar across subjects that the associated
emotion could be established from the records themselves.
Clynes also recorded muscular activities and other measures of
physiology.
A detailed discussion of these initial experiments is not possible
here. But they support and provide new opportunity to study sci-
entiﬁcally how music-making acts relate to emotional experiences
the acts express.
A few examples may help to clarify the implications I see in
these observations.
Joy, Clynes (1977, pp. 39–40) tells us, was expressed on his
device by a brief strong downward gesture, then an upward
rebound with overshoot, leading to a feeling of “ﬂoating” that con-
tinued until a new gesture was started. If the song “Mary Had a
Little Lamb” is sung joyfully, this seems to me to involve gestures
of producing and jumping off each note in a way similar to what
Clynes reports, and I am aware of a slight sense of ﬂoating
brieﬂy between the notes. Children typically sing it in this way.
This organization of gestures seems to me to be associated with
a feeling of joy more strongly than if the notes are sung or
played with more connection between them. This type of produc-
tion at the piano seems related also to the joy that can be conveyed
by many last movements of Haydn sonatas. It may be noted that a
smile also involves upward movement and a sense of facial
lightening.
Love, by contrast, Clynes reports (1977, pp. 37–38), though also
a positive emotion, is expressed quite differently in a prolonged
smooth curve. Such a form of action could, and typically would,
need phrasing over several notes, as in the love theme from
“Tristan and Isolde” by Wagner. The Andante movement of
Mozart’s KV 311 Piano Sonata, now in F major, seems to
express love more strongly with musical gestures connected as
Clynes’s observation implies, rather than with the greater detach-
ment associated with joy just discussed. It is plausible that Mozart
intended to express love for his mother with this second move-
ment that follows on the anger and pain expressed in the ﬁrst
movement.
Turning now to listening to music (Gardiner 2008b), I propose
that emotions experienced are most frequently closely related to
those developed as music is created. The growing research con-
cerning mirror neurons (Rizzolati & Craighero 2004), and the
insight this work gives into empathy (Damasio 2010), provides
support for this proposition.
An obvious potential problem with this hypothesis is that many
listeners who respond to music’s emotions do so even before they
have developed the skills needed to produce the music with the
emotional values they experience. The ways we have been discuss-
ing in which the person or people producing music speciﬁcally
generate emotional experience addresses this difﬁculty.
Emotions related to rhythmic movement within music build
upon the experience and foundation we all have regarding
locomotion.
Reactions toparticularmusical sounds chosen formusic canbees-
pecially strong when we produce the sounds ourselves and experi-
ence related physiological reactions. But for reasons still not
adequately understood, the sounds chosen for music also have a po-
tential individually and in combination to develop emotion in a
listener. This has been noticed and exploited in many different
ways throughout human history. Emotions related to harmony and
dissonance to tension and its release, seem to have been especially
important to the choice of sounds used musically (Gardiner 2012).
And as I have discussed and the work of Clynes helps to dem-
onstrate, the ways in which emotion and action may interact in
music making may well not be speciﬁc to music alone. It is
notable that children who cannot develop their cerebral cortex
as a result of early brain damage nevertheless show emotional re-
actions to music (Damasio 2010).
Music, then, as reviewed here, demonstrates a number of ways
emotion can be integrated with the cognitive development and ex-
pression of physical acts. The integration of emotion with control
of action that music exploits seems widespread throughout behav-
ior. The varieties within spoken verbal expression and touch
provide familiar examples. Musical expression can provide many
opportunities to study this integration.
It is also of interest that music making involves skill (Gardiner
2008a; 2008c; 2011). The study of relationship of emotion to
this example of skillful behavior may provide useful insight into
how interactions between emotions and actions affect skillful
behavior more generally.
How arousal inﬂuences neural competition:
What dual competition does not explain
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Abstract: We argue that although the “dual competition” model is useful
when considering interactions between emotional and neutral stimuli, it
fails to account for the inﬂuence of emotional arousal on perceptual or
goal-directed behavior involving neutral stimuli. We present the
“arousal-biased competition” framework as an alternative that accounts
for both scenarios.
In chapter 7 of The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013)
presents his dual competition model to explain how emotion-cog-
nition interactions determine the ﬂow of information processing
in the brain. A signiﬁcant limitation of the dual competition
model is that it focuses exclusively on the competition between
processing emotional versus nonemotional information and
ignores the question of how emotional arousal inﬂuences compe-
tition processes more generally in the brain. In our commentary,
we contrast Pessoa’s “dual competition” framework to another
recent emotion-cognition framework, “arousal-biased competi-
tion” (Mather & Sutherland 2011), which posits that not only do
emotional stimuli compete with nonemotional stimuli, but that
emotional arousal inﬂuences how nonemotional stimuli compete
with each other for neural representation.
Pessoa’s framework is dual natured in that it emphasizes com-
petition in both perceptual and executive processing. Although
Pessoa notes that these two systems interact, he discusses them
largely independently of one another in the book. The dual com-
petition framework accounts for how emotionally signiﬁcant
objects compete with other information, winning greater attention
and memory or impairing goal-directed behavior. Certainly, emo-
tionally arousing things like guns or naked bodies draw attention
and compete with other stimuli for both perceptual (e.g.,
Amting et al. 2010) and executive resources (e.g., Choi et al.
2012). Pessoa does an excellent job detailing the neural pathways
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and networks that are potentially involved in these competitive
processes. But how does an emotionally aroused state inﬂuence
the processing of otherwise benign information? For example,
why do most people recall where they were, or who they were
with, when they ﬁrst heard about the 9/11 attacks, despite the
nonemotional nature of such information? This type of enhanced
memory of neutral details of arousing events is not predicted by
the dual competition framework.
Critically, where Pessoa’s dual competition framework, as well
as most other theories of emotion-cognition interactions, comes
up short is when having to account for how emotionally arousing
stimuli sometimes enhance, rather than suppress, perception and
memory for the neutral things that happen nearby in space or
time. For example, fear-related cues have been shown to
enhance both the perception of (Phelps et al. 2006), and the
neural response for (Padmala & Pessoa 2008), simple visual fea-
tures such as Gabor patches. Additionally, the presence of a
task-irrelevant emotionally evocative image during encoding can
produce either retrograde amnesia (Strange et al. 2003) or retro-
grade enhancement (Anderson et al. 2006) of neutral images. The
dual competition framework can account for cases in which the
processing of neutral stimuli is impaired by arousing stimuli
(e.g., Amting et al. 2010), or when emotional distracters impair
goal-directed behavior (e.g., Dolcos & McCarthy 2006). It does
not account for cases in which arousing stimuli enhance perceptu-
al processing of neutral stimuli (e.g., Padmala & Pessoa 2008;
Phelps, et al. 2006). Nor does it account for cases in which emo-
tional arousal facilitates executive processes (e.g., Knight &
Mather 2009). In contrast, the arousal-biased competition
model accounts for both arousal’s enhancement and impairment
effects by positing that arousal increases the gain on biased com-
petition processes. Stimulus representations with high priority,
either because of top-down goals or bottom-up salience, are
further activated under arousal, while representations of compet-
ing, lower-priority stimuli, are further suppressed (Lee et al. 2014;
Sutherland & Mather 2012).
In terms of perceptual competition, Pessoa reviews ﬁndings
that demonstrate the competitive advantage held by emotionally
signiﬁcant objects, like emotional faces. However, recent ﬁndings
indicate that emotional arousal also increases the gain on compe-
tition between nonemotional stimuli (Lee et al. 2014; Sutherland
& Mather 2012). For example, on each trial in their study, Suth-
erland andMather (2012) presented participants with a sound that
was emotionally arousing or a neutral sound, and then 750 to
3000 ms later, brieﬂy ﬂashed eight letters on a white background
and asked participants to report as many of the letters as they
could. Some of the letters were light gray and some dark gray. Ev-
eryone reported a greater number of the more salient dark gray
letters than the light gray letters, but this advantage for the
salient letters was signiﬁcantly greater after hearing emotionally
arousing sounds. A similar pattern has been observed in the
brain when participants were shown one salient stimulus next to
a less salient stimulus, preceded by a tone previously conditioned
to predict shock or a neutral tone (Lee et al. 2014). Lee et al.
(2014) found that while neural activity in the fusiform face area
(FFA) corresponding to the perceptually salient face images was
enhanced, activity in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) corre-
sponding to the nonsalient item was attenuated on fear-induced
arousal trials. This enhancement of processing salient stimuli
and inhibition of processing competing less salient stimuli exem-
pliﬁes the type of interaction of emotional arousal and perceptual
priority accounted for by arousal-biased competition.
When Pessoa considers “executive competition,” he reviews
ﬁndings in which a task-irrelevant emotional stimulus produces
impairments in executive behavior and neural inhibition.
However, his dual competition perspective cannot account for
other ﬁndings demonstrating that the presence of a low-priority
emotionally arousing stimulus can facilitate goal-directed (or exec-
utive) behavior (Anderson et al. 2006; Knight & Mather 2009;
Steidl et al. 2006). For example, recently Sakaki et al. (2014)
found that when participants’ goal was to encode items preceding
a potentially emotional oddball item (i.e., oddball-1 items),
memory was greater for goal-relevant items on emotional
oddball trials compared to nonemotional oddball trials. This ob-
servation of retrograde enhancement demonstrates that task-irrel-
evant emotional arousal can facilitate the execution of task-
relevant behavior, which is contrary to the predictions made by
the dual competition framework. Additionally, when participants’
goal was to encode the oddball item itself, the presence of an emo-
tional oddball led to worse memory for oddball-1 items than the
presence of an emotionally neutral oddball. Together, these ﬁnd-
ings demonstrate that emotional arousal can either enhance or
impairmemory for neutral items depending on how goal-relevant
information is prioritized.
In conclusion, although Pessoa provides an informative take on
how emotional stimuli inﬂuence resource competition within the
brain, his dual competition model addresses only one subclass of
how emotion inﬂuences neural competition. To understand how
emotion inﬂuences cognition more generally, one must consider
how emotional arousal can either enhance or impair processing
of stimuli that are not inherently emotionally arousing. We
argue that emotion inﬂuences competitive processes in the
brain in general, regardless of whether the mental representations
in competition are themselves inherently arousing.
The cognitive-emotional brain is an embodied
and social brain
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Abstract: Pessoa (2013) makes a compelling case for conceiving of
emotion and cognition as deeply integrated processes in the brain. We
will begin our commentary by asking what implications this view of the
brain has for an ontology of cognition – a theory of what cognition is and
what cognitive processes exist. We will suggest that Pessoa’s book, The
Cognitive-Emotional Brain, provides strong support for an embodied
theory of cognition. We end our commentary by offering some
speculation about how Pessoa’s arguments naturally extend to social
cognition.
In the conclusions to The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa
(2013) suggests that the mapping of cognition and emotion onto
the brain is best characterized in terms of “integration,” rather
than “segregation” (p. 251). At the beginning of the book, he
tells us that he thinks of emotion and cognition as “complementary
pairs that mutually deﬁne each other” (p. 5). Pessoa amasses a
wealth of evidence that suggests the categories of cognition and
emotion are not distinct categories. In chapter 2, for example, he
elaborates his view of the amygdala as functioning as part of a
larger system for relevance detection. This perspective calls into
question theories in neuroscience that would divide the processing
of emotion-laden visual stimuli into a subcortical low-road, and a
cortical high-road. Pessoa mostly focuses his argument on his
own ﬁeld of cognitive neuroscience, but we suggest, however,
that the implications go well beyond cognitive neuroscience. We
suggest they are best interpreted as concerned with “cognitive on-
tology” – the debate over the right taxonomy to be used for under-
standing cognition (Anderson 2010; 2015; Poldrack 2006; 2008;
2010; Price & Friston 2005). Pessoa shows how neuroscience (by
which we mean the combination of neuroimaging, behavioural
and animal research that Pessoa reviews) should lead cognitive
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scientists in general to reexamine the categories it employs to un-
derstand cognition. We suggest in particular it should lead cogni-
tive scientists to embrace what we will call an embodied theory
of cognitive processes.
Let us begin by justifying the claim that is implicit in this argu-
ment: that neuroscience can provide a constraint on theorizing
about cognition in cognitive science. We take such a conclusion
to be a consequence of the network perspective that Pessoa devel-
ops in his book. Such a perspective upsets any project of localizing
function to speciﬁc anatomical brain regions. (For speciﬁc argu-
ments to this effect, see chapters 8 and 9). There can be no
one-to-one mapping of psychological function to anatomical
regions or structures, because brain regions and structures are
pluripotent and degenerate. Pluripotency refers to the well-estab-
lished ﬁnding that one and the same region (e.g., Broca’s area) can
be involved in the performance of multiple functions (e.g., lan-
guage processing, movement preparation, imitation, and
imagery related tasks (see Anderson 2010 for discussion of this
and other examples of pluripotency). Degeneracy refers to the
ﬁnding that different neural structures can perform one and the
same function (Edelman & Gally 2001; Figdor 2010; Friston &
Price 2003). Taken together these ﬁndings suggest a many-to-
many mapping of structure to function. There are a number of
possible reactions one might have to this result. One might, for
example, attempt to preserve the current theoretical framework
we have for carving up cognitive processes and look for theories
and models that map cognition more cleanly onto neural struc-
tures. A more radical response, however, is to question our
current ways of functionally decomposing a complex cognitive
process into more basic cognitive operations. We suggest that
this more radical response is the one Pessoa recommends. The
reason why we are not able to map function cleanly to the brain
may lie with the categories, theories, and models we are using
to deﬁne cognitive operations. In Pessoa’s view, it lies with the an-
tagonistic and separatist conception of the relation between
emotion and cognition. We need a different set of conceptual
tools for carving up the cognitive if we are to correctly model
the cognitive operations that map onto the brain.
How, then, do we determine what functional contribution an
individual brain region is making when we ﬁnd it activated in a
neuroimaging experiment? We cannot assume that whenever
we ﬁnd a brain region active it is being used to do the same
thing (Poldrack 2006). The same brain region can be active in
many different networks, and the contribution it makes to each
network may vary over time based on the number, strength, and
topology of its connections (Anderson 2010; Pessoa 2013, ch.8;
Price & Friston 2005). Nor can we just focus on this type of ana-
tomical or structural connectivity: brain regions that are not
directly structurally connected may nevertheless be functionally
connected, and vice versa (pp. 207–12). What we can do,
however, is compare the different domains in which a region or
network is systematically engaged. On the basis of these compar-
isons, Pessoa suggests one “hope is that cognitive ontologies can
be deﬁned that meaningfully carve the ‘mental’ into stable catego-
ries” (p. 226).
We suggest there is a cognitive ontology that can be extracted
from Pessoa’s book, and it is one that strongly supports an embod-
ied theory of cognition. The core idea of “embodiment” as we shall
understand is that cognitive processes are dynamically entangled
with the bodily processes involved in sensorimotor interactions
with the environment (see Kiverstein 2012; Kiverstein & Miller,
under review). We will let some themes from Pessoa’s book
serve as an illustration of what we mean. The early chapters of
his book establish that because of the extensive communication
between the amygdala and visual cortex, vision is always laden
with affective signiﬁcance. We do not wait to see before we
feel – instead our fast affective reactions to the environment
inform and constitute our perceptual experiences (cf. Barrett &
Barr 2009). Pessoa shows how areas of the brain that process emo-
tional information (e.g., hypothalamus, insula, medial prefrontal
cortex) function as hubs that because of their extensive connec-
tions are optimally placed to have a “near global effect” on brain
function. The function of these extensively connected affective
brain regions is to evaluate what is signiﬁcant for the organism
and to mobilize the body for action on the basis of these evalua-
tions. Putting these ideas together, we get the following big
picture. Evaluations of affective signiﬁcance that mobilize the
body for action have a “near global effect” on cognition. We
ﬁnd it hard to imagine a better statement of what it means to
claim that cognition is embodied.
Pessoa goes on to develop a picture of information-processing
in the brain in which there is a constant competition for the
efﬁcient use of limited processing resources. He shows how
“frontal-parietal regions work closely with regions such as the hy-
pothalamus, amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior insula to
prioritize processing based on the emotional value of a sensory
stimulus” (sect. 5.1.1, para. 2) He develops a model of attentional
and executive control (the “dual competition model”) that shows
how classically cognitive functions in the brain are in fact informed
by representations emotional value, again supporting an embod-
ied theory of attentional and executive control.
We will end our commentary by arguing that the argument we
have begun to sketch for an embodied perspective on cognition
naturally extends to the social brain. We will focus our argument
on work in social cognitive neuroscience concerned with empathic
responses to pain. This work has established that parts of the pain
matrix are activated both when a subject is in pain and when
another individual is perceived to be in pain (Singer & Lamm
2009). When, for example, we perceive a loved one being injected
with a needle, there is activity in the same network of brain areas
(speciﬁcally bilateral anterior insula; dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex; and parts of the cerebellum and brainstem) that are
active when we ourselves are injected (Decety & Lamm 2006;
Singer & Leiberg 2009). Similar results have been found for em-
pathetic experiences of touch (Bufaleri et al. 2007; Cheng et al.
2007; Lamm et al. 2007), disgust (Wicker et al. 2003), and joy
(Jabbi et al. 2007).
This type of mirroring activity has however been shown to be
modulated by contextual factors such as past experience, prior
beliefs, and group membership (Avenanti et al. 2010; Azevedo
et al. 2013; Lamm et al. 2007; Singer et al. 2006; Singer & de
Vignemont 2006). These ﬁndings have led to a proposal to distin-
guish two separate systems in the brain for affective and cognitive
empathy for pain (Jacob and de Vignemont 2012). This is in
keeping with a more general distinction that is made between emo-
tional contagion, in which I undergo a self-oriented emotion (I feel
distressed because you are distressed), and cognitive empathy, in
which I imaginatively recreate the pain you are undergoing.
What should we make of this distinction between affective and
cognitive empathy in the light of Pessoa’s work on the cognitive-
emotional brain?
We suggest it needs rethinking. Pessoa’s work challenges dual
process theories of cognition in general by calling into question di-
visions of cognition into automatic and cognitively controlled pro-
cesses. He proposes replacing this dichotomy with “a continuous
framework” that covers a spectrum of cases in which there is
more or less demand on the brain’s processing resources. What
would the distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy
look like within this continuous framework? We suggest such a
distinction is a candidate for conceptual revision in the light of
what Pessoa tells us about neural networks.
There are very likely some cases of empathy that require more
or less expenditure of cognitive effort and control. However, it
would be a mistake to treat these cases as different in kind from
cases of emotional contagion that seem to be less demanding in
the processing resources they consume. It would be a mistake
to assume, for example, that the processing required for emotional
contagion is resource independent and hence capacity unlimited
just because contagion occurs unintentionally, and unconsciously.
Based on Pessoa’s discussion of emotion and attention in chapter
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4, we suggest that one of the factors that decides whether limited
processes resources are given over to empathy is whether the
other person’s emotions matter to us or not. (Also relevant will
be the other demands on our attention [p. 85–89].) Consider in
this light the ﬁndings that mirroring activity is context-sensitive.
Azevedo et al. (2013) found, for example, that bilateral anterior
insula activity and autonomic reactivity were greater when
seeing a hand being painfully injected belonging to a person of
one’s own race as contrasted with a hand belonging to a
member of an out-group. Whether or not we feel what the
other is feeling seems to depend on the care one has for the
other, a ﬁnding that is naturally explained using the ideas we
just sketched from Pessoa’s book.
A second point we want to brieﬂy note is how Pessoa’s network
perspective requires us to rethink standard ways of understanding
the human social brain. Uta and Chris Frith have suggested that
the social brain in humans “has a ‘theory of mind,’ which
enables us to predict what others are going to do on the basis of
their beliefs and desires. It also has a ‘mirror system’ which
enables us to understand others’ goal and intentions and to empa-
thise with their emotions by a mechanism of motor resonance”
(Frith & Frith 2010, p. 165). Both systems are, however, concep-
tualized as made up of brain regions that compute speciﬁc func-
tions. Pessoa suggests by contrast that the processes a brain
region carries out will depend on the “network afﬁliation” it has
at a particular time. Networks continuously dissolve and reform
in ways that depend on the contexts in which they are functioning.
If all of this is right, it is mistake to say that some set of brain
regions are for mentalising or mirroring. There are networks
that the brain uses in the context of social interactions, and the
processing that takes place in these networks is deeply informed
by what is of affective signiﬁcance for the person (Schilbach
et al. 2012). Sharing emotion with the other is important
because it imbues our perception of the other person with affec-
tive signiﬁcance.
Behavioral evidence for a continuous
approach to the perception of emotionally
valenced stimuli
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Abstract: Pessoa’s (2013) dual competition model outlines a framework
for how cognition and emotion interact at the perceptual levels and
provides evidence within the ﬁeld of neuroscience to support this new
perspective. Here, I discuss how behavioral work fares with this new
model and how visual detection is inﬂuenced by information with
affective or motivational content.
Theories separating emotion from cognition are decades, maybe
even centuries, old. Classic views of emotion have long proposed
that each discrete emotion has dedicated neural circuitry that is
activated automatically, without conscious awareness (e.g.,
Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Izard 2007; Panksepp 2007). More con-
tinuous, multicomponent models of emotion that allow for inter-
actions between cognitive and affective systems have received
recent attention in the literature (e.g., Coan 2010; Cunningham
& Zelazo 2009; Lewis & Douglas 1998). In his Précis of The Cog-
nitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa presents a new approach to how
cognition and emotion are integrated in the brain that is similar
to these newer multicomponent models. His dual competition
model outlines a framework for such interactions at the perceptual
levels; here, I will discuss the speciﬁc aspects of his proposal that
address how perception is directly inﬂuenced by information
with affective or motivational content and how behavioral data
might speak to his new model.
According to what Pessoa calls the “standard hypothesis,” the
processing of emotionally valenced stimuli occurs rapidly, auto-
matically, and nonconsciously, independent of attention and
awareness. In terms of the brain, the processing of these stimuli
takes the “low-road,” or a subcortical route. He presents an alter-
native to the standard hypothesis – the multiple waves model –
suggesting that emotional stimuli engage multiple regions of the
brain, activating both cortical and noncortical channels. Thus,
the processing of emotionally valenced stimuli cannot necessarily
be accounted for by one speciﬁc mechanism, and there are mul-
tiple pathways for the perception of these stimuli.
Pessoa thoroughly evaluates neuroscience research that sup-
ports both the standard hypothesis and his new model, but
given that the focus of The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (Pessoa
2013) is indeed on the brain, there is very little discussion of
how behavioral work can also speak to these perspectives. There
is in fact a large body of work on visual attention to emotional
stimuli that researchers use to debate the standard hypothesis
versus alternative accounts. Countless studies have reported that
both adults and more recently, preschool children, detect negative
or threat-relevant stimuli, such as snakes and spiders, more
quickly than a variety of neutral stimuli, such as ﬂowers, mush-
rooms, frogs, and cockroaches (Flykt 2005; 2006; Hayakawa
et al. 2011; Lipp 2006; Lipp & Derakshan 2005; Lipp et al.
2004; Lipp & Waters 2007; LoBue 2010; LoBue & DeLoache
2008; 2011; Masataka & Shibasaki 2012; Öhman et al. 2001a;
Purkis & Lipp 2007; Soares et al. 2012; Tipples et al. 2002b.
They also detect threatening or angry faces more quickly than
happy, neutral, or even sad faces (Calvo et al. 2006; Eastwood
et al. 2001; Esteves 1999; Fox et al. 2000; Hansen & Hansen
1988; LoBue 2009; Lundqvist & Öhman 2005; Öhman et al.
2001b; Schubo et al. 2006; Tipples et al. 2002a; Williams et al.
2005). Similar ﬁndings have been reported with human infants
(LoBue & DeLoache 2010; Rakison & Derringer 2008) and non-
human primates (Shibasaki & Kawai 2009), providing compelling
evidence that humans have a perceptual bias for the rapid detec-
tion of emotional (and speciﬁcally negative or threat-relevant)
stimuli.
Consistent with the standard hypothesis, many researchers have
explained perceptual biases for threat via automatic, pre-attentive,
or nonconscious processes, as opposed to controlled, conscious, or
cognitively mediated processes. Evidence for the automaticity
account comes from data suggesting that the detection of
threat-relevant targets (snakes, spiders, angry faces) does not
vary based on the number of distracters present in an array. In
other words, whereas the detection of nonthreatening stimuli
slows when the number of distracters increases from four to
nine, detection of threat-relevant stimuli remains equally efﬁcient
regardless of the number of distracters present in a matrix (e.g.,
Eastwood & Smilek 2005; Fox et al. 2000; Öhman et al. 2001a).
This suggests that individuals use parallel, or automatic search
mechanisms to detect threatening stimuli, and that they use
serial, or conscious search strategies to detect nonthreatening
stimuli.
However, despite several studies demonstrating evidence for
automatic detection of threat, others present evidence against au-
tomatic search, either by failing to demonstrate set size effects for
threat-relevant stimuli or by reporting detection latencies that are
too slow to represent automatic search (for a review, see Becker
et al. 2011a; Horstmann & Bauland 2006). Other studies demon-
strate that the advantage for threat-relevant stimuli may have
nothing to do with emotional valence at all and is, instead,
driven by low-level features of the targets. Indeed, speciﬁc geo-
metric shapes, such as the “V” shaped brow characteristic of
angry faces or simple curvilinear ﬁgures common to snakes are
sufﬁcient in eliciting rapid detection (Larson et al. 2007; LoBue
& DeLoache 2011; LoBue & Larson 2010. Further, presenting
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participants with speciﬁc features of angry faces in non-face-like
conﬁgurations maintains the advantage (Coelho et al. 2011; Horst-
mann et al. 2006), and removing or manipulating these important
features eliminates it (Becker et al. 2011b).
While the controversy rages on about whether automatic versus
controlled search mechanisms drive the rapid perception of emo-
tional stimuli, most researchers acknowledge that both automatic
and controlled processes likely play a role in threat detection (e.g,
Frischen et al. 2008; Wolfe 1998). Further, research on visual at-
tention to emotional stimuli is usually designed to test the stan-
dard hypothesis and does not allow for the study of multiple
interacting pathways for rapid detection. This leaves us with the
same old dichotomy that Pessoa’s theory is aimed at revising –
subcortical versus cortical routes, parallel versus serial search,
nonconscious versus conscious processing – instead of leaving
room for a continuous, more integrated explanation.
Very recent behavioral work that explicitly examines multiple
pathways for the rapid detection of emotional stimuli indeed sug-
gests that there is no single factor that effectively drives the
phenomenon. In one recent study, for example, researchers at-
tempted to examine the unique and potentially interacting roles
of low-level perceptual cues, cognitive factors, and emotional
state on rapid visual detection of threat. Across studies, adult par-
ticipants were asked to detect low-level perceptual features of a
commonly studied threat-relevant stimulus – snakes. They were
asked to detect simple curvilinear (snake-like) versus equally
simple rectilinear shapes in a visual search task in the absence
of any threat-relevant cues. In Experiment 2, the same procedure
was used, except that threat-relevant or non-threat-relevant
labels – calling the simple shapes “snakes” or “caterpillars” –
were applied to the curvilinear and rectilinear stimuli in order
to examine the added role of cognition (or knowing the identity
of a stimulus) in detection. Finally, in Experiment 3, a fearful or
neutral emotional induction was administered to participants
before they completed the visual detection task with curvilinear
and rectilinear targets to examine the role that emotional state
might play in rapid detection.
The results were compelling, implicating all three factors.
Across all three studies, adults detected simple curvilinear
shapes more quickly than simple rectilinear shapes in the
absence of any threat-relevant cues, suggesting a perceptual bias
for curvilinarity. Further, threat-relevant labels and a fearful emo-
tional induction facilitated detection even further, potentially
playing an additive role in rapid detection (LoBue 2014). This
study – speciﬁcally designed to examine a more continuous hy-
pothesis about the roles of perception, cognition, and emotion
on rapid detection – suggests that multiple factors can lead to a
bias for emotionally valenced stimuli.
Another recent study using eye-tracking technology further
supports this perspective, demonstrating that the advantage for
threat-relevant stimuli in visual search tasks cannot be accounted
for by either bottom-up or top-down processing biases alone. In
the study, researchers replicated a classic threat-detection para-
digm with an eye-tracker. Adults were presented with 2 × 2 and
3 × 3 matrices of images and were told to press one button if all
of the images were from a single category, and a second button
if there was a discrepant image (target) in each matrix. The
targets were threat-relevant (snakes and spiders) or non-threat-
relevant (ﬂowers and mushrooms) – the same photographs and
procedure used in a classic, widely cited study by Öhman et al.
(2001a). The results replicated previous work, demonstrating
that adults detected discrepant snakes and spiders more quickly
than discrepant ﬂowers and mushrooms. Most importantly, the
ﬁxation data further suggested that a single mechanism was not
solely responsible for the results.
There was indeed an advantage for snakes and spiders in per-
ception; participants were faster to ﬁrst ﬁxate threat-relevant
versus non-threat-relevant targets, suggesting (consistent with
previous literature) that bottom-up processes lead to an advantage
for the threat-relevant stimuli. However, there was also an
advantage for snakes and spiders in behavioral responding – par-
ticipants were faster to decide that discrepant threat-relevant
stimuli were present after ﬁrst ﬁxating them, demonstrating that
there is also a top-down advantage for threatening stimuli in
detection tasks. Together, this work suggests that a bias for
threat-relevant stimuli is driven by an advantage in both
bottom-up and top-down processing (LoBue et al. 2014).
Together, this behavioral work adds to the body of literature re-
viewed by Pessoa, suggesting that the processing of emotional
stimuli cannot necessarily be accounted for by one speciﬁc mech-
anism and that there are multiple pathways for the perception of
emotionally valenced stimuli. As he puts it, “the fate of a biologi-
cally relevant stimulus should not be understood in terms of a ‘low
road’ versus a ‘high road,’ but in terms of the ‘multiple roads’ that
lead to the expression of observed behaviors” (Pessoa 2013, p. 79).
Although some of the newer behavioral work reviewed here sup-
ports a more continuous model of emotional perception, most
behavioral work to date has sought to support or refute the stan-
dard hypothesis and does not necessarily allow for multiple inter-
acting factors in their experimental designs. Ultimately, the
consideration of newer, more continuous models of emotional
perception might take us further in understanding the develop-
ment of emotional behavior than traditional views that promote
a fundamental separation between affect and cognition.
United we stand, divided we fall: Cognition,
emotion, and the moral link between them
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Abstract: Contrary to Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment
(Greene 2013), this commentary suggests that the network view of the
brain proposed by Pessoa, in which emotion and cognition may be used
as labels in the context of certain behaviors, but will not map clearly into
compartmentalized pieces of the brain, could represent a better
explanation of the rationale behind people’s moral behavior.
After revealing the error of Descartes (Damasio 1994), neurosci-
ences seem to have taken two different paths in the study of brain
organization during the past two decades. On the one hand, some
researchers have tried to emphasize the deep interactions
between cognition and emotion by postulating an integration of
the brain’s networks, none of which should be intended as specif-
ically emotional or cognitive (Feldman Barret et al. 2007; Ochsner
& Gross 2005; Pessoa 2008). But, on the other hand, there has
been an escalation of manichean points of view, according to
which there are separate systems for emotion and cognition that
seem to subtend different modules in the brain (Keren & Schul
2009). Speciﬁcally, in the domain of moral decision making, the
dualism between emotion and cognition has led to a dual-
process brain framework that has received considerable attention
due to the neuroimaging works of Joshua Greene (Greene et al.
2001; 2004; for a review, see Greene 2013). The main point of
Greene’s theory is that, when we make moral decisions (deciding
whether an act would be right or wrong), we can be automatic,
fast, and emotional, or controlled, slow, and rational. In an
attempt to establish a bridge between neuroimaging data and
moral philosophy, Greene proposes that deontological judgments
arise from areas of the brain more associated with emotional reac-
tions, whereas utilitarian judgments arise from areas of the brain
more associated with cognitive control. In this sense, deontology
is an emotionally (strong) based theory that may, in some cases,
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pull us away from a clear deliberation about the signiﬁcant char-
acteristics of a moral situation. But, in some circumstances, we
can transcend this visceral reaction by adopting a more rational
and utilitarian point of view in order to override it, as well as con-
stitute a more reliable moral guide because it is ineluctably cogni-
tive. What emerges is a dual-process (moral) theory in which the
deontological-utilitarian conﬂict (conﬂict that mirrors the emo-
tional-cognitive conﬂict) should be understood in terms of a mu-
tually suppressive relationship (Greene 2008).
In his interesting The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa
(2013) proposes a different framework of brain organization in
which cognitive control and emotion are not competitive mecha-
nisms but integrated processes. The book’s main claim is that
emotion and cognition are functionally integrated systems that
continuously impact each other’s operation. Although Pessoa
never speaks about moral judgments, I am very sympathetic
with the main claim, and I think that the framework proposed
by the author may also have important echoes in the context of
moral decision making. Speciﬁcally, the network perspective of
brain organization (e.g., behavioral processes are not implement-
ed by a single brain area, but rather by the interaction of multiple
areas), accompanied by the integrative view of cognition and
emotion that emerges from Pessoa’s book, permits us to reconsid-
er the conﬂict between utilitarian (cognitive) and deontological
(emotional) ethics in moral decision making, as suggested by
Greene (2013), and to “transform” this moral conﬂict through a
process of integrating a set of different moral considerations.
Here, I will focus on two aspects of Pessoa’s proposal.
A “conﬂict” between reason and emotion do not require the
existence of two systems. As noted by Keren and Schul (2009),
to prove the existence of two systems, we need a strong argument
regarding how the dichotomy emotion/cognition is arranged, al-
lowing one system to be characterized by one attribute and the
other by its complement. The arrangement chosen by Greene
(2013) is that emotions are automatic processes and, on the con-
trary, reason involves the conscious application of decision rules.
Furthermore, Greene identiﬁes the ventromedial area of the pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC) as deputed to emotional processes and the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) as a clearly cognitive area
that is dedicated to cognitive control. When people are faced
with the trolley dilemma, they apply a utilitarian perspective
using the dlPFC that favors hitting the switch to maximize the
number of lives saved. Conversely, when people are faced with
the footbridge dilemma, they experience a strong emotional re-
sponse enabled by the vmPFC. As a result, most people judge
that the action is wrong by adopting a deontological perspective.
Instead, for those few people who endorse a utilitarian perspective
in the footbridge dilemma, they have to override the negative re-
action to pushing innocent people off the footbridge in order to
perform an extremely affectively difﬁcult action. By combining
these ideas, we have a dual-process theory of moral judgment.
But this “alleged” conﬂict between cognition and emotion really
requires two mutually suppressing systems, and is it really a con-
ﬂict between utilitarianism and deontology?
Pessoa argued that the theories that posit a push-pull antagonis-
tic organization in the prefrontal cortex involved in cognition and
emotion, although still inﬂuential, are no longer tenable. In fact,
there are a large number of studies that strongly favor organiza-
tion of the prefrontal cortex not as a simple push-pull mechanism,
but as interactions that result in processes that are neither purely
cognitive nor emotional (Ochsner & Gross 2005; Pessoa 2008).
Speciﬁcally, the dlPFC is seen as a focal point for cognitive-emo-
tional interactions, which have been observed across a wide range
of cognitive tasks. This means that brain regions that are impor-
tant for executive control are actively engaged by emotion.
Emotion can either enhance or impair cognitive performance,
and the dual competition framework proposed by Pessoa, in
which emotion and cognition interact with/compete for the re-
sources required for the tasks, permits us to explain how
emotional content impacts executive control. Pessoa suggests
that these interactions between emotion and cognition do not ﬁt
into a simple push-pull relationship; thus, a continuous framework
seems better than a dichotomous one. The theory of moral judg-
ment proposed by Moll et al. (2007; 2008b) in which moral deci-
sion making is implemented by a single set of brain areas could
represent a valid alternative to Greene’s dual-process theory. In
this single-process theory of moral judgment, emotions act as a
guide to the salience of situational information or as an input to
the reasoning process. In that sense, the conﬂict between emo-
tional and cognitive mechanisms is replaced by a process that in-
tegrates a set of different considerations. For these reasons, as it is
conceivable (and possible) to develop a continuous model that
maps the interaction between emotion and cognition, I think
that it is also conceivable (and possible) to develop a continuous
model that captures the interactions between deontology and util-
itarianism as compatible and reinforcing theories without consid-
ering them mutually exclusive (Gray & Schein 2012).
Beyond the conﬂict between deontology and utilitarianism. In
Manfrinati et al. (2013), we developed an experimental paradigm
in which participants were explicitly required to choose between
two possible resolutions of a moral dilemma, one deontological
and the other utilitarian. Furthermore, we asked participants to
rate their emotional experience during moral-decision making, col-
lecting valence and arousal ratings throughout the process of resolv-
ing the dilemma. In this way, we can assess whether, and to what
extent, conscious emotion is engaged during the process of decision
that will lead to the choice of one of the two resolutions. The results
showed that cognitive and emotional processes participate in both
deontological and utilitarian moral judgments. In particular, we
found that, if the utilitarian judgment involves controlled reasoning
processes to construct a set of practical principles for our moral
behavior, then the whole process might have a high emotional
cost. In fact, when people choose a utilitarian resolution, they
might consider the consequences of an act as relevant indetermining
itsmorality, but theymost likely feel that this resolution could under-
mine their moral integrity, thus evoking a harsh emotional feeling.
Furthermore, and contrary to Greene’s (2008) prediction, ac-
cording to which there is an asymmetry between utilitarian and
deontological judgments, with the former driven by controlled
cognitive processes and the latter driven by more automatic pro-
cesses, we found that controlled reasoning is required to account
not only for utilitarian judgments, but also for deontological judg-
ments. In fact, our participants showed slower response times in
choosing the deontological resolution of the dilemma than the
utilitarian one. Given that these results showed an integrative
pattern of emotional and cognitive processes in moral judgment,
I think that this integrative pattern could also be applied to
account for the relation between deontology and utilitarianism.
Speciﬁcally, if the network perspective proposed by Pessoa sug-
gests that the mind-brain is not decomposable in terms of
emotion and cognition because they are functionally integrated
systems, then we could hypothesize that moral cognition cannot
be decomposed in deontology and utilitarianism. As claimed by
Gray and Schein (2012), the normative conﬂict between deontol-
ogy and utilitarianism seems to lose signiﬁcance when we consider
the psychological aspects of moral decision making. Indeed, when
we investigate these psychological aspects, we realize that, many
times, the acts of the moral agent are linked with their conse-
quences, which suggests that people simultaneously care about
deontological and utilitarian perspectives. Therefore, we might
consider the relationship between deontology and utilitarianism
as a continuum that “mirrors” the continuous framework
between emotion and cognition highlighted by Pessoa.
To sum up, in this commentary, I have tried to point out that
the network view of the brain proposed by Pessoa, in which
emotion and cognition may be used as labels in the context of
certain behaviors, but will not map clearly into compartmentalized
pieces of the brain, may represent a signiﬁcant rationale for the
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investigations of moral behavior. In accordance with Pessoa’s
claim that the effects of emotion on cognition, and vice versa,
are best viewed not as a simple push-pull mechanism, but as inter-
actions that result in processes that are neither purely cognitive
nor emotional, it no longer makes sense – in the ﬁeld of moral de-
cision making – to engage in debate over whether moral judgment
is accomplished exclusively by reason or by emotion. Rather,
moral judgment is the product of complex integrations/interac-
tions between emotional and cognitive mechanisms.
Models for cognition and emotion:
Evolutionary and linguistic considerations
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Abstract: A central claim in Luiz Pessoa’s (2013) book is that the terms
“emotion” and “cognition” can be useful in characterizing behaviors but
will not be cleanly mapped into brain regions. In order to be veriﬁed,
this claim requires models for the integration and interfacing of emotion
and cognition; yet, such models remain problematic.
As Luiz Pessoa (2013) acknowledges in the preface of his insight-
ful book, The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, the modeling of func-
tion-structure mappings for cognition and emotion has received
very little attention in the literature, particularly when compared
with the abundance of empirical ﬁndings conﬁrming the interac-
tion between cognition and emotion. Pessoa devotes an entire
chapter to the problem of function-structure mappings and em-
phasizes its importance throughout the book with admirable
clarity. His efforts to close this theoretical gap constitute a
signal contribution to the literature. Because of the crucial role
that function-structure mappings will play in future debates on
emotion and cognition, this review focuses on Pessoa’s proposals
on how to model their integration.
An overview of the current state of the literature concerning
models for cognition and emotion demonstrates the pressing
need for developing theoretical approaches that systematize
current ﬁndings. Pessoa forcefully argues that the “network per-
spective” he favors is particularly helpful in fulﬁlling this task.
More speciﬁcally, the dual competition model (or DCM) that
Pessoa offers receives substantial support from a vast array of ﬁnd-
ings in neuroscience, across species, which Pessoa documents in
great detail. These ﬁndings strongly suggest that emotion and cog-
nition are not isolated and, more important, that they are not dis-
cretely instantiated in neatly localized regions of the brain.
Indeed, in many cases cognition interacts with emotion producing
no systematically located activations. Pessoa’s impressive analysis
of these ﬁndings concerns attention-ﬁltering processes in which
emotion plays a decisive role in modulating cognitive processing.
He thereby illuminates the larger issue of how emotion shapes
cognition and vice versa, a topic that has been of central impor-
tance in neuroscience (e.g., LeDoux 1996).
Precisely because of the strong support that the DCM receives
from the empirical ﬁndings, it is essential to analyze its theoretical
underpinnings. A central tenet of Pessoa’s integrative approach is
that although“emotion” and “cognition” may be useful terms to
characterize behaviors, they do not neatly map onto brain
regions. To know if those conceptualize a uniﬁed network in the
brain, one needs to know how the activations of this network instan-
tiate the guiding characteristics and semantic contents underlying
emotional and cognitive behaviors. Even if the DCM adequately
models this network, and even if the function and structure of
the emotion cognition interface is best understood in terms of inte-
grated networks (rather than brain regions), one still needs to
explain how emotion and cognition map to each other in processes
of perceptual attention and conscious awareness.
Here, one confronts two questions: (a) what is the role of atten-
tion and consciousness (including self-awareness) in the integration
of cognition and emotion? and (b) what degree of complexity of the
semantic information is required for the integration of cognition
and emotion? Any answer to these questions – to create a satisfac-
tory model for the integration of cognition and emotion –must
involve evolution and language. With respect to evolution: How
to identify automatic and unintended processes, as opposed to
more recent forms of cognitive or emotional responses that
require self-awareness? With respect to language, which Pessoa
scarcelymentions: Can there be cognitive and emotional responses
that are fundamentally dependent on the language capacity? These
two questions are obviously related, and the potential implications
of answering these questions with respect to the independence of
emotion from cognition are not explicitly addressed by Pessoa’s
model, opening the possibility of a form of dissociation between
emotion and cognition that may challenge his model.
These questions must be answered in order to deﬁne the fun-
damental aspects regarding the mapping between cognition and
emotion. For example, although many forms of emotion seem
to be quite basic or “dumb” as Pessoa argues (p. 247), cognition
seems at least implicitly to require inferential and conceptual ca-
pacities. Presumably, many of those capacities are associated with
the language capacity in humans. Complex cognitive and inferen-
tially based reasoning appear to be a recent development in the
evolution of the emotion and cognition network. Their recent de-
velopment suggests at least some degree of independence
between emotion and cognition in instances of conscious infer-
ence and perceptual attention because some emotional processes
may occur unconsciously or independently from interactions with
inferentially and semantically based cognition. Thus, consider-
ations about evolution question the plausibility of a highly inte-
grated network for emotion and cognition, in the sense that the
automatic system may not map neatly to any of the more con-
sciously effortful and inferentially mediated system.
The DCM hypothesizes that emotional and motivational signals
are systematically integrated with perception and cognition. In
order to distinguish between automatic and voluntary processes,
however, it is fundamental ﬁrst to specify how “emotion” and
“cognition” are being understood. Pessoa (2005) correctly
remarks that recent ﬁndings have challenged the view that
emotion happens automatically and independently of attention
and awareness. He proposes that current research should focus
on how attention and awareness modulate emotion in perception.
Yet, there are many forms of attention (including effortful, effort-
less, and unconscious attention). What is more, there may be more
than one form of conscious awareness as argued in Montemayor
and Haladjian (2015). The distinction between awareness and
self-awareness is of particular relevance. For example, it has
been argued that self-awareness is fundamental for many forms
of emotional behavior and for conscious forms of cognition
(Damasio 2010).
With respect to attention modulation and emotion, both selec-
tive attention and basic emotional reactions appear to be early
evolutionary adaptations that require neither linguistic capacities
nor self-awareness. By contrast, consciously aware emotion may
necessitate capacities for identifying the mental states of conspe-
ciﬁcs (or having a theory of mind) and language (see Carruthers
2000; Dennett 1969; 2005). Language may itself be a spandrel
and a uniquely human capacity (Fitch et al. 2005), which strongly
suggests its recent evolution. If conscious awareness is required
for higher forms of attention that depend on semantic and con-
ceptual content, then it becomes more difﬁcult to maintain an in-
tegration model for emotion and cognition: the independence of
many kinds of emotional processes from cognitive ones would
have to be a central feature of any model of their interaction.
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Furthermore, conceptual content seems to be deeply associated
with language capacity because of its compositional and generative
characteristics (Fodor 1998). Conceptual content is also associated
with the more complex activities of imagination and metaphorical
reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). All theories of conceptual
content relate it to either the language capacity or the capacity
to form the beliefs that support inferential reasoning. For these
reasons, conceptual attention seems to be a recent, perhaps
uniquely human, phenomenon (assuming that language and infer-
ential reasoning are recent phenomena in the evolution of our
species). Emotional reactions seem to be less dependent on imag-
ination and metaphor. Still, it is very likely that at least some of the
consciously aware emotional reactions are less automatic than
others, for which there may be numerous explanations, including
the autonomy of the “old” emotional system. Crucially, emotion
and cognition could really be independent from one another in
humans, even if they interact systematically. Culture and social
cues could be a further complication (Tomasello 1999), in the
sense that the semantic and inferential enrichments of emotional
responses that characterize human emotional behavior may not
only be independent from cognitive processing, but also funda-
mentally dependent on social cues and interactions.
Considerations regarding the necessity of a linguistic format for
motivation, conceptualized in terms of the ﬁrst-person perspec-
tive in humans, complicate the interaction between emotion and
cognition even more. Some theorists argue that language is re-
quired for structuring self-consciousness (Baker 2013; Dewart
1989; Neuman & Nave 2010). As mentioned, language is scarcely
mentioned by Pessoa, but it may be fundamental to understand
the DCM, because some format must be responsible for the
mapping between cognition and emotion, and language is ideally
suited to perform this role. A model that explicitly addresses the
role of language in relation to emotion and cognition is desirable
and perhaps necessary, because of the probable linguistic under-
pinnings of self-awareness.
It is undoubtedly true that the dichotomization of concepts
such as “emotion” and “cognition” can be simiplistic. Pessoa’s
model proposes that “emotion” and “cognition” do not exclude
each other, but how exactly? It could be the case that the brain
dynamics of oscillations are such that signals for emotion and cog-
nition are indeed systematically coupled and always interacting,
but this is compatible with their dissociation at the level of cogni-
tive integration. At that level, they may play systematically distinct
roles and never be integrated. For example, working memory and
the kind of attention that is broadcasted cross-modally may sys-
tematically correlate with certain uniﬁed signals, but this need
not be the case for automatic forms of emotion and cognition.
Finally, regarding the structure and function of cognitive and
emotional processing, it is important to emphasize that there
are patent discrepancies between their normative or behavior
guiding role. The intensity and moral or aesthetic aspects of a
set of emotions do not seem to depend on the integration of
fact-based or perceptual aspects of stimuli. In particular, emotion-
al intensity does not seem to depend on the conjunction of per-
ceptual features. Rather, it appears dependent on a much more
integrative process that generates a unique conscious experience,
which is strongly uniﬁed and independent of any speciﬁc set of
perceptual features. Emotional intensity also seems to be inde-
pendent of the accuracy or inaccuracy of cognitive information,
such as the epistemic consequences of an argument or the knowl-
edge of features related to attention in perceptual processes. The
structure and normative function of emotional and cognitive
behavior may, therefore, be different. Likewise, measures for
the intensity and structure of emotions may shed no light on the
cognitive functions that interact with them and vice versa. The in-
commensurability between these different functions suggests that
there is a deep kind of dissociation between emotion and cogni-
tion (a normative kind of dissociation).
For these reasons, one of Pessoa’s central arguments, which
infers integration from the interaction of cognitive and emotional
signals, is problematic. The problem is reminiscent of arguments
that invalidly infer causal explanation from systematic correlation.
The book as a whole, however, demonstrates that new and more
integrative approaches to the study of emotion and cognition are
justiﬁed and urgently needed, and this is an aspect of the book that
deserves praise and notice. Pessoa’s book is certainly an important
step in the right direction – toward a conclusive and rigorous
model for the interaction between emotion and cognition.
On theory integration: Toward developing
affective components within cognitive
architectures
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Abstract: In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013) suggests that
cognition and emotion should not be considered separately. We agree with
this and argue that cognitive architectures can provide steady ground for
this kind of theory integration and for investigating interactions among
underlying cognitive processes. We brieﬂy explore how affective
components can be implemented and how neuroimaging measures can
help validate models and inﬂuence theory development.
Like Pessoa (2013), many authors (e.g., Anderson 2007; Newell
1990; Reisenzein et al. 2013) have called for theory integration
within psychological science. Indeed, the importance of integrat-
ing disparate theories of human behavior together is unlikely to be
disputed. However, the path toward theory integration, on the
other hand, can be quite thorny. Between research literatures, dif-
ferences often arise concerning language, assumptions, and meth-
odologies. For example, Pessoa discusses how the role of the
amygdala reaches far beyond its typical description as a “fear
center” for processing negative information. Similarly, within
the book Pessoa describes numerous research ﬁndings that
reveal (1) overlapping patterns of activation in brain structures
previously considered speciﬁc to “cognitive” or “emotional” pro-
cessing and (2) relevant interactions between affective states
and cognitive tasks. Indeed, we applaud Pessoa for exploring
the often rugged territory between established ﬁelds of research
and for building a strong case in favor of an integrative approach.
Yet, we also challenge Pessoa on the grounds of deﬁning an ap-
proach to theory integration. In what follows, we make three
points. First, we suggest that cognitive architectures can provide
steady ground for integrating theories of emotion and cognition,
as well as for describing interactions among underlying processes
of behavior. A cognitive architecture is a broad psychological
theory implemented as a formal (e.g., computer) model that in-
corporates multiple facets of behavior, such as perception and
memory, and that, ideally, can account for many different behav-
ioral tasks, ranging from, for example, low-level eye movement
behavior (e.g., Salvucci 2001) to deliberate problem solving
(e.g., Anderson 2005). Second, we provide examples of how affec-
tive components have previously been (Cochran et al. 2006; Ritter
et al. 2007) and might potentially be (e.g., Reisenzein et al. 2013)
implemented within cognitive architectures. Third, we also brieﬂy
describe how neuroimaging data can potentially be incorporated
into these types of models, as well as into the process of theory
development.
Although the book offers a strong “why” for theory integration
between the study of cognitive and affective aspects of behavior,
we suggest that one promising avenue for “how” to accomplish
this theory integration is by way of developing affective features
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within formalized cognitive architectures. Pioneering artiﬁcial in-
telligence and cognitive science researcher Alan Newell, argued
(e.g., 1973; 1990) that psychological science would beneﬁt by
moving beyond mere verbal (qualitative) hypotheses, such as
simple dichotomies (e.g., nature vs. nurture), toward formalized
(quantitative) hypotheses. Additionally, he suggested that one
path toward a uniﬁed theory of mind is by developing cognitive
architectures. A number of cognitive architectures have been de-
veloped, such as Soar (Newell 1990), EPIC (Meyer & Kieras
1997) and ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere 1998; see Langley et al.
2008 for a review of different architectures). Take ACT-R, for
example (see Anderson 2007 for details). This model incorporates
decades of research to describe a full range of cognitive processes,
from perception to action, and can provide ﬁne-grained predica-
tions about reaction times, neuroimaging measurements, eye-
tracking data, as well as behavioral responses. In our view, it is
quite stunning that, thus far, there have been relatively few at-
tempts to incorporate affective components into architectural
models of cognition and behavior. For the purpose of this com-
mentary, the most noteworthy aspect of cognitive architectures
relates to understanding and hypothesizing about interactions
between different perceptual, motor, and cognitive components
that naturally arise while modeling behavioral tasks. Within
Pessoa’s book and elsewhere (e.g., McGaugh 2000), affective
aspects of behavior such as stress, motivation, and arousal have
been shown to modulate cognitive processes such as attention
and memory, and we believe that developing these affective com-
ponents within cognitive architectures can afford researchers the
ability to precisely deﬁne how and where these types of interac-
tions may take place within a human system. Additionally, when
one or more aspects of cognition are qualiﬁed based on an affec-
tive state and a possible system-wide chain of interactions occurs,
cognitive architectures may be the best tool for dealing with the
high level of complexity.
How can affective components be implemented within cogni-
tive architectures? The approach that several authors have
called for or begun working with is to deﬁne how affective
states might modulate the underlying cognitive processes (e.g., at-
tention, working memory) within the architecture (e.g., Belavkin
2001; Cochran et al. 2006; Dancy et al. 2013; Hudlicka 2004;
Ritter et al. 2007; see also Gunzelmann et al. 2009 for similar
work related to fatigue). This can translate to adjusting certain pa-
rameters within existing architectures. For example, Cochran
et al. (2006) provide a relatively simple demonstration of this ap-
proach, in which they model the effect of one aspect of emotion
(arousal) within one cognitive module of ACT-R (declarative
memory). Cochran et al. (2006) point out that the standard
ACT-R model is not able to predict the results of the classic
study by Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1964), which found that study
of high emotional arousal stimuli led to short-term forgetting
and long-term remembering compared with low emotional
arousal stimuli. To implement this impact of arousal on memory
within ACT-R, Cochran et al. (2006) redeﬁned and expanded
certain parameters (speciﬁcally, within the declarative memory
module) to produce a pattern similar to the behavioral data. Sim-
ilarly, in another paper, Ritter et al. (2007) developed a model
within ACT-R to predict performance on a serial subtraction
task, in which certain cognitive mechanisms within the architec-
ture (e.g., attention, working memory) were modiﬁed to represent
the impact of stress. Much more, we suspect that it would be
worthwhile to explore how the ﬁndings and theories presented
within Pessoa’s book can be modeled within cognitive architec-
tures in similar ways.
Many cognitive architectures (ACT-R in particular) not only
attempt to model the processes underlying human behavior, but
they also incorporate neuroimaging ﬁndings to develop a brain-
like system of structures and processes (e.g., Anderson 2007;
Just & Varma 2007). Indeed, within ACT-R different cognitive
modules are associated with certain brain structures. Because of
this design approach, (1) neuropsychological ﬁndings can be
used to guide and constrain model development, and (2) neuroim-
aging data (such as fMRI) can be used in conjunction with behav-
ioral measurements to help validate models (e.g., Borst &
Anderson 2014). Because ACT-R provides latency information
for different cognitive processes (e.g., visually encoding a stimulus,
retrieving information from memory, producing a motor re-
sponse), this pattern of activity can be translated into predictions
for neuroimaging data in correspondence with the brain areas as-
sociated with the different cognitive modules. We suspect that this
facet of cognitive architectures may be especially compelling for
the development of affective components because, as Pessoa de-
scribes, certain brain structures (such as the amygdala) are associ-
ated with a variety of processes. These types of neuropsychological
research ﬁndings can be taken into account when exploring how
affective aspects might modulate particular processes within an
architecture.
There is, perhaps, no better way to conclude this short com-
mentary than by turning to one of the conceptual founders of in-
tegrative approaches to behavior and cognition. In many ways,
Pessoa’s book echoes Newell’s (1990) argument that, “A single
system (mind) produces all aspects of behavior. It is one mind
that minds them all. Even if the mind has parts, modules, compo-
nents, or whatever, they all mesh together to produce behavior.…
If a theory covers only one part or component, it ﬂirts with trouble
from the start” (p. 17). In short, Pessoa contends that, given the
high level of overlap between aspects of cognition and emotion,
the two should not be considered separately. We agree with this
and believe that the ideal research approach for pursuing this in-
tegration of theories includes cognitive architectures.
Neuropsychology still needs to model
organismic processes “from within”
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Abstract: Four issues are discussed: (1) differences between cognition
and emotion; (2) affect, emotion, and motivation differentials, including
a neuropsychological model of motivation; (3) mental attention (working
memory) as a resource neither affective nor cognitive, but applicable to
both; and (4) explication of neuropsychological scheme units, which
have neuronal circuits as functional infrastructure, thus helping to clarify
the semantics of functional connectivity.
Pessoa’s The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is important
because it attempts to clarify in broad detail neuroscience rela-
tions among cognition, emotion, and motivation. Pessoa sees
these constructs as intertwined in the brain networks but does
not make apparent how cognition, emotion, and motivation func-
tionally complement each other as different modes of processing.
A number of important issues remain unanswered. Do Pessoa’s
multiple waves and dual competition models (pp. 70–72, and
Chapter 7 of his book) imply that performance is overdeter-
mined – as Freud would have said – by many actively self-propel-
ling, often connected brain processes? How are external
“contexts” and related internal processes expressed in the brain?
Commentary/Pessoa: Précis on The Cognitive-Emotional Brain
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 38 (2015) 33
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000971
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:03:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Are they “passive” representations or coordinated sets of here-
and-now-activated multiple circuits (heretofore called schemes)?
A better neuropsychology should examine these and other
topics, adopting a processing attitude “from within” – a perspec-
tive called metasubjective to contrast it to an external observers’
perspective (Pascual-Leone 2013). We illustrate this point by dis-
cussing four issues.
The ﬁrst issue addresses subjective differences between
emotion and cognition. Contrary to Pessoa’s belief (p. 4 of his
book), capturing functional differences between psychology con-
structs is essential to understand their expression in the brain.
Cognition assigns a truth value to experience – that is, asserting
whether (present, past, or future) experiences are true or valid
vis-à-vis future outcomes. In contrast, emotion processes assign a
vital value, evaluating the importance of experience in situations
for one’s life and living (done by speciﬁc, positive or negative,
affect systems – love, mastery-seeking, guilt, joy, fear, etc.).
These two sorts of value (truth vs. vital) complement one
another and are compatible but not interchangeable. Because
they are compatible, some circuits or networks carry both sorts
of value together: fully and simultaneously cognitive and affective,
as Pessoa claims. Some researchers call these sorts of hybrid pro-
cesses emotions (Damasio 1999; 2010; Greenberg 2002), restrict-
ing the terms feeling, affect, affective (versus cognitive) to
processes where vital value predominates. As Panksepp and
Biven (2012) have reemphasized, primary “pure” affects have
innate-instinctual (evolutionary) roots, each with a distinct sort
of affective “ﬂavor” – roots whose number is estimated as high
as seven or nine primary affects (positive or negative). The exis-
tence of these innate roots is a major argument for differentiating
between affects and emotions, because the latter always embody
situation-bound cognitions that cannot be innate.
Neural networks differ relatively, not absolutely, on the sort of
value they carry (truth/cognitive vs. vital/affective), often modulated
by tasks/situations. We talk of cognition when the pragmatically pre-
dominant value is concerned with truth (e.g., lateral/dorsal prefron-
tal areas, lateral parietal). It is similarly useful to talk of affective or
emotional when vital value dominates (e.g., periaqueductal gray
area, anterior insula, orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal, posterior
medial cortex). Affect and cognition, as complementary modes of
processing, are in continuous dialectical interrelation (Pascual-
Leone 2012; 2014; see Pessoa, p. 249) at the service of goal-direct-
ed activity: activation of one mode tends to inhibit the other, al-
though they are jointly needed to fully analyze external or mental
experience. Indeed, as Pessoa’s data show, when affect/emotion
and pure cognitionmodes occur togetherwithin the same task, neg-
ative-affect activation may increase the use of mental-attentional
effort as a result of the implicit executive-processing demand
created by need to control the negative affect. Hence, truth value
characterizes cognition and vital value affect; emotion involves co-
existence of both values.
The second issue concerns organismic functional distinction
among affect, emotion, and motivation. Affect and motivation are
related, but they differ markedly (Pascual-Leone & Johnson 2004).
Pessoa equates motivation with external reward (p. 135). However,
a view “from within” the subject (i.e., metasubjective) shows it
differently. Motivation has three conjoint characteristics: (a) Affec-
tive motivation is an implicit conative (i.e., purpose-seeking, quasi-
volitional) tendency to convert conscious or unconscious affective
goals into conscious or unconscious cognitive goals; (b) the strength
or energy (magnitude of activation) of this tendency is high; (c) well-
learned, purely cognitive schemes tend to apply, because schemes
are self-propelling (Piaget’s assimilation tendency –with its intrinsic
cognitive-motivation strength). Cognitive goals are dispositions to do
something that is known, or believed, to be congruent with one’s
affective goals. Affective goals are dispositions towards the future
that seek certain vital outcomes or consequences (escape with fear,
approach with love, attack with anger, etc.).
There is reason to believe that anterior and posterior cingulate
gyri, albeit different, are interconnected sites where motivation
emerges (e.g., Beckman et al. 2009; Cromheeke & Mueller
2014; Pessoa, p. 237; Small et al. 2003; Torta et al. 2013).
However, the network enabling affective motivation is much
more complex. Without attempting a ﬁnal formulation, our hy-
pothesis is as follows (connections described here are often bidir-
ectional, enabling loops). Once an instinctual-affect reaction in the
midbrain occurs (perhaps in hypothalamus and periaqueductal
gray area; Panksepp & Biven 2012), activation may spread to an-
terior insula (which may dynamically express organismic, intero-
ceptive needs and costs) and to orbitofrontal cortex (which
expresses current vital sensorial values, or external priorities, of
the organism), among others. Then amygdala, one of the most
connected context-and-situation sensitive sites for affect/
emotion, synthesizes an affective criterion of relevance (Sander
et al. 2003); it provides an implicit, current ranking of affective-or-
ganismic priorities for vigilance and attention. Hence, relative to
appropriate threshold and in comparison to a baseline/control
condition, low or nil activation of amygdala means low or nil affec-
tive relevance (although a purely cognitive relevance of goals –
Piaget’s assimilation tendency –might still exist). Finally, we
propose that affective/emotion information is transferred to ante-
rior and posterior cingulate (ACC and PCC), where context-sen-
sitive conversion of (here-and-now dominant) affective goals into
cognitive goals takes place, to spread elsewhere (e.g., posterior
medial cortex).
ACC can also be activated, expressing schemes’ assimilation ten-
dency, in complex cognitive tasks with very low affective relevance
and no amygdala participation. Perhaps ACC differs from PCC in
that the former is more engaged in high affect or in cognitive con-
ﬂict/misleading situations; whereas the latter is active in less affec-
tive and less complex cognitive ( facilitating) situations. We
believe that motivational choices can occur in cognitively simple
situations with little participation of cingulate gyrus; however, in
more complex cognitive situations, cingulate cortex will be
needed. Hence, emotions are not pure affects but combine
truth values (cognition) with vital values. Motivation may have in-
tervened in the emergence of emotions via (a) and (b) – see the
beginning of this issue-section. Once overlearned, emotions are
strengthened as a result of (c).
The third issue concerns mental attention as a neutral brain re-
source, neither cognitive nor affective. Pessoa formulates the
concept of a “performance-resource function” in general terms
to characterize any kind of task activity (Pessoa 2013, p. 249).
Nonetheless, relations of affect with mental attention (mental
effort, working memory), and the relation of each to low
(simple) cognition versus complex cognition, are unclear in the
book. To effectively employ the construct of a performance-re-
source function, the “resources” must be properly and explicitly
deﬁned, which Pessoa does not do. Like most neuroscientists
and experimental psychologists, he speaks of resources in plural,
but likely means mental/endogenous attention – usually construed
as working memory (Pascual-Leone & Johnson 2005). Clear def-
initions are needed of automatic-perceptual attention versus
mental/endogenous attention (Arsalidou et al. 2010; 2013) and
other brain resources – such as a neoGestaltist internal-ﬁeld “sim-
plicity” factor (possibly lateral inhibition in the brain) and an over-
determination principle –which together would permit dynamic
syntheses in problem-solving acts. Clarity in these organismic con-
structs makes easier process/task analyses in neuropsychology
(Pascual-Leone 2005; Pascual-Leone et al. 2009; Pascual-Leone
& Johnson 2005; 2011). From this perspective, mental/endoge-
nous attention appears expressed in the brain as a neutral resource
(i.e., neither affective nor cognitive, albeit applicable to both).
The fourth issue addresses overdetermination of outcomes of
brain processing, as a result of codetermination by many active,
often connected, processes (cognitive and affective). Brain’s con-
nectivity spreads activation within cofunctional and often coacti-
vated neuronal lines – along circuits/pathways that necessarily
express certain semantic-pragmatic probabilistic invariances that
give psychological meaning to the circuits. We say necessarily,
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because (given the anatomy and constraints on processing
imposed by experience) pathways are activated and evolve in con-
gruence with organismic and situational constraints. Thus ,
cofunctional and often coactivated neuronal circuits become unit-
ized (coordinated) under these internal and external constraints,
to characterize sorts of action (and change) in new situations.
These coordinated functional invariances expressed in circuits
are called schemes by Piaget and others (Arbib et al. 1998;
Pascual-Leone & Johnson 2005; 2011). Schemes are unitized cir-
cuits or networks, embodying probabilistic constraints/resistances
of (past, present, future) reality to the subject’s actions or repre-
sentations. They can be seen as self-propelling systems that coor-
dinate three distinct sorts of component, all in dynamic/dialectical
interaction: (a) a releasing component that contains conditions
predicating features/templates that signal probable applicability
of the scheme in question; (b) an effecting component that stipu-
lates or carries cognitive, affective, or emotive effects of this
scheme; effects whose application probabilistically brings
results, often in a simultaneous or sequentially organized
manner; and (c) a functional component that formulates the gist
or overall functional description of the scheme: its practical impor-
tance and potential contribution to activities. In a very real sense,
neural circuits are functional infrastructure of the scheme units
formulated by constructivist psychological research.
As an illustration of how to apply the scheme construct to inter-
pret brain circuits or networks, consider the connected (cognitive
and affective) circuits that embody face recognition in humans
(e.g., Arsalidou et al. 2011; Tsao & Livingstone 2008). Face per-
ception and recognition use various brain areas, of which I
mention seven of them, from (a) to (f): (a) occipital “face” area
in the inferior occipital gyrus (a misnomer, because it analyzes in-
tricate perceptual patterns, not only faces), which extracts ﬁgura-
tive constituents (eyes, mouth, nose, etc.); (b) the fusiform “face”
area, in the fusiform gyrus, that synthesizes meaningful ﬁgurative
constituents into organized relational wholes (a face, ﬂower,
house, hands, etc.) as distinct perceptual totalities; (c) a site in
the superior temporal sulcus (STS); and (d) the posterior middle
temporal visual cortex (V5/MT – involved in visual motion aware-
ness) –we note that in the latter two sites, temporally structured
patterns of exploration are organized, leading to cognitive appraisal
of distal objects such as a face and its meaningful mobile constitu-
ents, including gaze direction. (e) A more deeply cognitive inter-
pretation of the complex object (e.g., the dynamic face) may
require other areas such as left inferior frontal cortex (BA 47)
and the occipito-temporal junction. (f) When emotion-affective
relevance such as familiarity is involved, face recognition uses
the amygdala. Both right and left hemispheres may participate in
this processing, but the right hemisphere may be more involved
in ordinary (automatic) face recognition.
When we apply the construct of complex scheme (a coordinated
system of multiple subordinate schemes) to processing of meaning
in the face, we notice that the occipital areas may provide condi-
tions (releasing component) to the complex face scheme. The fu-
siform gyri may provide initial perceptual-conﬁgural effects
(effecting component) to this face scheme. These effects would
in turn serve as conditions of a further elaboration: a more
complex cognitive face scheme produced by STS and V5/MT,
which (these areas can coordinate sequentially occurring
changes) would relate face movement-and-perspective sequences
to yield cognitive-expressive and emotional, not just perceptual,
meanings –with contribution from amygdala and BA 47, 37 etc.
The gist (functional component) of the complex face scheme
would of course be the context-relevant salient features of this
face scheme as a functional totality.
Consider now the schemes’ overdetermination of performance
(Pascual-Leone 1984; 2012; Pascual-Leone & Johnson 2011), a
principle that expresses the self-propelling disposition of
schemes (brain circuits) with their spreading of activation in “mul-
tiple waves.” According to this principle, the full meaning of an
object (e.g., face) is attained as multiple schemes with different
modes and modalities of processing (located in different sites)
become coactivated and rally together to overdetermine total
meaning (the cognitive-emotional import) of the complex object
in question. From this perspective, automatized and controlled
processes – embodied in different cofunctional and coactivated
scheme circuits – become combined and work together, as
Pessoa points out, because they are part of a more complex (super-
ordinate) scheme they have together constituted with life experi-
ence and neuroplasticity.
Pessoa offers new ideas on the neuroscience of cognition and
emotion. We have added some new distinctions to neuropsychol-
ogy relevant for neuroscience, which might help to improve
Pessoa’s theoretical framework.
When emotion and cognition do (not) work
together: Delusions as emotional and
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Abstract: In this commentary, I argue that the cognitive-emotional
framework put forward by Pessoa (2013) can be successfully applied to
psychopathology and, in particular, to the reasoning of delusional
subjects. More speciﬁcally, I show that the notion of executive
competition (Ch. 7) offers a signiﬁcant contribution to the idea that
delusions may involve both executive and emotional dysfunctions.
The proposal Pessoa puts forward in The Cognitive-Emotional
Brain (2013) sets out to counter the standard paradigm of labeling
brain regions as either affective or cognitive, offering instead a
framework that does justice to the complex interactions among
different neural systems. Notably, Pessoa presents a host of em-
pirical evidence in support of the connection between the amyg-
dala – traditionally associated with fear-detection or processing of
negative information – and the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is
thought to play a central role in cognition. In particular, amygdala
and PFC seem to cooperate in a number of tasks connected to in-
formation gathering and salience detection, such as discriminating
between threatening and neutral facial expressions (see also Lim
et al. 2009). Here, I argue that the cognitive-emotional framework
Pessoa proposes can be successfully applied to psychopathology
and, in particular, to the reasoning of delusional subjects (DS).
First, I brieﬂy show that delusions can be characterized in terms
of executive dysfunctions that affect the ability to detect relevance
in a context. Second, I utilize Pessoa’s notion of executive compe-
tition (Ch. 7) to offer an original explanation of the executive def-
icits observed in DS.
In her recent book, Bortolotti (2009) convincingly argued that
the pathological character of delusions cannot derive solely from
their being irrational. Indeed, several everyday beliefs – for
example, superstitious or religious – can be regarded as completely
irrational without thereby qualifying as delusional (see Bortolotti
2009, p. 259). If characterizing delusions as irrational beliefs is
clearly insufﬁcient, then Bortolotti’s conclusion calls for a more
detailed explanation of why DS are worthy of clinical attention.
One possible solution would be to qualify delusions in terms of ex-
ecutive dysfunctions, arising from some disturbance in the ability
to detect relevance (or salience) in a context. From a phenomeno-
logical perspective, the idea that delusions may involve issues with
relevance detection is supported by an analysis of case reports:
indeed, DS often describe a peculiar keenness, as well as the
feeling of “seeing” hidden connections between things. In
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particular, the prepsychotic stage corresponds to a phase of
“heightened awareness and emotionality” in which speciﬁc per-
ceptions or ideas acquire “exaggerated importance” (Kapur
2003, p. 15). For example, in a ﬁrst-person account of his
illness, Aaron Reina (2009) reports that he gradually became con-
vinced that one could determine “a person’s feelings, thoughts,
and even their personality by the color combinations of their
clothing” (p. 3).
From a cognitive perspective, the capacity to detect relevance
in a context is often connected to executive functions such as shift-
ing (i.e., switching between tasks or different aspects of the same
task), updating (i.e., incorporating relevant information while re-
moving irrelevant ones) and inhibition – for example ﬁltering out
inappropriate responses (see Miyake et al. 2000 for a thorough
discussion). Notably, delusional patients seem to face serious chal-
lenges in every aspect of the executive domain. With respect to
shifting, DS are often resistant to belief revision and ﬁnd it partic-
ularly difﬁcult to switch between different mental scenarios or
interpretations, thereby displaying a peculiar ﬁxity in their reason-
ing. For example, subjects affected by the Capgras syndrome
would insist in claiming that their spouse has been replaced by
an impostor, refusing to take other options into account (e.g.,
maybe my spouse looks different because she is tired). The
ability to update instead requires some sort of “temporal
tagging” in order to pry apart newer, more relevant information
from old and no longer relevant data (Miyake et al. 2000, p. 57).
Interestingly, one of the most common disruptions in delusional
narratives concerns exactly temporal ordering: patients often ex-
perience “difﬁculties in indexing events in time,” and their
stories are typically characterized by “a derailing of thought, cons-
tant tangents … or the compression of a temporally extended
story in a single gesture” (Gallagher 2007, p. 218). With respect
to inhibition, some recent studies found that delusional patients
fare signiﬁcantly worse than controls in the Stroop Test, frequently
employed to measure a subject’s degree of impulsivity (see Ibanez
Casas et al. 2013; Rocca et al. 2006). Indeed, the test requires the
ability to suppress an automatic response – that is, to read the word
regardless of the color – in order to focus on a stimulus that is more
relevant for the task at hand – that is, to read the color regardless of
the word.
Although the correlation between executive functioning and
delusions is at times considered controversial in neuropsychiatric
research (see Guillem et al. 2008), more-speciﬁc studies have
been recently conducted in this direction. For example, Ibanez
Casas and colleagues have attempted to explore the degree of ex-
ecutive functioning impairment in patients affected by schizo-
phrenia and delusional disorder. When ﬂexibility, impulsivity,
and updating were measured through standardized tests – for
example, Stroop Test or Tower of London –DS tended to fare
worse than controls (2013, p. 4). In a different study focused on
attention and executive functioning, subjects affected by delu-
sional disorder obtained lower scores also with respect to other
psychiatric patients such as paranoid schizophrenics (see Grover
et al. 2011). However – interestingly enough –DS have also
been found to score better than controls in some selected areas:
for example, they committed fewer errors in the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST), thereby suggesting some kind of
“hyper-vigilance to selectively abstracted stimuli” (Ibanez Casas
et al. 2013, p. 7).
The cognitive-emotional framework proposed by Pessoa offers
a signiﬁcant contribution to the characterization of delusions out-
lined above. On one hand, it describes relevance detection as an
affectively laden process, in which emotions work as cues directing
our attention to some elements of the context while disregarding
others: in this sense, “vision is never pure, but only affective”
(p. 257). On the other hand, it introduces the notion of executive
competition, according to which the functions of shifting, inhibi-
tion, and updating often interact in a limited resources scenario,
so that “resources devoted to one operation will not be available
for other operations” (p. 161). Notably, Pessoa maintains that
executive functions and emotional processing share a common
pool of resources: this means that emotional content may inﬂuence
executive control in various ways (although the reverse is also pos-
sible – see pp. 121 and 251). In particular, when an emotional
stimulus is strong enough, task performance will often be im-
paired because additional resources are diverted from the execu-
tive functions in order to process the affective content (see also
Mather & Sutherland 2011; Pessoa et al. 2012).
Applying this framework to delusional patients represents an in-
teresting challenge. Indeed, the executive dysfunctions observed
inDSmay indicate that their attention is disproportionally directed
toward speciﬁc – and emotionally signiﬁcant – elements of the
context. For example, persecutory delusions might originate
from a strong feeling of anxiety that prompts patients to attend
more closely to threatening stimuli in the environment. In these
cases, a highly threatening emotional content causes resources to
be diverted from the main task, and performance declines as a
result (see Pessoa 2009, p. 161). Several studies on highly anxious –
although nonclinical – populations already support this point (see
Fox et al. 2002; Norberg et al. 2010). Thus, Pessoa’s proposal
sheds an interesting light on the pathological reasoning observed
in DS, which can then be explained in terms of resources that
are “taken up” in order to process complex – and often threaten-
ing – emotional items. For example, a patient affected by
Capgras would direct attention to the stimuli related to his
“feeling of estrangement” towards the spouse, thereby ﬁnding it
hard to revise the belief that she or he has been replaced by an im-
postor in favor of a more “mundane” interpretation.
Connecting delusions, emotional processing, and executive
functions requires a greater level of precision in determining
what goes wrong in this aberrant process of relevance detection,
however. What exactly makes the patient’s reasoning abnormal
or pathological? Here, the notion of negative distractor intro-
duced by Pessoa may come in handy. Indeed, he argues that emo-
tional contents can modulate attention in a way that either
enhances or impairs task performance, depending on the level
of strength – or arousal – of the stimulus. Roughly put, when the
affective signiﬁcance of a stimulus is low, performance would gen-
erally increase because the resources can be efﬁciently “mobilized
in the service of handling the task at hand” (p. 167). On the con-
trary, items with sufﬁciently high affective signiﬁcance – regard-
less of their relevance to the task – tend to compromise
performance. In this sense, the emotionally laden items work as
negative distractors that drain common pool resources from the
main task (see p. 172). If this interpretation is correct, the execu-
tive competition model proposed by Pessoa would provide an in-
teresting explanation for the speciﬁc deﬁcits observed in DS
(see Grover et al. 2011; Ibanez Casas et al. 2013). Indeed, the
delusional content itself may work as a powerful distractor absorb-
ing the patient’s attention and directing resources away from the
functions that are needed to complete the task at hand. To make
this point more explicit: delusional patients may continually per-
ceive threatening – or otherwise negative – stimuli in the environ-
ment, which force them to invest a disproportionate amount of
resources that become unavailable to other cognitive functions.
From a neurological viewpoint, this process need not translate
to decreased activation of the relevant brain areas (e.g., amygdala,
PFC), but rather reﬂects the fact that some common pool resourc-
es are “taken up” in dealing with delusional beliefs. This is consis-
tent with Pessoa’s ﬁndings, according to which negative distractors
can at times produce increased activation of the relevant networks
(see pp. 128–29). Therefore, the DS’s poor outcome in executive
tests may be caused by an overworking executive system, where
highly signiﬁcant items continuously drain resources from the
current task. In this sense, the proverbial ﬁxity associated to delu-
sions would result from the subject’s incapacity to process – or
even “see” – other elements of the context as emotionally and
functionally relevant.
The application of Pessoa’s proposal to psychopathology also
allows us to resolve an apparent inconsistency arising from one
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of the studies discussed above (Ibanez Casas et al. 2013). Indeed,
the fact that DS fared better than controls in some selected areas
(e.g., WCST) indicates that their executive abilities should not be
understood as impaired, but rather as dysfunctional. In other
words, DS disproportionally direct their resources toward speciﬁc
stimuli in the environment because they perceive them as perva-
sive, affectively signiﬁcant, and in need of additional processing.
Thus, DS can be regarded as being in a permanent – or at least
frequent – condition of overload, that phenomenologically reﬂects
the feeling of “hypersalience” observed in several patients (see
Kapur 2003; Speechley et al. 2010). As Pessoa would put it, DS
continuously face demands that exceed their available capacity
of processing, causing performance to suffer when the task specif-
ically requires attention (see pp. 89 and 98).
To sum up, the account of delusions outlined here has two main
advantages. First, it offers an explanation of their pathological
character that goes beyond the mere ascription of irrationality
(see Bortolotti 2009). Second, it strengthens the connection
between delusions and executive dysfunctions, which is still con-
sidered controversial in the neuropsychiatric literature (see
Guillem et al. 2008). Notably, the executive competition model
proposed by Pessoa offers an important contribution to the idea
that delusions may involve both emotional and executive dysfunc-
tions. On one hand, particularly strong emotions shape the pa-
tient’s attention and direct it towards speciﬁc elements of the
context (Ch. 2). Here, the guiding emotion may vary depending
on the delusional content, although we can safely assume that
fear would play a key role (e.g., threatening stimuli in persecutory
delusions). On the other hand, affectively laden items work as neg-
ative distractors that monopolize executive functions that then
become unavailable for other tasks (Ch. 7). In order to test this
hypothesis empirically, I propose to extend Pessoa’s studies on
the relationship between emotions, attention, and executive
control to delusional populations (see Pessoa 2005; 2008; 2009).
In particular, it would be interesting to see whether the regions
connected to cognitive-emotional interactions (e.g., amygdala,
PFC) experience an increase or decrease in activation while DS
are dealing with emotionally laden interferences in executive
tasks.
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Abstract: All organisms must integrate cognition, emotion, and motivation
to guide action toward valuable (goal) states, as described by active
inference. Within this framework, cognition, emotion, and motivation
interact through the (Bayesian) fusion of exteroceptive, proprioceptive,
and interoceptive signals, the precision-weighting of prediction errors,
and the “affective tuning” of neuronal representations. Crucially,
misregulation of these processes may have profound psychopathological
consequences.
The notion that humans have separate and often conﬂicting facul-
ties for “cognition” and “emotion” has long fascinated scholars and
laymen, as exempliﬁed by Pascal’s motto, “The heart has its
reasons, which reason does not know,” and by the emotionless
(but rational) Star Trek character Mr. Spock.
In cognitive science, the distinction between cognition and
emotion is echoed in the idea that segregated brain areas imple-
ment cognitive and emotional functions and that there are two in-
dependent processing “routes,” one cognitive/controlled and one
emotional/automatic, which usually compete (but also occasionally
cooperate) to control behavior (Kahneman 2003a). However
useful this “dual-systems” view might be, one would not expect di-
chotomies inherited from folk psychology – such as cognition
versus emotion (or even perception vs. representation vs. action) –
map one-to-one to functionally segregated brain areas. Compel-
ling evidence, reviewed in Pessoa’s The Cognitive-Emotional
Brain (2013), challenges the segregation of cognitive and emotion-
al processing in the human brain. The emerging view is that not
only cognition interacts with emotion at many levels; but in
many respects they are functionally integrated and continuously
impact each other’s processing.
Studying cognitive-emotional interactions by focusing on ad-
vanced cognitive abilities (e.g., how the processing of affectively
charged stimuli inﬂuences executive control) is important to
better understand human cognition. However, this is not the
only approach. Cognition and emotion have always been tightly
linked; they were linked even before the emergence of sophisti-
cated human abilities. The ancestral reasons for this linkage can
be traced back to the demands of situated action control, not of
complex cognitive problems; it might be an important require-
ment of organisms that, as Pavlov (1927) has once put it, need
to maintain a balance between the internal milieu of the body
and the external world.
The basic design of the human brain was largely evident in
simpler animals that had to solve the basic problems of survival
in situated environments rather than higher cognitive problems.
All that mattered for those animals was deploying adaptive behav-
ior to fulﬁll their needs and motivations – in other words, acting to
disclose “desired” or goal states (Cisek 1999; Friston 2013;
Pezzulo & Castelfranchi 2009). In turn, pursuing goals requires
animals to select what is valuable for them to do (adaptive behav-
ior) or meaningful to process, remember, and predict (perception
and cognition). In this perspective, solving the most elementary
problems of adaptive behavior requires a close synergy between
some (perhaps rudimentary) forms of perception, cognition,
emotion, and motivation. Indeed, lower species possess emotional
and motivational abilities, here broadly conceptualized as processes
that mobilize bodily resources and invigorate actions, control inter-
oceptive signals and autonomic states, bear on the value (and sali-
ency) of stimuli, goals, and information gain, modulate selection
processes, and deal with ecologically meaningful events such as
rewards and punishments or their expectations (Panksepp 2011;
Rolls 2005).
Importantly, in order to be useful for adaptive behavior, the
contribution of emotion and motivation has to be integrated in a
timely manner within the organism’s action-perception cycle.
What is currently valuable is highly contextual and governed by
numerous factors that entail perception and cognition, including
metabolic costs, affordances, and the available repertoire of
choices (e.g., for a gazelle, ﬁnding food versus escaping from a
lion). Considering all of these factors represents a serious chal-
lenge for architectures that segregate perception, action, and
utility (Cisek & Pastor-Bernier 2014; Lepora & Pezzulo, in
press; Verschure et al. 2014).
The evolutionary perspective pursued here implies that the
very fabric of cognition – from its ancestral origins to the most
modern and sophisticated skills – is inextricably linked to utility,
adaptivity, and meaningfulness; and in turn these should imbue
cognitive processing at large, as testiﬁed by the ubiquitous pres-
ence of value- and outcome-related signals in the brain (Vickery
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et al. 2011). Furthermore, this perspective suggests that cognitive-
emotional interactions can be better understood within a systems-
level framework that explains how cognition and emotion resolve
basic adaptive problems and how elaborations of these basic pro-
cesses underpin cognitive abilities.
Active inference offers one such framework (Friston 2010).
Active inference considers that organisms act to fulﬁl prior
beliefs or expectations that encode the (evolutionary) values of
their states (e.g., having access to food). In this framework, the
brain is a statistical organ that learns the structure of the (external
and internal) world and the causes of perception (and interocep-
tion) in the form of hierarchical models. Such models support
both perception (predictive coding) and action (active inference)
in a seamless fashion by minimizing free energy or, more
simply, prediction error.
Perception corresponds to (Bayesian) inference that tests cog-
nitive hypotheses – encoded at higher hierarchical levels –
against sensory evidence. The higher levels generate predictions
in a top-down manner, and the discrepancy (prediction error)
between descending predictions and sensations compete to
update perceptual hypotheses (i.e., select the hypothesis that min-
imizes prediction error). Crucially, prediction errors can also be
minimized through action. Here, active inference enters the
scene and adds two novel ingredients to the picture (Friston
et al. 2009). First, top-down predictions can act as higher level
goals for the organism (e.g., being satiated); and, second, goals
steer a cascading ﬂow of exteroceptive and proprioceptive predic-
tions that are fulﬁlled by peripheral (motor and autonomic) reﬂexes –
until the goal state is achieved.
Up to now we have focused on the minimization of exterocep-
tive and proprioceptive prediction errors. However, the same
principles apply to the regulation of interoceptive and bodily in-
formation that links to the autonomic system to sympathetic and
parasympathetic systems. This interoceptive inference has been
linked to emotion and self-awareness (Friston et al. 2014; Seth
2013; Seth et al. 2012). In this view, the internal world is con-
trolled by autonomic reﬂexes that fulﬁll descending interoceptive
predictions –where descending predictions provide homoeostatic
setpoints. These interoceptive predictions are one aspect of mul-
timodal predictions from high-level beliefs about our embodied
self (literally our “gut feelings”). In this formulation, interoceptive
information does not cause self awareness, or vice versa: There is a
circular causality in which hierarchical representations enslave au-
tonomic reﬂexes, whereas interoceptive prediction errors inform
hierarchical representations. Emotion can therefore be regarded
as a necessary attribute of any representation that engenders in-
teroceptive predictions.
To characterize the adaptive function of emotions and feelings
(Damasio & Carvalho 2013) – and their integration within the
action-perception cycle –we consider how adaptive behavioral
control rests on the functional integration of exteroceptive, pro-
prioceptive, and interoceptive signals. These have complementary
roles: Interoceptive prediction errors inform the current motiva-
tional need (or drive) of an animal, in terms of a discrepancy
between optimal homeostatic levels (e.g., hunger in terms of
low glucose), whereas exteroceptive and proprioceptive predic-
tion errors specify allostatic goals in terms of the sensory states
the animal has to solicit by acting (e.g., the sensations of eating).
Suppressing the exteroceptive prediction errors (that report the
fact that I am not currently eating) can be resolved by acting
(eating), which in turn suppresses interoceptive prediction
errors engendered by an empty stomach.
That simple scenario exempliﬁes how hierarchical inference
supports motivated behavior, while laying the foundations of emo-
tional-cognitive integration. In turn, this integration spans other
domains of perception, cognition, and affect. For example, inter-
oceptive and exteroceptive streams can be integrated to support a
“cognitive-emotional” inference. In this embodied predictive
coding perspective (Pezzulo 2013), the most plausible causes of
events are inferred based on both exteroceptive (what I see)
and interoceptive (how do I feel) cues. An affectively charged
event, such as the presence of a predator can be recognized and
categorized from both its perceptual characteristics and the fear
it instills in us –with a form of perception that is not “pure” but
affectively biased (Barrett & Bar 2009). This in turn induces a cir-
cular causality; where fear is both a cause and a consequence of
(predator) perception. The temporal span of this process offers
various opportunities to impinge on other processes such as
memory and planning.
Note that in embodied predictive coding, some “cognitive” pro-
cesses are off-loaded to the body, as bodily states (e.g., high
arousal state or heart rate) become part and parcel of the infer-
ence and can inﬂuence it (Garﬁnkel et al. 2014). The potential
adaptive value of this body-based mechanism is apparent in dan-
gerous situations, where high arousal can prioritize cognitive pro-
cessing. Note also that patients with congenital insensitivity to
pain have problems in recognizing potentially harmful scenarios.
Interoceptive signals can report motivational urges, too, so that
the mismatch between an internal need (e.g., hunger) and sensory
stimuli (e.g., no food) can modulate the importance of visual
signals (Montague & King-Casas 2007) and focus attention
(Mysore & Knudsen 2011). In active inference, these dynamics
depend on a precision-weightingmechanism that underpins all hi-
erarchical inference. This mechanism prioritizes top-down as-
cending prediction errors depending on their precision (inverse
variance), and – as a consequence – it regulates various competi-
tive processes (Desimone & Duncan 1995), both within levels
(e.g., between perceptual hypotheses) and across levels (e.g.,
giving prominence to prior beliefs over sensory evidence). In ad-
dition, precision dynamics regulate the balance between goal
achievement and belief revision, because expectations having
high precisions are immune to revision by prediction errors and
thus act as immutable goals that steer action.
Precision-weighting has been linked to neuromodulation and
the control of attention (in the perceptual domain) and affordance
(in action selection) (Feldman & Friston 2010). Precision-weight-
ing is a key source of cognitive-emotional modulations, too. Sup-
posing that valuable goals or needs are reported by exteroceptive
or interoceptive signals with high precision, they focus perceptual
processing on events that have behavioral signiﬁcance. Further-
more, they induce a cascade of top-down predictions and subse-
quent action (Friston et al. 2012). More broadly, precision-
weighting is a ﬂexible mechanism through which an organism’s
goals and needs prioritize processing dimensions for cognition
and emotion: which events should be attended to and predicted
(attention and planning) and what are their outcomes and affec-
tive consequences (emotion); which expectations have value and
should be fulﬁlled (goal achievement); which prediction errors
should be monitored and corrected (cognitive control); and
what should be learned from them (memory). By the same mech-
anism, conﬂicts between “cognition” and “emotion” can be
created in psychological experiments; for example, by using affec-
tively charged but task-irrelevant stimuli as “distractors.”
We have described how precision dynamics prioritize active in-
ference depending on affective or motivational value. In a similar
way, at the longer timescale of learning, neuronal coding resources
can be prioritized to capture the most behaviorally signiﬁcant
events in the long-range statistics of interoceptive and exterocep-
tive signals. This phenomenon might produce an “affective
tuning” of neural representations at multiple levels. For
example, (Machens et al. 2005) report that auditory neurons in
the grasshopper are particularly sensitive to a behaviorally relevant
stimuli –mating signals – rather than representing the unbiased
distribution of natural sounds. At deeper hierarchical levels, neu-
ronal populations might encode expectations of states that have
value for the organism (goal states) with higher resolution. This
has cascading consequences on perception and action because –
in active inference – precise expectations at higher hierarchical
levels enslave behavior. Furthermore – pursuing an embodied
view of cognition – the same hierarchies supporting action-
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perception loops might be reused for more advanced cognitive
abilities such as planning, mindreading, and executive function
(Barsalou 2008; Jeannerod 2006; Pezzulo 2012; 2014; Pezzulo
et al. 2011; 2013; 2014). This suggests that the same “affective
tuning” of neuronal hierarchies naturally biases higher cognitive
abilities, too.
In sum, various active inference mechanisms reviewed here –
embodied predictive coding, precision dynamics, and the affective
tuning of neural representations – offer a rich substrate for cogni-
tive-emotional interactions. At the same time, they are prone to
vulnerabilities and misregulations, which might produce psycho-
pathological states such as anxiety disorders and psychotic symp-
toms (Adams et al. 2013; Friston et al. 2014). Some forms of
psychopathology might depend on (precision-mediated) misregu-
lations at the cognitive-emotional interface. For example, eating
disorders could arise from the failure to handle conﬂicting infor-
mation at the level of interoceptive signals (e.g., hunger) versus
body schema and (false) belief (e.g., seeing oneself as fat). In
active inference, this deﬁcit is not purely representational but de-
termines how subjects act (and think); for example, anorexics plan
their actions as if they had an enlarged body (Keizer et al. 2013).
Conceptualizing psychopathological states in terms of active infer-
ence may shed light on this intriguing domain, where cognitive-
emotional interactions are clearly evident in both a clinical and
neuropsychological sense.
The cognitive-emotional brain:
Opportunitvnies and challenges for
understanding neuropsychiatric disorders
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Abstract: Many of the most common neuropsychiatric disorders are
marked by prominent disturbances of cognition and emotion.
Characterizing the complex neural circuitry underlying the interplay of
cognition and emotion is critically important, not just for clarifying the
nature of the mind, but also for discovering the root causes of a broad
spectrum of debilitating neuropsychiatric disorders, including anxiety,
schizophrenia, and chronic pain.
Until the twentieth century, the study of cognition and emotion
was largely a philosophical matter. But recent years have wit-
nessed the emergence of powerful new tools for interrogating
the brain and new areas of multidisciplinary research focused on
identifying the neurobiological mechanisms underlying cognition,
emotion, and their role in mental health and disease. In The Cog-
nitive-Emotional Brain, Luiz Pessoa (2013) provides an authorita-
tive perspective on this recent work and its implications for our
understanding of the basic building blocks of the mind. Here,
we highlight four of the book’s most important implications for
understanding neuropsychiatric disorders, including anxiety,
schizophrenia, substance abuse, chronic pain, and autism. These
disorders cause enormous suffering for millions of patients and
their families, outstripping the global burden of cancer or cardio-
vascular disease (Collins et al. 2011; Goldberg & McGee 2011;
Kessler et al. 2012; Whiteford et al. 2013). Notably, these disor-
ders involve prominent alterations in both cognition and
emotion (Millan et al. 2012), pointing to the need for a deeper un-
derstanding of the cognitive-emotional brain.
First, The Cognitive-Emotional Brain reminds us that mental
faculties emerge from the coordinated interactions of large-scale
brain networks. Put simply, fear, reward, attention, and other psy-
chological processes cannot be mapped to isolated brain regions
because no one region is both necessary and sufﬁcient. Conversely,
similar symptoms can emerge from damage to different regions in
the same functional network (Karnath & Smith 2014). Pain, which
is among the most prevalent clinical disorders (Institute of Medi-
cine 2011), nicely illustrates this point. Pain is a multidimensional
experience, involving systematic changes in both cognition and
emotion: painful stimuli elicit anxiety, capture attention, and moti-
vate action. Neurobiologically, pain is associated with a complex
pattern of regional activation, often termed the “pain matrix” (Ian-
netti et al. 2013). Stimulation of individual components of the pain
matrix does not consistently elicit pain, suggesting that pain and its
disorders are emergent properties of regional interactions. This is
not a new or contentious idea; pioneers like Mesulam, Goldman-
Rakic, and LeDoux highlighted the importance of distributed
neural circuits more than two decades ago, and there is widespread
agreement among basic and translational researchers (Bullmore &
Sporns 2012; Fornito et al. 2015; Goldman-Rakic 1988; LeDoux
1995; 2012; Mesulam 1998; Turk-Browne, 2013; Uhlhaas &
Singer 2012). The Cognitive-Emotional Brain is a bracing call for
accelerating the transition from localization strategies (i.e.,
mapping brain structures to function; sometimes termed “neo-
phrenology”) to a network-centered approach. From a clinical neu-
roscience perspective, this suggests that understanding
neuropsychiatric disorders will require embracing the kinds of an-
alytic tools (e.g., functional connectivity ﬁngerprinting, graph the-
oretic and machine learning approaches) that are necessary for
elucidating how psychological constructs and mental disorders
are realized in brain circuits (Turk-Browne 2013; Woo et al. 2014).
Pessoa’s second key conclusion is that the identity of brain func-
tional networks, including the circuitry that underlies clinically rel-
evant phenotypes, cannot be inferred from neuroanatomy alone.
Pessoa makes it clear that the networks identiﬁed by functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other neurophysiological
techniques do not necessarily recapitulate the pattern of direct con-
nections revealed by invasive anatomical tracing techniques.
Indeed, there is ample evidence of robust functional connectivity
between brain regions that lack direct structural connections
(Adachi et al. 2012; Birn et al. 2014; Honey et al. 2009; Vincent
et al. 2007) and increasing evidence that regulatory signals can
propagate across complex, indirect pathways (Ekstrom et al.
2008). From a clinical perspective, this indicates that fMRI-
derived measures of functional connectivity are particularly useful
because they can be used to assay dysfunctional networks that en-
compass polysynaptically connected nodes (Birn et al. 2014), just as
viral tracers can be used to delineate polysynaptic anatomical path-
ways in the nervous system (Dum et al. 2009). More broadly, The
Cognitive-Emotional Brain implies that many of the signs and
symptoms of mental disorders – anhedonia, hypervigilance for
threat, working memory impairments, drug seeking, and so on –
will reﬂect complex brain circuits (Okon-Singer et al. 2015; Semino-
wicz et al. 2004; Shackman et al. 2013; Stout et al. 2013).
The third key conclusion is that emotion and cognition are not
different in kind but are instead deeply interwoven in the fabric
of the brain. Subjectively, we often experience cognition and
emotion as fundamentally different. Emotion is saturated with feel-
ings of pleasure or pain and manifests in readily discerned changes
in the body, whereas cognition often appears devoid of substantial
hedonic, motivational, or somatic features. These apparent differ-
ences in phenomenological experience and peripheral physiology
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have led many scholars to treat emotion and cognition as categori-
cally distinct, even oppositional, mental forces that presumably
reﬂect the operation of segregated brain circuits (de Sousa 2014;
Schmitter 2014). A similar dichotomy pervades psychiatric nosology.
But careful scrutiny reveals contrary evidence; cognition can arouse
the face and body; conversely, emotion can profoundly alter atten-
tion, working memory, and cognitive control (Grupe & Nitschke
2013; Okon-Singer et al. 2015; Shackman et al. 2011). The Cogni-
tive-Emotional Brain provides a useful survey of recent brain
imaging research demonstrating the integration of emotional and
cognitive processes in the brain (Shackman et al. 2011). Largely
on the basis of brain imaging data, Pessoa joins with other theorists
in rejecting claims that emotion and cognition are categorically dif-
ferent (Barrett & Satpute 2013; Damasio 2005; Duncan & Barrett
2007; Lindquist & Barrett 2012). Elucidating the contribution of
the cognitive-emotional brain to psychopathology mandates the
joint efforts of cognitive, affective, computational, and clinical neu-
roscientists. This kind of multidisciplinary research would reﬁne our
understanding of the mechanisms that give rise to “mixed” cogni-
tive-emotional symptoms, such as hypervigilance or aberrant rein-
forcement learning (Cavanagh & Shackman 2014), and provide
novel targets for intervention.
Pessoa’s fourth and most original conclusion is a powerful synthe-
sis of the ﬁrst three. Pessoa argues that widely held beliefs about the
constituents of “the emotional brain” and “the cognitive brain” are
fundamentally ﬂawed. Regions such as the amygdala are not “emo-
tional,” and regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC) are not “cognitive” (Birn et al. 2014; Buhle et al. 2014;
Fox et al. 2005; Shackman et al. 2009). Both regions play a central
role in the regulation of adaptive behavior. This should not be sur-
prising – the human brain did not evolve to optimize performance
on artiﬁcial laboratory probes of “pure” cognition or emotion.
Pessoa also makes it clear that brain regions can dynamically
assume different roles. Just as an individual can perform psycholog-
ically distinct roles in different social networks (e.g., executive,
mother, sister, daughter), brain regions are poised to perform a
range of functions (a property termed functional “superimposition”)
in different neural “contexts” corresponding to their level of partici-
pation in particular functional networks. To paraphrase Pearson and
colleagues (Pearson et al. 2014), key brain regions, such as the orbi-
tofrontal cortex, are functionally heterogeneous, with individual
neurons dynamically multiplexed into different functional roles. As
such, they will “evade a single, modular, functional role assignment”
(p. 954). Our brain reﬂects evolutionary pressures that demanded
distributed neural systems capable of using information about plea-
sure and pain, derived from stimuli saturated with hedonic and mo-
tivational signiﬁcance, to adaptively regulate attention, learning,
somatic mobilization, and action in the service of maximizing repro-
ductive ﬁtness. From this perspective, it is easy to imagine how dys-
function of circumscribed territories of the brain can have a deep
impact on distal regions and circuits, as recent work by our group
and others demonstrates (Fox & Kalin 2014; Fox et al. 2010;
Gratton et al. 2012). This may help to explain the co-occurrence
of cognitive and emotional symptoms, as well as frequent comorbid-
ities, among psychiatric and neurological disorders. Clarifying the
nature of the cognitive-emotional brain is likely to have substantial
beneﬁts for our understanding of disorders marked by symptoms
that blend elements of cognition and emotion (e.g., hypervigilance
to potential threat or overgeneralization of threat, in the case of
the anxiety disorders [Grupe & Nitschke 2013]).
Although many challenges remain, The Cognitive-Emotional
Brain provides a road map to the most fruitful avenues for
future research. One of the most important unresolved questions
concerns the functional signiﬁcance of regions activated by both
cognitive and emotional challenges. For example, Pessoa high-
lights a recent meta-analysis from our group demonstrating that
the elicitation of negative affect, pain, and cognitive control are
all associated with activation in an overlapping region of the
MCC (Shackman et al. 2011). A key unresolved question is
whether the MCC and other regions implicated in both cognitive
and emotional processes, such as the anterior insula, perform a
single general function (e.g., adaptive control [Cavanagh & Shack-
man, in press; Shackman et al. 2011]) or salience detection (Ian-
netti et al. 2013) or multiple speciﬁc functions.
On a broader note, much of the evidence surveyed by Pessoa
comes from the human brain imaging literature. Accordingly,
his conclusions are ultimately tempered by questions about the
origins and signiﬁcance of the fMRI signal and the measures of
functional connectivity that underlie network-centered approach-
es to understanding the cognitive-emotional brain (Akam & Kull-
mann 2014; Cabral et al. 2014; Logothetis 2008). An important
challenge for future studies will be to combine mechanistic tech-
niques in animal models (e.g., optogenetics) with the same whole-
brain imaging strategies routinely applied in humans (Birn et al.
2014; Borsook et al. 2006; Casey et al. 2013; Narayanan et al.
2013; Oler et al. 2012; Roseboom et al. 2014). Combining nonin-
vasive mechanistic techniques (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion or transcranial direct current stimulation) or pharmacological
manipulations with fMRI provides another opportunity for under-
standing how circumscribed perturbations can produce distribu-
ted dysfunction (Chen et al. 2013; Guller et al. 2012; Paulus
et al. 2005; Reinhart & Woodman 2014).
For many disorders marked by cognitive and emotional distur-
bances, extant treatments are inconsistently effective or associated
with signiﬁcant adverse effects (e.g., Bystritsky 2006). The Cogni-
tive-Emotional Brain provides an insightful survey of state of the
science and a useful stimulus for the next generation of basic and
clinical research, reminding us that we have a remarkable oppor-
tunity to use new tools for understanding brain function to dis-
cover the origins of neuropsychiatric disease.
Strengthening emotion-cognition integration
doi:10.1017/S0140525X14001022, e87
Rebecca Todda and Evan Thompsonb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC
V6T 1Z4, Canada; bDepartment of Philosophy, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada.
becket.todd@ubc.psych.ca evan.thompson@ubc.ca
http://psych.ubc.ca/persons/rebecca-todd/
http://philosophy.ubc.ca/persons/evan-thompson/
Abstract: Pessoa’s (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can
be strengthened in two ways: ﬁrst, by clariﬁcation and reﬁnement of key
concepts and terminology, and second by the incorporation of an
additional key neural system into the model, the locus coeruleus/
norepinephrine system.
We agree with Pessoa’s (2013) integrative view of emotion and
cognition in The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, and we agree with
his network view of the brain’s cognitive-affective architecture.
We suggest, however, that these viewpoints can be strengthened
in two ways. First, their key concepts and terminology need clar-
iﬁcation and reﬁnement, in order to foster exchange between the
parallel but mutually insulated research streams of affective
science and the science of decision making. Second, Pessoa’s
“dual competition model” of cognition-emotion would beneﬁt
from the incorporation of an additional key neural system for
the affective biasing of attention, decision making, and control
processes – the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system. In this
commentary, we address these two points in turn.
Concepts and terminology. Pessoa states that he will not deﬁne
the terms “emotion” and “cognition,” but instead will use them
“descriptively to refer to paradigms, task conditions, or ‘processes’
that are closer to the traditional, intended meanings of emotion
and cognition” (p. 3). Although he observes that these meanings
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do not reﬂect real distinctions in kind but simply different lines of
research, he often unwittingly perpetuates the emotion-cognition
dichotomy by following the traditional usage. For example, in
chapter 6 he describes “emotion” as referring to positive and neg-
ative affective states, and “motivation” as referring to motor
actions of approach and avoidance, thereby following the standard
division of the disciplinary territory into research on emotion and
research on decision making. This division is perpetuated by dis-
cussing “motivation” and “value representation” with reference to
decision making and by discussing “emotion” with reference to af-
fective science, as well as by discussing these two bodies of liter-
ature in separate chapters. Yet, as Pessoa points out, these two
lines of research actually investigate a single family of phenomena.
Moreover, as he acknowledges, both lines of research manipulate
both the positive and negative value (to use terminology from de-
cision making) or valence (to use terminology from emotion liter-
ature) of a stimulus, which in turn inﬂuences both selective-
attention processes that occur upstream of emotional state and
action, and more downstream measures that include accuracy,
choice, and eye movement. For example, as Pessoa describes in
detail, both emotion and decision-making research employ aver-
sive and appetitive conditioning to examine the inﬂuence of affec-
tive salience on attention, action, and control processes. The
distinction between motivation and emotion also breaks down
within affective science itself, as many emotion theorists include
action tendencies as constitutive of emotion (e.g., Frijda 1986).
Throughout the book there is also conﬂation between “motivation”
and “emotion,” on the one hand, and the actual value or valence of
a stimulus, on the other hand, where “emotion” sometimes refers
to manipulations of negative value and “motivation” to positive
value, in deﬁance of the previous distinctions between the terms.
For these reasons, we suggest that a consistent terminology
would help to foster a common language between the parallel
but mutually insulated areas of research in affective science and
the science of decision making. Better still would be to treat
these two areas as making up one single ﬁeld of research.
Hence, recent research coming from both traditions has beneﬁted
from distinguishing between “salience” (overall importance of a
stimulus, negative or positive) and “value” in order to parse
neural systems sensitive to salience, value, or both (Chikazoe
et al. 2014; Kahnt et al. 2014).
This point is important for Pessoa’s comprehensive review of
amygdala function. He states, “though the precise contribution
of the amygdala in these networks is still unknown, it does not
map speciﬁcally onto emotion, but, instead, corresponds to
broader and more abstract dimensions of information processing,
including salience, ambiguity, unpredictability, and other aspects
of biological value” (p. 78). We propose that positive and negative
value (typically discussed in the emotion literature in terms of
valence), ambiguity, and unpredictability are all aspects of
overall salience. We have previously described “affective salience”
as a quality that endows a stimulus with prioritized access to atten-
tion and action because it has been associated with pleasure/pain
or approach/avoidance (e.g., novelty and surprise signal prediction
error, which is arguably intrinsically affectively charged) (Mar-
kovic et al. 2014; Todd et al. 2012a). We describe this quality as
“affective salience” in order to distinguish it from “objective sali-
ence,” which is related to physical features of an object as de-
scribed in vision research (Todd et al. 2012b). The notion of
“affective salience,” which incorporates features of ambiguity,
novelty, surprise, and value, maps onto Pessoa’s summary of
amygdala function – determining what something is and whether
it is important to attend to it and do something about it.
Along similar lines, it is also helpful to clarify the difference
between emotional state and the inﬂuence of stimulus salience
on behavior. “Emotional state” refers to a sustained state of
arousal within the perceiver, whereas “stimulus salience” refers
to the degree to which a discrete stimulus may bias attention
because of its association with arousal, value, etc. This distinction
is important but is often conﬂated in the literature. Pessoa
discusses Mather’s model of arousal-biased competition (Mather
& Sutherland 2011), which models the inﬂuence of affective
state on attention and memory. We in turn have proposed the
complementary notion of “affect-biased attention” (Todd et al.
2012a), which is attention biased by the affective salience of the
stimulus itself. Affect-biased attention is the predisposition to
attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over
others; it tunes ﬁlters for initial attention and subsequent process-
ing and thereby regulates subsequent emotional responses (Todd
et al. 2012a). Hence, it provides an important example of emotion-
cognition integration in the brain and behavior.
Enlarging the dual competition model. Pessoa’s dual competi-
tion model of cognition-emotion is a timely, sophisticated, and
empirically grounded model that uniﬁes disparate ﬁndings on
the interrelations between affective salience, emotional state,
and controlled cognitive processes into a coherent theoretical
framework. In outlining this model, Pessoa proposes six key
mechanisms for affective modulation of visual activity (pp.
161–66). The locus coeruleus/norepinephrine (LC/NE) system
is not a component of this model, although it is discussed
brieﬂy in relation to its modulation of frontoparietal attentional
networks via basal forebrain cholinergic and GABA projections.
Beyond its interactions with other neurochemical systems, we
propose that the LC/NE system in itself constitutes a seventh
mechanism and is central to understanding the effects of salience
on cognition and action.
The locus coeruleus is a brainstem nucleus that produces nor-
epinephrine (NE) and sends projections to most regions of the
brain, including the visual cortex, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)/ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), thalamus, and amygdala, as
well as important nodes in networks mediating executive attention
and motor response (Sara 2009). Our own “biased attention via
norepinephrine” (BANE) model outlines the role of this system,
in interaction with the amygdala and OFC/VMPRC systems de-
scribed in Pessoa’s dual competition model, in biasing attention
and memory to relevant aspects of the world (Markovic et al.
2014). The LC/NE system plays an important role in the modula-
tion of attention and control processes by affective salience (Sara
2009; Sara & Bouret 2012). The LC is structurally well positioned
to facilitate affect-biased attention. It receives inputs from the
central nucleus of the amygdala (Berridge & Waterhouse 2003),
as well as from ventral prefrontal regions important for stimulus
evaluation and decision making (for review, see Aston-Jones &
Cohen 2005), facilitating tuning of LC activity to what is motiva-
tionally relevant. The LC itself also projects to regions of the thal-
amus and visual cortex (Jones & Moore 1977), allowing for rapid
tuning of sensory responses.
Nonhuman animal studies have found that motivationally rel-
evant stimuli elicit LC response (for review, see Sara 2009;
Sara & Bouret 2012), and LC-NE activity has been shown to
directly modulate visual cortex activation (Waterhouse et al.
1990). A wide body of evidence suggests that LC neurons facil-
itate responses to the overall salience of a stimulus (Sara 2009),
modulating activity for stimuli that are positive and negative in
value, as well as those that are novel and surprising (Berridge
& Waterhouse 2003). Arousing stimuli elicit phasic LC activa-
tion, resulting in release of NE (Aston-Jones & Bloom 1981;
Grant et al. 1988; Herve-Minvielle & Sara 1995; Rasmussen &
Jacobs 1986). Released NE may tune target neurons by improv-
ing their signal-to-noise ratio, inhibiting responses to neighbour-
ing frequencies while sparing response to the best frequency
(Manunta & Edeline 2004). LC activity is also important in asso-
ciative learning of what is salient. LC neurons ﬁre in response to
direct reward and punishment and subsequently to any stimuli
associated with the salient event (Sara 2009). Moreover, NE
modulation of long-term changes in synaptic strength and gene
transcription allow the LC/NE system to guide behavior based
on stimulus salience within a given context (Berridge & Water-
house 2003).
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NE also plays a crucial role in the emotional enhancement of
memory via activity in the amygdala (Cahill et al. 1996; 2003; Roo-
zendaal et al. 2009). In humans, a deletion variant in the ADRA2b
gene impairs alpha2b NE receptor function, putatively affecting
tonic levels of NE availability (Small et al. 2001). The ADRA2b
deletion variant has been linked to individual differences in
tuning to affectively salient aspects of the world, including emo-
tional enhancement of memory (de Quervain et al. 2007). We
have found that it also inﬂuences selective visual attention to affec-
tive salience. In an emotional version of the attentional blink task
described by Pessoa (Anderson 2005; Anderson & Phelps 2001),
we found that carriers of the deletion variant show an “emotional
sparing” or a reduced attentional blink for affectively salient
stimuli (Todd et al. 2013). They also showed a stronger link
between the perceived salience of stimuli at encoding and accuracy
and conﬁdence of subsequent recognition memory (Todd et al.
2014). Moreover, in deletion carriers we have found that enhanced
visual processing of affectively salient stimuli is linked to greater ac-
tivation in nodes of valuation networks (Rasch et al. 2009). These
ﬁndings support a role for the LC/NE system in affective biasing of
visual attention in humans.
The BANE model makes a number of predictions that add to
our understanding of processes outlined in Pessoa’s model.
These include the prediction that ADRA2b will mediate individual
differences in the strength and duration of emotional learning.
They also address the inﬂuence of NE activity on the relation
between affective salience and other cognitive processes, as out-
lined in the dual competition model. One outstanding question
concerns the relation between the notion of affective salience
itself and that of prediction error: For example, can we say that
things are by deﬁnition more salient if they elicit higher levels
of prediction error? We suggest that a productive area for
future research is to develop both the BANE and dual competi-
tion models in conversation with current views models of contex-
tual inﬂuences on cognition, including predictive coding models
(Clark 2013; Grossberg & Seidman 2006; Summerﬁeld & Egner
2009; Summerﬁeld et al. 2006).
Social theory and the cognitive-emotional
brain
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Abstract: Pessoa’s (2013) arguments imply that various leading approaches
in the social sciences have not adequately conceptualized how emotion and
cognition inﬂuence human decision making and social behavior. This is
particularly unfortunate, as these approaches have been central to the
efforts to build bridges between neuroscience and the social sciences. We
argue that it would be better to base these efforts on other social theories
that appear more compatible with Pessoa’s analysis of the brain.
During the past two decades, brain research has affected the
balance between competing approaches within economics, politi-
cal science, sociology, and anthropology. If empirically further
endorsed, then the arguments presented in Pessoa’s The Cogni-
tive-Emotional Brain (2013) deserve to have a similar inﬂuence
on theorizing in these ﬁelds, as well as on the efforts to merge neu-
roscience with the social sciences. To explain why and how, we
start by providing an overview of the impact that brain research
has had on social theories.
In the 1990s, it became increasingly apparent that the tenets of
rational choice theory (Becker 1976) are contradicted by the
growing body of neuroscientiﬁc insights into how human decision
making is inﬂuenced by emotions (e.g., Damasio 1994; LeDoux
2000). At the time, rational choice analysis had become the pre-
dominant approach in political science and in economics (where
it is often called “expected utility theory”) and had also become
quite inﬂuential in sociology. Its impact on anthropology had
been less signiﬁcant but not negligible. Rational choice analysis
presumes that agents (be they individuals, households, or organi-
zations) are able to calculate and choose the one option, from all
those available, that gives themselves the highest satisfaction or
utility. It thus depicts decision makers as highly informed, self-
centered, and calculative. Emotions and feelings are conspicuously
absent from the decision-making processes postulated by rational
choice analysis. Neuroscientists (Koenigs et al. 2007; Krajbich
et al. 2009), however, provided evidence suggesting that human
decision making is to a signiﬁcant extent dependent on emotions.
This neuroscientiﬁc critique of rational choice theory’s premises
coincided with accumulating empirical evidence from the social
sciences that its predictions were frequently inaccurate as well
(e.g., Henrich et al. 2001). Later these growing doubts were
joined by the widespread conviction that the outbreak of the
2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis had been caused by “human foibles”
not captured by rational choice theory (Leiser et al. 2010).
This conﬂuence of scientiﬁc developments and social forces
induced social scientists to reconsider the roles that emotions
play in social life. Many social scientists have done so by building
on dual-systems (or dual-process) models developed in psychology.
These models distinguish between two modes of thinking and de-
ciding (Chaiken & Trope 1999; Kahneman 2003b; Stanovich &
West 2000). In the ﬁrst of these two modes, often dubbed
System 1, thinking and deciding are fast, automatic, intuitive, ef-
fortless, slow-learning, and emotional. By contrast, in System 2,
thinking and deciding are slow, deliberate, effortful, rule-gov-
erned, emotionally neutral, as well as relatively adaptable. Often,
it is assumed that these modes form distinct neural networks in
the brain, one of which (System 1) is evolutionary older than the
other. According to dual-systems models, human cognition and de-
cision making are routinely processed in System 1. Although less
precise, this mode allows people to choose satisfactory courses of
action more often than not. It is occasionally overridden and cor-
rected by System 2, which is slower and demands more effort,
but is also more accurate. The consequence of people’s preponder-
ant reliance on System 1 is that although human decision making is
often adequate for life’s purposes, it still displays systematic biases
and fallacies. These errors explain how and why humans fail to
display the behavior predicted by rational choice analysis and
sometimes embark on courses of action that are against their
own interests.
Beyond psychology, dual-systems models have been used in
other disciplines to develop such approaches as behavioral econom-
ics (Smith 2005; Thaler 1993), behavioral law (Sunstein 2000), and
behavioral public policy (Shaﬁr 2012). These approaches employ
the biases and fallacies highlighted by dual-systems models to
explain a set of seemingly irrational behaviors in ﬁnance, consump-
tion, voting, law abidance, and so forth. Their academic popularity
should not be underrated. During the past 20 years, chairs, gradu-
ate programs, academic societies, annual conferences, and hand-
books have sprung up, thus institutionalizing these approaches. In
2002, Kahneman and Smith shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economics for their contributions to them. Yet, these are not
merely academic debates. The alternative assumptions concerning
human cognition and decision making that underlie rational choice
analysis and behavioral approaches have rivaling implications for
governance (Dow Schüll & Zaloom 2011). If humans are viewed
as well informed and rational, then it becomes easier to justify lim-
iting state involvement in people’s lives. If, however, individuals are
seen as “predictably irrational” (Ariely 2008) and “unreasonably
short-sighted” (Kahneman 2011, p. 286), then benign state
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intervention appears prudent. Indeed, in recent years, both the
United Kingdom and United States governments have established
behavioral insight teams to inform future policy making. Finally,
behavioral economics has had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the devel-
opment of neuroeconomics (Camerer et al. 2004). Not all neuroe-
conomists are behavioral economists, but most of them are. Much
effort in neuroeconomics has therefore gone into attempts to
uncover the distinct neural networks subserving the emotional/intu-
itive and cognitive/deliberative modes of decision making (e.g.,
Albrecht et al. 2010).
As Pessoa acknowledges (p. 250), his book provides a welter of
arguments against the dual-systems models that have underpinned
the recent behavioral turn in the social sciences. He concludes that
labels such as perception, cognition, and emotion may be of use for
some descriptive purposes, but such labels do not map onto behav-
ior or the brain. Herein lies the importance of The Cognitive-Emo-
tional Brain for the social sciences in general, and for the ongoing
efforts to bridge the social sciences and brain research in particu-
lar. If Pessoa’s arguments are empirically valid, then the attempts
to create more realistic models of human decision making by
adding a category of apparently irrational emotions to supposedly
more rational cognition are deeply ﬂawed and doomed to fail.
This is signiﬁcant in view of the large impact that behavioral ap-
proaches have had on the social sciences, neuroeconomics, and
policy making during the last two decades.
Pessoa’s rejection (2013) of the main premise on which dual-
systems models and the new behavioral approaches in economics,
law, and political science are built – namely, that emotion and cog-
nition can be treated as separate – is conjoined by other critiques.
Volz and Gigerenzer (2014) have noted that the results of neuroe-
conomic experiments have been contradictory, in that speciﬁc brain
regions have been associated with intuitive judgments in some
studies and with deliberate judgments in others. Keren and Schul
(2009) have argued that lack of conceptual precision has rendered
dual-systems models, behavioral economics, and neuroeconomics
hard to falsify. Last, scholars have criticized the psychological exper-
iments that have purportedly shown the existence of biases and
errors in human decision making. For example, Stein (2013) has
argued that the choices made in these experiments can easily be in-
terpreted as rational rather than fallacious – for example, by judging
them against the standard of Baconian (as opposed to Bayesian)
probability. Pessoa’s book, in conjunction with these other cri-
tiques, puts into doubt whether the attempts to link neuroscience
with economics, political science, and other social sciences have
started from the right conceptual place.
If so, then this would be a regrettable false start, as brain re-
search and the social sciences can, in principle, support each
other. Neuroscience can help ensure that social theories are
grounded in empirically valid assumptions regarding cognition,
emotions, and decision making. Less often recognized is that
brain research itself can also be improved with the help of social
theories. The latter can offer conceptually precise, and cross-cul-
turally valid formulations of the social phenomena that neurosci-
entists have started to investigate, such as ethical behavior,
social interaction, beauty, or crime prevention (Turner 2012). In
addition, social theories can help neuroscientists become more
aware of the political and social biases that they may implicitly
display in their research on some of these topics (Whitehead
2012). It is therefore important to continue to build bridges
between neuroscience and the social sciences – but henceforth
with the help of social theories that are compatible with the
latest understandings of the cognitive-emotional brain.
What might these social theories look like? If Pessoa’s analysis is
empirically valid, then this has two implications for theorizing
within economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology.
First, theories in these ﬁelds should be based on the recognition
that emotion, perception, and cognition are highly intertwined.
This is the central message of The Cognitive-Emotional Brain.
Second, Pessoa can be read as supporting the notion that although
there may be a rich interlocking of human cognition, emotion, and
decision making, this occurs against a background of functional
and anatomical constraints. Even though the embedding of
older brain regions (such as the amygdala and hypothalamus)
into new neural networks can generate novel functions (pp. 34–
36), they still serve an organism’s ability to respond to relevant
stimuli in its environment, thereby promoting organism survival,
maintenance of well-being, and social cohesion. Thus, an elabora-
tion of older functional systems integral to core homeostatic needs
has likely emerged over the course of human evolution to support
richer patterns of interaction between an organism and its physical
and social environment. In this process, each prior form of neural
organization would constrain and shape the emergence of new
capabilities; a perspective that has been widely explored within
neuroscience (e.g., Dehaene & Cohen 2007; Damasio 2010, pp.
251–79). At this point in its development, it would be hard for
neuroscience to specify which precise neural constraints might
apply to higher-order decision making and social interaction. Nev-
ertheless, it is reasonable to assume that such constraints operate.
Fortunately, there are social theories that meet these two crite-
ria. A prominent example is the cultural theory developed by an-
thropologists Douglas and Thompson and political scientists Ellis
and Wildavsky (Douglas 1982; Thompson et al. 1990). This ap-
proach distinguishes among four fundamental ways of organizing,
perceiving, justifying, and emotionally experiencing social rela-
tions – namely, individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy, and fatal-
ism. It posits that every social domain (from the family unit to
the international level) is characterized by the waxing and waning,
and merging and splitting, of these four “ways of life.” As such, cul-
tural theory does not distinguish between perception, cognition,
and emotion. Each of its ways of life includes perceptions (of
human nature, time, risk, time, space, etc.), cognition (such as infor-
mation-processing styles), as well as emotional likes and dislikes
(Douglas & Ney 1998). Furthermore, the approach recognizes
that human behavior and decision making are constrained. Cultural
theory argues that any social domain is forever being constructed by
the interplay between a limited set of elementary ways of perceiv-
ing, knowing, behaving, and experiencing. Hence, it reconciles the
wide variety and change of social life with clear constraints on cog-
nition, emotions, decision making, and social interaction.
Douglas’s cultural theory is not the only social science approach
that meets the criteria outlined above. Others include the relational
models theory developed by Fiske (1991) and the heuristics
program established by Gigerenzer and colleagues (Hertwig et al.
2013). Such social science frameworks appear to be compatible
with, or are at least not contradicted by, the overall arguments
laid out in The Cognitive-Emotional Brain. As a result, these ap-
proaches seem much more suitable pillars on which to build
bridges between neuroscience and the social sciences than the
“behavioral” social theories that are currently used for this
purpose and that are so powerfully undermined by Pessoa’s book.
Precision about the automatic emotional brain
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Abstract: The question of automaticity in emotion processing has been
debated under different perspectives in recent years. Satisfying answers
to this issue will require a better deﬁnition of automaticity in terms of
relevant behavioral phenomena, ecological conditions of occurrence, and
a more precise mechanistic account of the underlying neural circuits.
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In his book, The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, and and in his précis,
Pessoa (2013) provides a rich and cogent overview of current
emotion research, with a particular emphasis on human neuroim-
aging work and his own important contributions to the ﬁeld. A
major theme addressed from the start concerns the notion of “au-
tomaticity” in emotion processing and the elaboration of a “dual
competition model,” whereby emotion and motivation are pro-
posed to interact either synergistically or antagonistically with per-
ception and executive functions. In line with laudable efforts
throughout the book to deconstruct the boundaries between af-
fective and cognitive realms of the mind-brain, as encouraged
by other scientists in the past (Gray 1990; Ledoux 2000; Leventhal
& Scherer 1987), it is notable that Pessoa is embracing a perspec-
tive on the functional relationship between “controlled” versus
“automatic,” or conscious versus nonconscious, processing of
emotional information that appears less dichotomous than
earlier views (Pessoa & Ungerleider 2004), and also less crude
than ways in which these terms are commonly (unfortunately)
used in the literature. Hence, Pessoa puts forward a “continuous
framework” for the perception of emotional stimuli and their
competition with other information in capacity limited systems.
However, as Pessoa tries to accommodate these general notions
with existing data and refers to general psychological concepts and
terms (e.g., resource capacity, multiple waves, recurrent loops,
etc.), the proposed framework often remains at an abstract
level, which makes it difﬁcult to falsify and thus lacks a strong heu-
ristic value. Moreover, Pessoa chose to refrain from providing his
own deﬁnition for several important notions (e.g., emotion infor-
mation or automaticity, to start with) –which is wise to avoid a
priori biases but then leaves abundant space for ad hoc interpre-
tations and potential inconsistencies. What is needed in the ﬁeld is
a precise mechanistic account of these concepts and the corre-
sponding phenomena, based on speciﬁc neuronal processes and
circuits.
There is abundant evidence that some form of emotional pro-
cessing can take place without conscious awareness of stimuli or
despite opposing intentional goals, which cannot simply be dis-
missed by stating that awareness was not probed or attention “ex-
hausted” in an appropriate manner. These effects are subserved
not only by the amygdala, but also by high-level cortical areas
and other brain structures, including reward pathways (Pessi-
glione et al. 2008; Pourtois et al. 2013; Raio et al. 2012; Vuilleum-
ier & Righart 2011). What is of interest and remains challenging is
not really whether or not emotion-related information is pro-
cessed without awareness of its presence, but rather what are
the differences in processing, nature of representations, neural
substrates both in space and in time, etc. For example, fear con-
ditioning occurs without consciousness but shows different tem-
poral features than during conscious processing (Raio et al.
2012). Furthermore, as underscored by several researchers
(Bargh 1989; Moors et al. 2005) and acknowledged by Pessoa, au-
tomaticity is a broad concept that encompasses several distinct di-
mensions, including lack of explicit report, intentionality, effort, or
control, among others. None of these dimensions is a unique de-
ﬁning feature of “automaticity,” and only some of them may apply
to emotion responses (e.g., in amygdala) – as the resource efﬁciency
principle described by Pessoa; but other dimensions may not
apply – as lack of control or autonomy, for example (Dominguez-
Borras & Vuilleumier 2013; Vuilleumier & Righart 2011). An im-
portant goal for future research is to more precisely dissect these
dimensions in relation to different kinds of emotion information
and different brain circuits. In the light of past research in neuro-
science and cognitive science, to which Pessoa has made great con-
tributions, it is hard to argue against or in support of “automaticity”
in emotion processing without deﬁning more precisely what is
meant by automatic and emotional.
Another issue is that many facets of automaticity and their un-
derlying substrates are not necessarily speciﬁc to emotion, but also
apply to nonemotional material. Various forms of nonconscious,
unintentional, efﬁcient, and fast processing have been observed
in some degree for a large variety of stimuli, for example,
ranging from subliminal priming with words or numbers, classic
Stroop effects, through to motor preparation and mimicry
(Dimberg et al. 2000; Eimer & Schlaghecken 2002; Kouider &
Dehaene 2007). These effects imply activations of high-level
brain areas several synapses away from primary sensory areas, in-
cluding motor cortex, hippocampus, language, or even prefrontal
executive control areas (Henke et al. 2003; Nakamura et al. 2007;
van Gaal et al. 2010). There is no necessity to attribute a “special”
privilege to the amygdala in this respect, neither to deprive it.
What might be “special” is a particular threshold to respond to a
particular kind of information and the functional impact on partic-
ular downstream areas, for example, associated with attention or
autonomic arousal (Vuilleumier 2009). Nonconscious or preatten-
tive processing should not be equated with the implication of a
subcortical route specialized for emotion information – just as
nonconscious word priming does not imply direct subcortical con-
nections to Wernicke’s area. It has long been proposed that such
effects may reﬂect efﬁcient, fast, feed-forward sweeps of inputs
into pathways overlapping at least in part with (cortical and sub-
cortical) pathways subserving conscious processing, but presum-
ably unaccompanied by other neural processes engaged in the
latter case such as reentrant feedback, sustained activity, rhythmic
oscillations, and/or additional inputs through the same or parallel
pathways (Vuilleumier 2005). This echoes the notion of “multiple
waves” of processing put forward by Pessoa and Adolphs (2010),
although the latter account is rather broad and needs to be
more speciﬁc in order to be testable. The role of a speciﬁc sub-
cortical route (e.g., through colliculus, pulvinar, or visual thala-
mus) is necessary to explain affective blindsight in patients
without visual cortex (Hamm et al. 2003; Morris et al. 2001;
Pegna et al. 2005), but its role in the healthy brain, exact
anatomy, and informational content remain to be elucidated
(Schmid et al. 2010).
In any case, it must be underscored that preattentive or non-
conscious processing (cortical or subcortical) should not be ex-
pected to be similar to “full” conscious processing of the same
sensory inputs. It might be limited to coarse or partial informa-
tion, such as low-frequency cues or eye features in faces
(Whalen et al. 2004) (among other possibilities), and thus possible
for some stimuli but not others. For example, emotional meaning
might be extracted efﬁciently from faces because of particular fea-
tures or conﬁgural properties present in a single stimulus, thanks
to specialized neuronal populations tuned to faces that exist
throughout the visual systems. This seems much less likely for
visual scenes where emotional meaning derives from speciﬁc
layouts of more complex, multipart objects. Accordingly, there
is evidence for coarse representations of faces (Gabay et al.
2014; Maior et al. 2010; Nguyen et al. 2014) or biologically
salient stimuli such as snakes (Van Le et al. 2013) in subcortical
visual pathways, although their functional role is unresolved.
This accords with the notion that nonconscious processing
might be “dumb,” as Pessoa puts it (see also Vuilleumier et al.
2003; Vuilleumier & Righart 2011). An important goal for re-
search is to pinpoint more precisely which information is
encoded in which brain region, for which function, and under
which conditions.
Furthermore, the existence of nonconscious and unintentional
responses does not preclude that they may be modulated by top-
down factors, including expectations, context, goal-driven control,
and so forth. Subliminal priming is malleable to current task
demands and attentional control even when stimuli remain non-
conscious (Bahrami et al. 2007; Fischer et al. 2007; Martens
et al. 2011; Nakamura et al. 2007). Even exogenous attention,
which typically operates in a reﬂexive (rapid and involuntary)
manner, can be modulated by top-down factors related to task
goals or readiness to respond to particular events (Ansorge et al.
2009; Folk et al. 1992). Likewise, expectations and affective
states inﬂuence emotion processing for stimuli outside attention
(Bishop et al. 2004; Pichon et al. 2015) and can abolish the
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effect of attention load on emotional response (Cornwell et al.
2011). These top-down modulations do not necessarily imply
that stimulus processing depends on consciousness and voluntary
attention and hence cannot be interpreted against “automaticity”
without distinguishing more precisely between different sources
of modulation and different components of automaticity.
Although a continuous framework of resource competition
neatly account for number of phenomena (Pessoa 2013), it is
not sufﬁcient to explain how reduced resources as a result of in-
creased attention load can affect emotion-speciﬁc responses in
some brain areas (e.g., prefrontal cortex or visual cortex)
without affecting others (e.g., amygdala) (Shafer et al. 2012; Vuil-
leumier et al. 2001), unless one postulates dissociable sensitivities
to these effects. Moreover, in some cases, increased attentional
load or suppression from awareness may actually increase emo-
tional responses (e.g., in amygdala) to neutral or positive stimuli
relative to low-load conditions (Silvert et al. 2007; Williams
et al. 2004). Further, a continuous framework does not take into
account that key aspects of selective attention and awareness
are nonlinear in nature (Dehaene et al. 2014; Sergent &
Dehaene 2004) (and presumably emotion too; Sander et al.
2005). Finally, the central concept of resource is relatively
vague and lacks precise neural substrates. By focusing on effects
rather than causal mechanisms, a resource account runs into the
risk of circularity, for example, when appealing to “residual re-
sources” to explain why emotional effects on behavior or amygdala
activity are observed under “high load” conditions, without a more
direct measure of resource. Whereas in vision, competition for re-
sources can be mapped neurally onto overlapping receptive ﬁelds
(Desimone 1998), other forms of competition may exist in other
brain systems and be resolved by distinct mechanisms. Models
of emotion and cognition interactions need to consider that mul-
tiple processes operate in parallel and produce distinct (linear or
nonlinear) effects on different nodes within distributed networks
(Pourtois et al. 2013; Sander et al. 2005).
Lastly, caution must be taken when drawing conclusions based
solely on human neuroimaging studies, which have several limita-
tions because of their poor resolution (spatial and temporal) and
vascular origin (BOLD contrast in fMRI). This makes it hard to
compare processing conditions when they differ in terms of the
onset or duration of neuronal responses (Pourtois et al. 2010) or
recruit partly distinct neuronal subpopulations within the same
brain structure (Zhang et al. 2013). In particular, the amygdala
is not homogenous but made of several subnuclei, each containing
multiple type of neurons, which might be sensitive to different
sources of sensory inputs and top-down modulations (Vuilleumier
2009). Conscious (vs. nonconscious) and attentive (vs. preatten-
tive) processing might also be characterized by distinctive patterns
of rhythmic oscillatory activity or connectivity within and/or
between subregions, whose impact on BOLD fMRI or other elec-
trophysiological measures is unresolved. Answering these ques-
tions will require ﬁner investigations in animal models or novel
technologies in humans.
The issues reviewed by Pessoa (2013) should encourage research-
ers to go beyond simplistic dichotomies (such as automatic vs. con-
trolled processes). However, it is important to be careful in how
psychological terms are used, deﬁned, and related to speciﬁc
neural substrates. Time is now ripe to formulate precise mechanistic
hypotheses in order to elucidate the exact functional circuits impli-
cated in emotion phenomena and deﬁne them in terms of informa-
tion processing systems (i.e., by determining which type of
information is represented and/or transmitted in speciﬁc pathways –
rather than just the “amount” of information as in a continuous re-
source model). This is an exciting prospect for future research.
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Abstract: Pessoa (2013) makes an impressive case that emotion,
motivation, and cognition are neurally intertwined. Our commentary
broadens the discussion to the functional, “mind” level. We argue that
philosophical and computational considerations justify some modern
“separatist” views. We highlight several psychological phenomena that
illustrate independence, including affective and motivational reactions to
rudimentary inputs, and the guiding role of such reactions in cognition.
In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013) makes an impres-
sive case that emotion, motivation, and cognition are intertwined on
the neural level and that many behaviors reﬂect a tight integration
of these processes. Admirably, Pessoa does not deny that it is still
useful to characterize certain processes and behaviors using tradi-
tional terms emotion, motivation, and cognition, but he points out
that any strict assignments of brain regions and brain networks to
these terms obscures the way the mind and brain typically work.
Being in agreement with much of the book, and coming from
the primarily psychological, rather than neuroscientiﬁc perspec-
tive, our commentary aims to broaden the discussion of the rela-
tionship between emotion, motivation, and cognition. We do so by
ﬁrst placing the distinction in a historical and philosophical
context, which explains and justiﬁes some modern “separatist”
views. We then highlight some psychological phenomena that,
in our opinion, ﬁt nicely with the idea of at least occasional inde-
pendence. Again, we will say relatively little about the brain, but
because one of the purposes of neuroscience is to better under-
stand the mind and actual behavior, refocusing some of the discus-
sion onto this more psychological level might be useful.
Philosophical and historical background. Pessoa avoids com-
mitting himself to any strict deﬁnition of affect, emotion, motiva-
tion, and cognition. He dislikes dichotomies and views the
differences as a matter of degree rather than kind. And, as an em-
piricist, he prefers the data to guide deﬁnitions (see Ch. 1). But it
is useful to at least remind ourselves why many modern function-
alist frameworks ﬁnd it useful to view emotion and cognition as
different beasts, though, of course, they have long moved from
Plato-like fractionation of the mind into the reasoning, the desir-
ing, and the emotive components, and other simplistic frame-
works. So, why would modern functionalist care to distinguish
cognition and emotion? Most important, because much of what
makes human mind and human behavior in society interesting
touches on this difference. Why does the heart seem to have
reasons that reason cannot know? Why are we afraid of things
that we rationally know are safe and do not like things we rational-
ly should? Why does it seem that some of our decisions seem like
mere justiﬁcations for emotional preferences? Why can powerful
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bodily and feeling reactions be elicited by simple stimulus fea-
tures, in every sensory domain, such as gentle touches, baby
screams, rancid smells, or seeing heights? And why can percep-
tion, thinking, decision and action radically change depending
on our emotional state? These important questions seem harder
to ask and answer when one blurs the emotion-cognition distinc-
tion, yet they have inspired decades of fascinating research and in-
sightful theorizing (e.g., Haidt 2001; Loewenstein et al. 2001;
Schwarz 1990; Zajonc 1980).
More conceptually, it just seems useful to view cognition as
processes concerned primarily with “representing” and “judging” –
transformations of representations that aim to be “truth preserving”
and which often take a propositional form. In contrast, it seems
useful to reserve terms like affect, emotion, and motivation for pro-
cesses primarily aimed at getting the organism to “care about” and
to “do” something, and recruiting necessary physiological and expe-
riential states to handle its concerns (Frijda 1988; Zajonc 1980).
Critically, some affective processes can involve precognitive mech-
anisms of sensation and perception, and even completely noncogni-
tive mechanisms, such as global neuromodulation (Panksepp &
Biven 2012). In fact, some of these mechanisms are so basic that
they are shared with species with clearly noncognitive status (e.g.,
neuromodulation of anxiety-like behaviors in species like crayﬁsh,
Fossat et al. 2014). Reﬂecting these insights, there are several
modern philosophical works that emphasize low-level, nonproposi-
tional, perceptual, or embodied components of affect and emotion
(e.g., Charland 1995; Goldie 2000; Prinz 2006a).
In psychology, the noncognitivist view has always been amply
represented, going back to the founding fathers of psychology
like Wundt and James, but it found perhaps the most eloquent
and passionate expression in the writings of Robert Zajonc
(1980; 2000). His proposals of “affective primacy,” as well as his
notion that “preferences need no inference,” still inspire contem-
porary research (see Niedenthal et al. 2010; Winkielman 2010). As
such, it is perhaps worth visiting some of the claims that affect,
emotion, and motivation can be induced with minimal signiﬁcant
perceptual and conceptual processing and work in relative disso-
ciation from the explicit belief system.
Affect with minimal cognition. We’ve already mentioned that
basic affective states (simple, bivalent reactions) can be induced
by rudimentary sensation-like processes. As Zajonc (1980; 2000)
has pointed out, inspired by James, affective states can also be in-
ﬂuenced by noncognitive manipulations of bodily states, including
peripheral and central somatosensory feedback mechanisms (for a
recent review, Winkielman et al. 2015). Social psychologists have
also provided plenty of examples for implicit, or even unconscious
contributions to preferences, attitudes, and prejudices, some of
which appear to involve simple learning mechanisms and are im-
pervious to rational interventions (Greenwald & Banaji 1995;
Winkielman et al. 2011). Interestingly, there is even a class of phe-
nomena where affect appears to result from the simple dynamics
of processing. The best known is the “mere exposure effect” – en-
hancement of liking as a function of sheer stimulus repetition. But
enhancement of liking, as measured with a variety of means, can
also be obtained by enhancing perceptual clarity, contrast, or re-
ducing visual noise – all low-level perceptual manipulations. The
current view on such phenomena holds that there is a link
between greater perceptual ﬂuency and positive affect. Some ac-
counts of this link are inferential in nature, but others merely
propose that easy and fast dynamics, nonspeciﬁc signals of famil-
iarity, and low conﬂict are fundamentally, perhaps innately,
marked as communicating positive states of affairs (for a recent
review, see Winkielman et al. 2012). So, perhaps in the same
sense that one does not need to learn or “infer” that sugar tastes
good and that injuries are painful, organisms know to “dislike” dis-
ﬂuency and processing conﬂict. In short, some seemingly “cogni-
tive” phenomena actually illustrate the minimal conditions for
affect induction, without much elaborating, structuring, categoriz-
ing, or cognitive interpreting needed to explain preferences.
Motivation with minimal cognition. Pessoa proposes that moti-
vational processes are also highly dependent on associated cogni-
tion. However, several phenomena highlight the possibility of
rudimentary, “subcognitive” inﬂuences on motivation. For
example, approach-avoidance motivation can be changed by
simple manipulations of embodiment, such as direct stimulation
of body-related brain areas and actual body position (e.g., Price
et al. 2012). They can also be manipulated by direct biological in-
terventions into the underlying brain chemistry, biofeedback, and
direct stimulation (for a recent review, see Harmon-Jones et al.
2013). Further, basic motivational signals and states (including
reward signals) can spill over to completely unrelated stimuli,
highlighting that they are not tightly bound to any particular cog-
nitive representation and operate with a different dynamics (e.g.,
Inzlicht & Al-Khindi 2012; Knutson et al. 2008; Winkielman et al.
2005). Though Pessoa nicely highlights the neural and computa-
tional sophistication of “reward” processing, this analysis slightly
detracts from the fact that on a psychological, “person” level
such processing often leads to irrational pursuits and alienated
desires (Berridge 2003). Though addiction is often taken as a
best example of such irrational wanting, psychologically oriented
economists have highlighted a wealth of similar phenomena in
daily life (Loewenstein 2007).
Cognition without affect is powerless. Notice also that taking a
“separatist” perspective highlights key aspects of psychological
processes that would otherwise be missed. A low-level example
is that most animal learning research relies on the use of uncondi-
tioned stimuli and most unconditioned stimuli are emotive. This
research illustrates that learning rarely occurs without affective
input (though this point is not emphasized often enough in this re-
search literature; Panksepp 2011). A higher-level example is the
case of cognitive control – nicely discussed by Pessoa. To
remind, cognitive control refers to the mental processes that
allow behavior to vary adaptively from moment to moment, with
one of its core functions being to inhibit unwanted, yet dominant
response tendencies. Often seen as the paragon of higher cogni-
tion, recent evidence suggests that cognitive control is often
aided by emotion (e.g., Koban & Pourtois 2014; Shackman et al.
2011), with a recent model suggesting that control is initiated
when goal conﬂicts produce phasic twinges of negative affect
that not only focus attention but also energize goal-directed
behavior (Inzlicht & Legault 2014). Emotional change, according
to this view, is at the heart of control, and when emotion is
removed by misattributions (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi 2012), reap-
praisals (Hobson et al. 2014), or using pharmaceutical agents (Bar-
tholow et al. 2012), control becomes impotent. One thus gains a
deeper understanding of cognitive control when appreciating
some of the emotional ingredients that go into it. Such an under-
standing would not come into relief by labeling all phenomena as
cognitive, as has been in fashion lately. In fact, Pessoa does an ad-
mirable job rebalancing the neural picture, though perhaps at the
cost of blurring some crucial, heuristically useful distinctions.
Restoring the balance. In conclusion, the target article offers a
useful framework showing how cognition and emotion work to-
gether in the brain, clariﬁes imprecise understandings of such
terms as “low-road,” or “emotional brain,” and highlights the
role of emotion in supposedly cognitive functions. In our com-
mentary, we offered some insights from psychology that support
thinking about emotion and cognition as slightly different
beasts, and some fascinating phenomena that illustrate their strug-
gle. Curiously, in psychology, we currently have a problem of gra-
tuitous and imperialistic cognitivism. For example, a recent
analysis of the theorized process variables in the 2011 volume of
the primary journal of social psychology (JPSP Sections I and II)
found that cognitive explanatory variables were invoked almost
2.5 times as often as emotional explanatory variables, with
emotion process variables accounting for less than 23% of all phe-
nomena (Inzlicht et al. 2013). Given the view that emotion
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pervades most, if not all, of social life (Zajonc 2000), the ﬁnding
that emotion was invoked as a process variable in less than 25%
of all papers should raise concerns. According to some views,
which assume that any transformation of input is cognition (e.g.,
Lazarus 1984), there is now a “primacy of cognition,” with the dis-
tinctiveness of emotion being practically dismissed, reduced
completely to cognition by some writers (e.g. Duncan & Barrett
2007). As such, the target article and the excellent book bring a
welcome “balance to the force,” without reestablishing naïve di-
chotomies. We hope that our commentary can inspire some addi-
tional appreciation of how emotion, motivation, and cognition
interplay and sometimes separate in the mind and behavior.
Author’s Response
The cognitive-emotional amalgam
doi:10.1017/S0140525X14001083, e91
Luiz Pessoa
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.
pessoa@umd.edu
http://www.cognitionemotion.org
Abstract: In the précis to The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, I
summarize a framework for understanding the organization of
cognition and emotion in the brain. Here, I address six major
themes that emerged in the commentaries: (1) emotional
perception and automaticity; (2) the status of cognition and
emotion: together or separate? (3) evolutionary implications for
the understanding of emotion and cognition; (4) the diverse
forms of cognitive-emotional integration; (5) dual process
theories; and (6) functional diversity of brain regions/networks
and cognitive ontologies. The central argument is, again, that
cognition and emotion are so highly interactive, and indeed
integrated, that these two elements blend into a new amalgam.
R1. Affective perception
The commentaries by LoBue, Todd & Thompson,
Greening & Mather, and Vuilleumier discuss concepts
related to affective perception, including the perennial
question of automaticity.
The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (Pessoa 2013) speciﬁes
multiple mechanisms for affective modulation of visual pro-
cessing. LoBue also suggests that the ﬁeld should investi-
gate “multiple pathways” that imbue emotion-laden
stimuli with their properties. A particularly compelling
aspect of her work is that she seeks to devise experiments
that can unravel diverse sources of bias for emotionally
valenced stimuli, including both bottom-up-like and top-
down-like contributions.
Despite the “pluralistic” account of affective vision in the
book (Ch. 2–4 and 7), it missed an important component.
Todd & Thompson corrected this omission by describing
the contributions of the locus coeruleus to “affect-biased at-
tention,” as recently developed in the “biased attention via
norepinephrine” (BANE) model (Markovic et al. 2014).
Their point is important for a more general reason, too.
The goal of describing multiple mechanisms of affective at-
tention was to highlight that the ﬁeld needs to move past the
idea of “single structures” or even “single circuits.” The
omission of an important mechanism demonstrates that
the list is far from complete; it is likely that several additional
mechanisms play important roles in affective vision, too.
Vuilleumier, a major contributor to our understanding of
emotional perception, argues that it is time to move past
general questions like “Is emotional perception automatic?”
to speciﬁc, testable mechanistic questions, and that the pro-
posals we offered remain too abstract. Although it is true that
more mechanistic accounts are important for the ﬁeld to
advance further (for an exampleof a formal model, see
Grossberg et al. 2014), at this point of model development,
my goal was to describe a general (“abstract”) framework
that, if persuasive to others, would lend itself to further re-
ﬁnement. Somewhat ambitiously, the situation is analogous
to the description of the biased competition model (Desi-
mone & Duncan 1995), which had to await a few years
before more mechanistic notions of competition based on
receptive ﬁelds were developed based on subsequent empir-
ical data (Luck et al. 1997; Reynolds et al. 1999).
Greening & Mather discuss their arousal-biased com-
petition model (Mather & Sutherland 2011). The model
describes how arousing stimuli enhance perceptual pro-
cessing of other neutral stimuli. It thus clearly covers terri-
tory not addressed by the dual competition model (Ch. 7).
But one of the original goals of my proposal was to describe
how competition takes place when items have affective
and/or motivational signiﬁcance, including situations that
may involve both negative and positive items (Fig. R1).
This is something that is not addressed by the arousal-
biased completion model. For example, in a recent study,
we investigated the interactions between reward and
threat on brain and behavior during a visual discrimination
task (Hu et al. 2013). Reward was manipulated by linking
Figure R1. The dual competition model. Visual competition incorporates both affective and motivational factors, such that perception
will reﬂect the interplay of multiple “forces” that sculpt it. In the hypothetical examples here, both a negative-image distractor and a
reward-associated target inﬂuence perception. (A) Emotional images interfere with perception when the target item is positive but
relatively weak. (B) In contrast, when the target item is associated with high reward, it wins the competition and in this way may
reduce (or even eliminate) the deleterious impact of the negative image.
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the task-relevant stimulus categories (pictures of houses or
high-rise buildings) to reward or non-reward, whereas
threat was manipulated using task-irrelevant backgrounds
(of different colors) that were previously paired or unpaired
with aversive electrical stimulation. Behaviorally, an unspe-
ciﬁc effect of reward was observed: responses were faster
during reward versus non-reward conditions (say, detecting
houses when they were reward associated). More impor-
tant, a reward by threat interaction was detected: The
slowing of reaction time by irrelevant threat stimuli (dis-
criminating between house and building stimuli was
slowed when a background was a CS+) that was observed
during non-reward was eliminated during reward condi-
tions. Within the dual competition framework, the
reward-associated visual stimulus was thus able to more ef-
fectively compete with the background CS+ stimulus
(which itself was able to more effectively compete with
the no-reward stimulus category).
R2. The status of cognition and emotion: Together
or separate?
The Cognitive-Emotional Brain describes how cognition
and emotion go together, a notion that was welcomed
across several commentaries (see sect. R4 below).
However, some commentaries discussed contrasting view-
points that espouse greater autonomy for cognition and
emotion. According to these views, it is best to conceptual-
ize cognition and emotion as somewhat separate processes,
or even involving stronger separation in the mind-brain.
Winkielman, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones (Winkielman
et al.) endorse what they call a modern separatist ap-
proach. They provide examples of what they refer to as
affect and motivation with minimal cognition. More inter-
esting, to my mind, is their discussion of cognitive control –
“often seen as the paragon of higher cognition,” as they
say – and the tight link that it has with emotion. In particu-
lar, they discuss the framework of Inzlicht and Legault
(2014), who formulated the affect alarm model of self-
control. In this framework, affect is not a mere moderator
of control, nor a by-product of self-control. Instead, it is es-
sential to self-control and signals when control is needed by
amplifying the detection of conﬂict and producing the
urgency to conﬂict resolution. Steps in the direction of
uniting cognitive and affective aspects of control were pre-
viously taken by Botvinick (2007) in his attempt to link
conﬂict monitoring and decision making. Noting the impor-
tance of the anterior cingulate cortex to conﬂict monitoring,
on the one hand, and evaluating action outcomes and learn-
ing to avoid aversive events, on the other hand, he de-
scribed the outline of an initial “integrative account” in
which these processes are interrelated. More generally,
one of the most elaborate integrative accounts of anterior
cingulate cortex function was developed by Shackman
and colleagues (2011), who propose that the integration
of negative affect, pain, and cognitive control in this
region follows from anterior cingulate contributions to
adaptive control, as discussed by Shackman, Fox, &
Seminowicz (Shackman et al.).
Whereas I am sympathetic to Winkielman et al.’s sug-
gestion that there is a need to “restore the balance” in ac-
counts of behavior that favor cognition to the exclusion of
emotion, and vice versa, I am less certain about the need
to separate (even without dichotomizing) emotion and cog-
nition. But Winkielmanet al.’s position is certainly defensi-
ble and constitutes an alternative position to the mind-brain
than the one described in The Cognitive-Emotional Brain.
And as the ﬁeld evolves to describing howmultiple processes
interact during complex behaviors, the question of whether
they should be described as cognitive or emotional will
largely fade.
In contrast, Pascual-Leone, Pascual-Leone, & Arsali-
dou (Pascual-Leone et al.) adopt a traditional separatist
stance in conceptualizing emotion and cognition. One of
their chief arguments is that emotion is subjectively differ-
ent from cognition, an issue to which I turn next. I strongly
disagree, however, that the distinction between cognition
and emotion is one of “two sorts of value,” as they propose –
“truth” value for cognition and “vital” value for emotion – a
suggestion that is unlikely to move the ﬁeld forward.
Regarding the subjective difference between cognition
and emotion, it is instructive to consider how brain circuits
are linked to bodily states. For example, the central amygda-
la is at times viewed as a “controller of the brainstem” (Car-
dinal et al. 2002) and uses its widespread projections to the
hypothalamus and brainstem nuclei to coordinate behavio-
ral, autonomic, and neuroendocrine responses. Given the
effects of these structures on bodily states and the regula-
tion of the internal milieu, a more direct link with emotional
“felt states” is established. Furthermore, cortical regions, in-
cluding medial and orbital frontal sectors, as well as the
insula, are strongly interconnected with brain regions in
the basal forebrain, midbrain, and hindbrain that can
directly affect bodily states, and be affected by them
(Pessoa 2013, Ch. 9). If researchers choose to call processes
more directly linked to bodily states “emotional,” this would
seem reasonable, as long as they also emphasize that such
processes are strongly coordinated with others that have a
less direct impact on body states. Broadly, this “emotion-
cognition” coordination is always present.
Montemayor also espouses a separatist view of emotion
and cognition. He misquotes me as saying that emotion is
often “dumb,” and suggests that cognition requires inferen-
tial and conceptual capacities. But if we consider the frame-
works by Botvinick (2007) and by Shackman and colleagues
(2011) summarized above, for example, such description is
misleading. To put it plainly: How can emotion be dumb if
it is part of cognition (say, cognitive control)? Even more
troubling, Montemayor suggests that there is a “deep
kind of dissociation between emotion and cognition,” ven-
turing as far as stating that it is a “normative kind of disso-
ciation.” But to argue in favor of a normative distinction is
to embrace the very dichotomy that even Montemayor ac-
knowledges can be simplistic!
R3. Evolution: Implications for the understanding
of emotion and cognition
Dobzhansky famously titled a paper, “Nothing in biology
makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky
1973). This is a blessing and a curse, however, because ad
hoc evolutionary “explanations” are all too frequent.
Here, I will discuss some of the Commentaries that
discuss evolution in a way that I found problematic.
Pascual-Leone et al. suggest that an important differ-
ence between emotion and cognition is that emotion
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(they use the term affect to refer to a concept that is dichot-
omous with cognition) has innate-instinctual, evolutionary
roots. In contrast, cognitions are always situation-bound
and hence cannot be innate. But this argument runs the
risk of suggesting that emotion has deep evolutionary
roots for survival, while cognition runs atop and reﬁnes
the “lower” level depending on context. Instead, the
entire brain must be understood in evolutionary terms,
not just emotion/motivation. A more appealing and power-
ful view is described by Pezzulo, Barca, & Friston
(Pezzulo et al.), whose evolutionary perspective is one
that “implies that the very fabric of cognition – from its an-
cestral origins to the most modern and sophisticated skills –
is inextricably linked to utility, adaptivity, and
meaningfulness.”
Another problematic line of reasoning is described by
Montemayor, who subscribes to antiquated notions of
an old emotional system that is autonomous. The brain
has, of course, old systems. However, these do not exist
within a “layered” architecture, with newer structures
added on top of old ones, such that the ones on top
control the ones at the bottom (cf. the triune brain). I
would argue that evolutionary changes to brain circuits
are such that “new” systems are embedded within “old”
ones. This interweaving creates a web of functional and
structural coupling in a way that blurs “old” and “new”
(Fig. R2; see also discussion in sect. R3.4). To motivate
this perspective, it is relevant to consider a network per-
spective of the relationship between function and structure
in the brain – structure-function mappings (Ch. 8; Pessoa
2014 and associated commentary). More important, the ar-
chitecture of the brain includes extensive avenues for signal
communicating, in general, and cognitive-emotional inter-
actions, in particular. Two particularly interesting examples
are those of the hypothalamus and the amygdala (Ch. 9).
R3.1. Hypothalamus
Historically, the hypothalamus has been conceptualized in
terms of “descending” systems, such as when described as
the “head ganglion” of the autonomic nervous system.
However important the hypothalamus may be for descend-
ing control, though, a signiﬁcant recent insight is that the
mammalian cerebral cortex and the hypothalamus share
massive bidirectional connections. Whereas hypothalamic
contributions to descending control of bodily functions
are well documented, its contributions to ascending pro-
cessing are poorly understood. Notably, the hypothalamus
has widespread projections to all sectors of prefrontal
cortex (Rempel-Clower & Barbas 1998). Given the role
of the hypothalamus as a critical component of the
central autonomic nervous system, this pattern of connec-
tivity implies that the hypothalamus has the ability to inﬂu-
ence processing throughout prefrontal cortex. Notably, this
includes lateral prefrontal cortex, which is important for
cognitive function.
R3.2. Amygdala
A remarkable property of the primate amygdala is its
massive interconnection with cortex. Indeed, as many as
1,000 separate cortical and subcortical pathways may exist
(Petrovich et al. 2001). The connectivity is all the more
notable given that it involves all cortical lobes, as well as
subcortex. Combined, these properties indicate that the
amygdala is an extensively interconnected connector
hub –where a hub is a region with a high degree of connec-
tivity. Furthermore, in a network analysis by Modha and
Singh (2010), several amygdala nuclei (e.g., lateral
nucleus, accessory basal nucleus) were identiﬁed as part
of a “core” brain circuit, all of whose regions have extremely
high connectivity. Together, these ﬁndings reveal that
the amygdala has exceptional potential for signal
communication.
The pattern of connectivity between the amygdala and
prefrontal cortex (Amaral & Price 1984; Ghashghaei et al.
2007) is of particular interest given the latter’s role in cog-
nitive functions. In one study, although the amygdala was
estimated to be directly connected to approximately 40%
of prefrontal regions, approximately 90% of prefrontal
cortex was deemed capable of receiving amygdala signals
after a single additional connection within prefrontal
cortex (Averbeck & Seo 2008). This “one-step” property se-
riously undermines the notion that “affective” signals are
conﬁned to orbital and medial prefrontal territories.
Other notable aspects of amygdala connectivity include in-
teractions between the amygdala and the basal forebrain
that are important for attentional functions (Ch. 2), and
Figure R2. Brain evolution. (A) Layered brain evolution where
newer structures/circuits are added atop older ones. (B)
Embedded brain evolution where newer structures/circuits are
integrated with older ones, thus expanding the functional
repertoire of older regions. Multiple types of integration are
possible, including “looped circuits,” widespread inﬂuences with
both “descending” and “ascending” components, as well as
projection systems from older structures that modulate newer
ones. Basal ganglia refer to regions at the base of the brain;
pallium refers to developmental structures that are precursors
to cortex. Panels adapted with permission from Butler (2009)
and originally based on MacLean (1990). (C) Hypothalamic
ascending connectivity illustrating how old and new brain parts
interact, thus integrating diverse types of signals. Summary of
four major pathways from the hypothalamus to the cerebral
cortex on a ﬂattened representation of the rat brain. The “basal
ganglia” refer to the basal forebrain and the amygdala complex.
Note that one of the indirect connections ﬁrst descends to the
brainstem. Key: BG: basal ganglia; BS: brainstem; CTX: cortex;
HY: hypothalamus; TH: thalamus. Reproduced with permission
from Risold et al. (1997).
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substantial projections from the amygdala to visual cortex
that inﬂuence competition in visual cortex (Ch. 7).
R3.3. Beyond immediate structural substrates:
Functional connectivity
The interweaving of “old” and “new” circuits is not only
created by structural pathways but by functional interac-
tions, too.
At a ﬁrst glance, the notion of an architecture anchored on
physical connections is clear-cut. However, the boundary
between anatomy and function becomes blurred very
quickly once one starts considering factors that characterize
the anatomy (Lee et al. 2003): for example, the laminar
proﬁle of the connections (often interpreted in terms of
“modulatory” vs. “driving” inputs), the presence of excitatory
or inhibitory interneurons, the strength of the connection,
and so on. Thus, understanding how regions and networks
contribute to brain function requires identifying the way
regions are “functionally connected,” where functional con-
nectivity can be deﬁned as the “temporal correlation
between spatially remote neurophysiological events”
(Friston et al. 1997), regardless of their anatomical connec-
tivity. The relationship between structural and functional
connectivity is a complex one (Ch. 8). For example, in prin-
ciple, responses in two regions could be perfectly correlated
(barring, say, noise) as a result of common inputs. They also
could be perfectly correlated, yet having the effect be entirely
mediated via an intermediate region.
What determines functional connectivity if structural
connectivity does not always determine it? Adachi et al.
(2012) compared existing data on structural connectivity
in macaques and functional connectivity obtained during
MRI scanning of macaques under anesthesia. They ana-
lyzed the effect of different types of indirect structural con-
nections on functional connectivity. Remarkably, functional
connectivity between pairs of regions without a direct cor-
ticocortical connection depended more strongly on
whether two regions (A and B) had common inputs and
outputs (A←C→B; A→C←B) than on whether there was
stepwise information ﬂow between them (A→C→B).
Adachi and colleagues thus proposed that functional con-
nectivity depends more strongly on network level than on
pairwise interactions. See also Mantini et al. (2011).
To summarize, the previous sections on the amygdala,
hypothalamus, and functional connectivity were aimed at il-
lustrating how a network perspective, together with knowl-
edge about structural and functional connectivity, is
compatible with the notion that “new” brain circuits and
systems are embedded within “old” ones. If this view is
correct, the idea of a layered architecture, with newer
structures added on top of, and in control of, old ones
must be discarded.
R3.4. Neuroevolutionary perspective
Bos, Brummelman, & Terburg (Bos et al.) correctly
point out that a weaknesses of the book is that it lacks a neu-
roevolutionary approach in describing brain function. I
hope to remedy this in future treatments of brain architec-
ture, structure-function mappings, and cognitive-emotional
interactions. But, I disagree with Boset al. when they
propose that, from an evolutionary perspective, “cognition
can be seen as the tip of the emotional iceberg.” This is an
unfortunate metaphor because it, once again, perpetuates
the “layered” view of brain evolution (MacLean 1990). A
traditional view is that cortex is a late addition to the
brain plan and that it controls subcortex. Indeed, the idea
of cortical inhibition of subcortex has a long history
dating to early researchers, such as Hughlings-Jackson
(see Parvizi 2009). But what is the basic plan of the verte-
brate brain? It is now understood that both cortex and sub-
cortex are part of the plan. Figure R3 shows a proposed
brain “archetype” by Striedter (2005).
What do we know about the evolution of some “emotional”
regions? The amygdala of mammals is composed of more
than a dozen subregions. Chareyron and colleagues (2011)
found that the lateral, basal, and accessory basal subregions
are dramatically more “developed” in monkeys than in rats
(based on morphological characteristics, such as cell counts
and the volume of subregions). One possibility, as described
by the authors, is that the differences between rats and
monkeys are linked to their degree of connectivity with
other brain structures, in line with the proposal of correlated
evolution between components of functional systems (Barton
&Harvey 2000). The lateral, basal, and accessory basal nuclei
are more developed in primates than in rodents, and parallel
the greater development of the cortical areas with which
these nuclei are interconnected in primates. Chareyron and
colleagues (2011) propose that such correlated evolution
may be responsible for a higher convergence and integration
of information in the primate amygdala, and that the relative
development of these amygdala nuclei might be inﬂuenced
by their interconnections with other brain structures –
namely, their afferent and efferent connections (Amaral
et al. 1992).
To sum up, an evolutionary perspective to brain function
is absolutely needed, as suggested by Bos et al. But I dis-
agree with them when they suggest that, in terms of evolu-
tion, the network perspective that I adopt runs into
problems when faced with amygdala heterogeneity (i.e.,
multiple subregions). This is far from being the case. For
example, the lateral and central amygdala, while strongly
interrelated territories, are parts of different brain circuits
that have had different evolutionary trajectories. Thus, I
describe in Chapter 3 how the amygdala mobilizes both
brain (via the lateral amygdala) and the body (via the
central amygdala).
R4. Manifold forms of cognitive-emotion
integration
Several of the commentators were enthusiastic about a
framework in which cognition and emotion are strongly in-
teractive and provided particular examples of the explana-
tory power of the interaction/integration framework.
Foster & Keane suggested that the emotion of surprise
constitutes a good example of when emotion and cognition
are interdependent. Manfrinati suggests that an integra-
tion stance leads to proposals of the brain bases of moral
processing that are more closely aligned with those by
Moll and colleagues (2005; 2008a) instead of the dichoto-
mist formulation by Greene (Greene et al. 2001). Accord-
ing to Manfrinati, moral judgment is the product of
complex interactions between emotional and cognitive
mechanisms. Egidi discusses how integration plays a role
in understanding the impact of happy and sad moods on
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discourse and sentence comprehension. Verweij & Senior
discuss potential implications of cognitive-emotional inte-
gration for the social sciences, broadly deﬁned, and in par-
ticular, implications for theorizing within economics,
political science, sociology, and anthropology. Petrolini
argues that the integration framework described in the
book can be successfully applied to psychopathology and,
in particular, to the reasoning of delusional subjects. Gar-
diner discusses cognition-emotion integration in the
context of music. Kiverstein & Miller suggest that inte-
gration is important for the understanding of the human
social brain. Olds & Marewski suggest that cognitive-
emotional integration needs to be taken seriously by
those building formal/computational models of “cognitive
architectures,” which as the name implies, largely ignore af-
fective components. Froese proposes that the framework
of The Cognitive-Emotional Brain should inform enactive
approaches in the cognitive sciences. Indeed, I found his
suggestion of extending the notion of functional connectiv-
ity and context dependency to include bodily and environ-
mental dynamics fascinating and very worthwhile of
investigation.
R5. Dual process theories
Kiverstein & Miller suggest that the framework of The
Cognitive-Emotional Brain challenges dual process theo-
ries of cognition in general. This is a theme that pervades
much of the book. For example, Chapter 4 discusses the
notions of automatic and controlled processes and argues
instead for a gradient of processing efﬁciency.
Common to all dual process models is the strong as-
sumption of the existence of two qualitatively different
mental systems, for example, “intuition” and “reasoning”
(for a lucid discussion, see Keren & Schul 2009). A
common practice is to call the two components “System
1” and “System 2,” where the ﬁrst is automatic/heuristic/re-
ﬂexive and the second is controlled/analytic/reﬂective
(Evans 2008). But as others have expressed in the past,
the idea of a dual system model is both slippery and con-
ceptually unclear (Keren & Schul 2009). For one thing,
nearly all dual process models have as a central component
the automatic versus controlled dichotomy, which is not a
viable distinction, as discussed in The Cognitive-Emotional
Brain.
As with the question of automatic versus controlled pro-
cessing of emotion-laden visual stimuli (Ch. 4), the question
of whether there are two systems in dual process models is
not an entirely empirical one. This is because no single crit-
ical experiment can provide a ﬁnal, deﬁnitive answer. In the
end, however irresistible dichotomies are to the human
mind (Kelso & Engstrøm 2006; Newell 1973), dichotomiz-
ing implies oversimplifying (Keren & Schul 2009; Kruglan-
ski et al. 2006). A continuous framework is better, albeit
more complex (Kruglanski et al. 2006).
R6. Functional diversity of brain regions and
networks, and cognitive ontologies
Kiverstein & Miller suggest that the integration frame-
work of The Cognitive-Emotional Brain has implications
for understanding so-called “cognitive ontologies.” Indeed,
Figure R3. Basic plan of the vertebrate brain. Reproduced with permission (Striedter 2005).
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this is a theme that I have brieﬂy addressed in recent papers
(see Pessoa 2014).
If brain regions are engaged in many processes based on
the networks they are afﬁliated with in particular contexts,
they should be engaged by a range of tasks. As described
in the Précis, we recently (Anderson et al. 2013) character-
ized the function of brain regions in a multidimensional
manner via their functional ﬁngerprint (Passingham et al.
2002). Activations were classiﬁed in terms of task
domains chosen to represent a range of mental processes,
including perception, action, emotion, and cognition. The
functional ﬁngerprint for a given region thus represented
both the set of domains that systematically engaged the
region and the relative degree of engagement (see
Fig. 13 of target article). Based on ﬁngerprints, we calculat-
ed a diversity index to summarize the degree of functional
diversity across the brain (see Fig. 14 of target article). The
ﬁngerprint concept was extended to brain networks, pro-
viding a way to compare them and to advance our under-
standing of the properties of constituent nodes.
Our ﬁndings showed that brain regions – and, importantly,
large-scale networks – are very diverse functionally (see also
Poldrack 2006; 2011). Beyond the descriptive aspects of the
approach, it outlines a framework in which a region’s func-
tion is viewed as inherently multidimensional: a vector
deﬁnes the ﬁngerprint of a region in the context of a speciﬁc
domain structure. Although the domain that we explored
used a task classiﬁcation scheme from an existing database,
it was not the only one possible. How should one deﬁne
the domain structure? One hope is that cognitive ontologies
can be deﬁned that meaningfully carve the “mental” into
stable categories (Bilder et al. 2009; Price & Friston 2005).
However, I believe that no single ontology will be sufﬁcient.
Instead, it is better to conceive of several task domains that
are useful and complementary in characterizing brain func-
tion and/or behavior. Thus, a region’s functional ﬁngerprint
needs to be understood in terms of a family of (possibly
related) domains.
R7. What form of cognitive-emotional brain is
better?
Views of the framework advocated in The Cognitive-Emo-
tional Brain were mixed. Most commentators praised the
integration framework and suggested that they may have
implications in many related domains – even to the social
sciences more generally. But some questioned the pro-
posed form of interaction/integration between cognition
and emotion and, in some cases, argued against it.
Perhaps such state of affairs is not surprising in the end.
Emotion “feels” different from cognition. These mental
states and associated processes also appear, at ﬁrst blush,
to be subserved by fairly independent brain regions and cir-
cuits. Yet, when we consider the available neuroscientiﬁc
data, attempts to characterize regions as either “emotional”
or “cognitive” quickly break down. An architecture of rich
interconnectivity leads to a structure-function mapping
that is both one-to-many and many-to-one. Ultimately,
looking at the brain from the perspective of one brain
region at a time is bound to produce a highly distorted
and, more critically, impoverished description of the
brain. What is required is a framework where cognition
and emotion are highly interactive, as I have argued in
The Cognitive-Emotional Brain.
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